Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

20,501 detections

Detects a shell spawned by Claude.app or Cursor.app with the --allow-dangerously-skip-permissions flag, indicating the coding agent's safety/permission prompts have been bypassed, widening the blast radius of subsequent agent-driven commands.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
8115
Detects efforts to clear Windows Event Logs using PowerShell (Clear-EventLog, EventLogSession.ClearLog) or wevtutil.exe (cl, clear-log). This behavior is characteristic of anti-forensic activities performed by ransomware like Nova to impede incident response and investigation efforts.
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Brandon Rodriguez@BMRodriguez
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Federal Signal Detections
3 months ago
405
Detects the creation of a file named 'NF-eletronica.txt' that contains the text 'Documento indisponivel' via cmd.exe. This pattern is indicative of a security researcher or adversary deploying a canary or decoy file to monitor for unauthorized access or to plant deceptive content.
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Subhankar H@Andrewsec57
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
3017
Detects unauthorized modifications to the SAM registry hive (specifically keys and values related to user account RIDs) by non-system processes, which is a technique used in RID hijacking to grant elevated privileges or create hidden accounts.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
3 months ago
405
Detects Windows system binaries and commonly abused native LOLBins executing from outside their expected system directories, indicating a renamed, relocated, or imposter copy consistent with masquerading, DLL side-loading staging, or process-name spoofing.
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Collin Lairamore@Bollinmore
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
002
This rule detects the execution of 'cmd.exe' when it is spawned by a process that is not part of a common list of authorized parent processes. This behavior is often indicative of potential malicious activity, as adversaries may attempt to spawn shells from unexpected applications to maintain persistence, execute secondary payloads, or perform lateral movement.
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Emiliano Mema@Nosalva
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
001
Detects suspicious command-line activity originating from TeamCity service processes on Windows. The rule looks for unexpected child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, curl.exe) initiated by the TeamCity server or associated Java processes, which may indicate exploitation of an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
008
This rule detects the use of the Windows certutil.exe utility with flags commonly abused by adversaries for file downloads (-urlcache, -urlfetch) or file deobfuscation/decoding (-decode, -decodehex, -encode). It specifically targets LOLBIN (Living Off the Land Binary) behavior by monitoring process command line arguments, while providing allowances for common administrative tasks like PKI maintenance or CRL/OCSP updates to minimize false positives.
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Montaser Ismail@M0nt3x
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
709
This rule detects potentially malicious command execution (RCE) originating from AI orchestration platforms and development runtimes (such as Ollama, LangChain, AutoGen, CrewAI, n8n, Node.js, and Python). It flags instances where these processes spawn command shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, bash, sh) and execute suspicious command-line patterns indicative of code injection or command execution (e.g., eval(), exec(), subprocess, child_process). The rule uses a threshold of 3 or more occurrences in a 15-minute window per device and process to reduce noise.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
3 months ago
006
Detects command-line activity indicating an attempt to extract generic passwords from Google Chrome or Brave browser credential storage, often associated with tools that access the 'Safe Storage' or similar password databases.
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Emiliano Mema@Nosalva
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
6011
This rule detects suspicious activity originating from an Internet Information Services (IIS) worker process (w3wp.exe) associated with Microsoft SharePoint. It monitors for the spawning of common command-line shells, interpreters, or Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) from the SharePoint IIS worker process, which is a potential indicator of Remote Code Execution (RCE) exploitation, specifically targeting vulnerabilities like the hypothetical CVE-2026-45659.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
3 months ago
6010
This rule detects potentially malicious activity leveraging the Windows Certutil utility for downloading, decoding, and executing files or payloads. It monitors process command line arguments to identify common download flags, hex/base64 decoding operations, evasion techniques, and interaction with high-risk file types or directories. The rule calculates a severity score based on the combination of these behaviors, such as downloading and decoding a file, or executing content from a temporary directory.
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Christopher Scott@Scocha
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
6022
This rule detects attempts to disable, stop, or uninstall various security products, including antivirus and EDR solutions, by monitoring command-line activity for administrative utilities like sc.exe, net.exe, wmic.exe, and PowerShell.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
3 months ago
7013
Detects the execution of administrative or system-modifying tools (e.g., bash, sh, chroot, mount) or suspicious command lines involving root-level path manipulation or capability inspection (capsh) initiated by office applications, sandbox host processes, or specialized Excel engines. This behavior is indicative of a potential container breakout, privilege escalation, or post-exploitation activity originating from an initial access vector.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
706
Detects instances where a VS Code or similar IDE process launches suspicious child processes (Python or temporary executables) shortly after an extension installation or modification event, followed by an outbound network connection to a .workers.dev domain. This behavior is indicative of a malicious IDE extension establishing an interactive command and control (C2) channel or exfiltrating data.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
3 months ago
509
Detects attempts to clear or manipulate the shell command history (e.g., bash) using specific commands often utilized by attackers to conceal their activities. The detection monitors for commands such as deleting specific history entries, redirecting history output to /dev/null, or using escape sequences to clear the terminal buffer.
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Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
6014
Detects the macOS security CLI dumping the Claude Code OAuth credential item from Keychain (find-generic-password -w targeting 'Claude Code-credentials') by a process other than Claude Code itself, indicating credential theft targeting the coding agent's stored token.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
7012
No description available.
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Kaung Khant Ko@kaungkhantko
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
6013
Detects the execution of LOLBins (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, wscript) directly spawned from common web browsers (explorer, chrome, edge, firefox) with command-line arguments indicative of malicious activity, such as base64-encoded commands, hidden window styles, or remote script download and execution.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
9111
Detects curl reusing a captured cookie jar (-b /tmp/lhr_c) against a known tunnel domain, indicating session-cookie replay to hijack an authenticated session exposed via a reverse tunnel.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
4011
Detects pgrep enumerating ngrok, cloudflared, or ssh processes from within a Claude Code or Cursor coding-agent session, indicating discovery of existing tunnel/remote-access tooling as part of an agent-driven attack chain.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
3 months ago
4011
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