Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potentially malicious command execution (RCE) originating from AI orchestration platforms and development runtimes (such as Ollama, LangChain, AutoGen, CrewAI, n8n, Node.js, and Python). It flags instances where these processes spawn command shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, bash, sh) and execute suspicious command-line patterns indicative of code injection or command execution (e.g., eval(), exec(), subprocess, child_process). The rule uses a threshold of 3 or more occurrences in a 15-minute window per device and process to reduce noise.
Detects command-line activity indicative of attempts to disable, bypass, uninstall, or interfere with the Netskope security agent functionality on an endpoint.
Detects the execution of LOLBins (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, wscript) directly spawned from common web browsers (explorer, chrome, edge, firefox) with command-line arguments indicative of malicious activity, such as base64-encoded commands, hidden window styles, or remote script download and execution.
The following analytic detects modification of the PYTHONPATH environment variable in conjunction with a package installation process.
Python looks up the `sys.path` variable, which is generated by combining user and site folders with `.pth` files and the value of the PYTHONPATH environment variable, to determine which directories to use for importing modules.
If an adversary is able to control the value of PYTHONPATH, they can point it to an attacker-controlled directory and hijack imported packages, achieving user-level persistence across future Python invocations and new shell sessions.
If confirmed malicious, this could result in arbitrary code execution every time Python is invoked by the affected user.
Python looks up the `sys.path` variable, which is generated by combining user and site folders with `.pth` files and the value of the PYTHONPATH environment variable, to determine which directories to use for importing modules.
If an adversary is able to control the value of PYTHONPATH, they can point it to an attacker-controlled directory and hijack imported packages, achieving user-level persistence across future Python invocations and new shell sessions.
If confirmed malicious, this could result in arbitrary code execution every time Python is invoked by the affected user.
Detects the execution of administrative or system-modifying tools (e.g., bash, sh, chroot, mount) or suspicious command lines involving root-level path manipulation or capability inspection (capsh) initiated by office applications, sandbox host processes, or specialized Excel engines. This behavior is indicative of a potential container breakout, privilege escalation, or post-exploitation activity originating from an initial access vector.
Detects execution of processes that reference suspicious Windows API functions related to token manipulation or process injection, specifically when initiated by critical system processes like svchost.exe or lsass.exe. This activity often indicates attempts at credential access or privilege escalation.
This rule detects potential webshell activity by monitoring the correlation between web server processes spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, rundll32.exe) and the creation of executable or script files within identified web directories. The logic establishes a high-confidence correlation when both events occur on the same device within a 15-minute window, while also surfacing uncorrelated individual process spawns or suspicious file writes as lower-confidence indicators. It includes exclusions for known administrative and deployment processes to reduce noise.
Linux su Login Shell Invocation
Cortex XDR
Detects the invocation of the 'su' command with a login-shell style argument (e.g., 'su -'), which is used to switch user contexts and potentially elevate privileges.
This rule detects the use of the Frida dynamic instrumentation toolkit and the objection framework, specifically searching for command-line arguments and process names associated with their installation or use, as well as network activity on the default Frida server port (27042). It monitors for activities like SSL pinning bypass, mobile application patching, and remote agent deployment.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized command-line activity originating from Power Platform-related execution environments (such as Copilot Studio or Power Platform sandboxes). It specifically monitors for the execution of common system administration binaries like cmd, powershell, or curl, which, when triggered from within a low-code/cloud runtime environment, may indicate a sandbox escape or an attempt to interact with the underlying host operating system.
Potential exploitation of JetBrains TeamCity (Unauthenticated RCE, CVE-2026-63077) looking for suspicious child processes spawned by TeamCity services.
Detects instances where AI coding assistants (e.g., Cursor, Claude, Copilot) are observed interacting with specific configuration or sensitive files and subsequently initiating suspicious shell commands. The rule correlates file read activity (containing keywords like 'skill', 'preflight', '.ssh', or '.aws') followed closely by execution of potentially malicious commands like 'whoami /priv', credential decoding, or registry exploration, indicating potential abuse of the assistant's context.
This rule monitors process execution events and correlates them against a watchlist of known malicious or suspicious binary names, such as crypto-miners, unauthorized remote access tools, or renamed system utilities (LOLBins) being executed from suspicious locations.
This rule detects the suspicious execution of the psql.exe command-line client interacting with the Veeam Backup database. It specifically monitors for attempts to query database tables containing sensitive user_name and password information, often correlated with WMI or encoded PowerShell execution, which suggests an attempt to extract credentials from backup software.
Detects the execution of Python or Pythonw processes with command-line arguments that include base64 decoding followed by the exec() function. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to execute obfuscated or encoded malicious code directly in memory to evade detection.
This rule detects the use of 'osascript' on macOS to generate a fake credential prompt dialog. It specifically looks for AppleScript commands containing keywords such as 'display dialog', 'password', and either 'with hidden answer' or 'Enter your password'. This behavior is characteristic of an adversary attempting to phish user credentials by presenting a legitimate-looking prompt.
This rule detects suspicious activity originating from an Internet Information Services (IIS) worker process (w3wp.exe) associated with Microsoft SharePoint. It monitors for the spawning of common command-line shells, interpreters, or Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) from the SharePoint IIS worker process, which is a potential indicator of Remote Code Execution (RCE) exploitation, specifically targeting vulnerabilities like the hypothetical CVE-2026-45659.
This rule detects attempts to disable, stop, or uninstall various security products, including antivirus and EDR solutions, by monitoring command-line activity for administrative utilities like sc.exe, net.exe, wmic.exe, and PowerShell.
This rule detects sequences of suspicious process activity where multiple known LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) execute in a chain. Specifically, it monitors for scenarios where a process from a predefined list (e.g., msdt.exe, mmc.exe, rundll32.exe) initiates another process from the same list, often indicative of proxy execution or privilege escalation techniques involving suspicious command-line parameters like '-embedding', 'NtLoadDriver', or '/i:'.
This rule detects potentially malicious PowerShell activity characterized by the co-occurrence of file download indicators (such as Invoke-WebRequest, WebClient, or UserAgent strings) and file execution or staging commands (such as IEX, Expand-Archive, or Copy-Item) within the same command line. It is designed to identify ingress tool transfer and command-line execution patterns often associated with post-exploitation or malware staging, while reducing noise by requiring both download and operational intent.
This rule detects sequences of suspicious process activity where multiple known LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) execute in a chain. Specifically, it monitors for scenarios where a process from a predefined list (e.g., msdt.exe, mmc.exe, rundll32.exe) initiates another process from the same list, often indicative of proxy execution or privilege escalation techniques involving suspicious command-line parameters like '-embedding', 'NtLoadDriver', or '/i:'.
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