Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
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This rule identifies non-Microsoft processes (based on file name, file company name, and process signer) that initiate network connections to known Microsoft authentication endpoints. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary-controlled process attempting to leverage cloud services or perform authentication-related activities outside of expected system or productivity software.
Detects Apple-signed python/python3 or osascript referencing the same /tmp/*.js file path twice in one command line (drop-then-execute), indicating LOLBin abuse to stage and immediately re-run a JavaScript payload from a world-writable directory.
Detects Visual Studio Code or Node.js processes checking for common CI/CD environment variables (such as GITHUB_ACTIONS, JENKINS_HOME, or GITPOD_WORKSPACE_ID) or specifically testing for the existence of CI environments via 'process.env.CI'. This behavior is characteristic of malicious extensions attempting to identify if they are running within a sandboxed CI/CD build environment to potentially evade detection or adjust their payload delivery.
This rule detects potential multi-stage desktop takeover attacks by monitoring sequences of process execution within a 5-minute window. It looks for initial shell (explorer.exe or cmd.exe) spawning script-based tools (mshta.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe) with suspicious command-line arguments (extensions like .lnk, .url, .hta, or PowerShell-specific artifacts like 'IEX', 'DownloadString', or '-enc'). This is immediately followed by a secondary stage where PowerShell, cmd, or rundll32 are used to load external DLLs, register modules via regsvr32, or interact with AppData/Local/Temp directories, indicative of payload staging and execution.
Detects instances where a VS Code or similar IDE process launches suspicious child processes (Python or temporary executables) shortly after an extension installation or modification event, followed by an outbound network connection to a .workers.dev domain. This behavior is indicative of a malicious IDE extension establishing an interactive command and control (C2) channel or exfiltrating data.
Detects the DOUBLECUP/ClickFix loader activity which involves a sequence of suspicious command-line execution patterns. The rule correlates three specific behaviors occurring within a 5-minute window: finding PowerShell paths using 'where', searching for the 'ZZ1984' marker using 'findstr', and executing a minimized background command process. This combination is highly indicative of the ClickFix delivery chain used to trick users into running malicious commands.
This rule detects suspicious process execution chains where common web application servers (gunicorn, uwsgi, celery) spawn command-line utilities (bash, sh, curl, wget, python3) containing strings indicative of Python object inspection or class pollution. This pattern is commonly associated with attempts to exploit server-side vulnerabilities for remote code execution or post-exploitation activities.
Detects curl POSTing hardcoded username/password-style credentials to a /login endpoint on a known tunnel domain (ngrok, Cloudflare Quick Tunnel, or localhost.run), indicating credential submission to an attacker-exposed tunnel endpoint.
This rule detects the execution of scripts or processes containing command-line arguments indicative of a cryptocurrency wallet drainer (e.g., 'DRAIN', 'DRAIN_PCT') targeting specific cryptocurrencies (bitcoin, ethereum, etc.). These scripts are commonly used by threat actors to exfiltrate funds from victim crypto wallets.
Detects python.exe executing from unusual locations (AppData, Temp, or ProgramData directories) that subsequently establish outbound network connections, consistent with DeviceManager RAT behavior delivered via the DOUBLECUP loader.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation through the abuse of a debug backdoor in the Wacom WTabletServiceISD service. It identifies when the 'PowerT' registry value is set for the service, followed shortly by the service spawning a command shell (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) under SYSTEM privileges. It specifically excludes scenarios where AutoAdminLogon is enabled, which might otherwise trigger false positives.
Detects potential credential theft attempts targeting macOS Keychain. It identifies the use of the 'security' utility with commands like 'dump-keychain' or 'find-generic-password' and monitors for unauthorized processes accessing files within the 'Library/Keychains' directory.
This rule detects execution of macOS processes that contain specific strings associated with cryptocurrency wallet-draining malware (e.g., 'DRAIN_PCT', 'DRAIN_FUNCTION'). It monitors process creation command-line arguments to identify attempts by malicious software to execute functions intended to empty victim crypto wallets.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities such as vssadmin, wbadmin, wmic, diskshadow, and bcdedit to delete volume shadow copies, backup catalogs, or modify boot configuration to prevent system recovery. The rule explicitly excludes designated backup servers to reduce noise from legitimate management activities.
Detects a decrypted Keychain dump (security dump-keychain -d) spawned from a Cursor/coding-agent process with output filtered for Linear, MCP, or OAuth-related strings, indicating targeted credential theft of MCP/Linear integration tokens.
Detects execution of a 'setup.mjs' preinstall lifecycle hook, the stage-1 loader used in the
4 August 2026 compromise of the keyv and cacheable npm namespaces. The trojanised package.json
adds "preinstall": "node setup.mjs" while leaving dist/ byte-identical to the last clean
release, so the only execution-time signal is the hook itself. The loader downloads a
standalone Bun runtime and executes an obfuscated second stage (Math_Symbol.js).
4 August 2026 compromise of the keyv and cacheable npm namespaces. The trojanised package.json
adds "preinstall": "node setup.mjs" while leaving dist/ byte-identical to the last clean
release, so the only execution-time signal is the hook itself. The loader downloads a
standalone Bun runtime and executes an obfuscated second stage (Math_Symbol.js).
This detection identifies instances where a Microsoft Office application (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, or Outlook) spawns a child process commonly associated with script execution or living-off-the-land binary (LOLBin) abuse — including wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe, regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe, certutil.exe, and bitsadmin.exe.
This behavior is a well-known indicator of malicious macro or embedded-object execution following a phishing lure: a victim opens a weaponized document, and a macro (or OLE/DDE object) launches a script interpreter or LOLBin to download, decode, or execute a second-stage payload. Office applications rarely need to spawn these processes during legitimate use, making this a high-fidelity pivot point for detecting initial access and user-execution activity.
Rationale
Office applications spawning script hosts or command interpreters is atypical for normal document/spreadsheet/presentation workflows.
Threat actors frequently abuse Office macros (VBA), DDE, or OLE objects as an initial access vector, then use LOLBins to evade detection and blend in with legitimate system activity.
Tools like mshta.exe, certutil.exe, and bitsadmin.exe are commonly abused for downloading and executing remote payloads while evading traditional AV/EDR signatures.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Technique Tactic
T1566 (Phishing) Initial Access
T1204 (User Execution) / T1204.002 (Malicious File) Execution
T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter) Execution
T1218 (System Binary Proxy Execution) — e.g. T1218.005 Mshta, T1218.010 Regsvr32, T1218.011 Rundll32 Defense Evasion
T1197 (BITS Jobs) Defense Evasion, Persistence
T1140 (Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) — via certutil Defense Evasion
Data Source
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — DeviceProcessEvents
Logic Summary
Flags process creation events over the last 30 days where:
The initiating (parent) process is winword.exe, excel.exe, powerpnt.exe, or outlook.exe, and
The spawned (child) process i
This behavior is a well-known indicator of malicious macro or embedded-object execution following a phishing lure: a victim opens a weaponized document, and a macro (or OLE/DDE object) launches a script interpreter or LOLBin to download, decode, or execute a second-stage payload. Office applications rarely need to spawn these processes during legitimate use, making this a high-fidelity pivot point for detecting initial access and user-execution activity.
Rationale
Office applications spawning script hosts or command interpreters is atypical for normal document/spreadsheet/presentation workflows.
Threat actors frequently abuse Office macros (VBA), DDE, or OLE objects as an initial access vector, then use LOLBins to evade detection and blend in with legitimate system activity.
Tools like mshta.exe, certutil.exe, and bitsadmin.exe are commonly abused for downloading and executing remote payloads while evading traditional AV/EDR signatures.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Technique Tactic
T1566 (Phishing) Initial Access
T1204 (User Execution) / T1204.002 (Malicious File) Execution
T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter) Execution
T1218 (System Binary Proxy Execution) — e.g. T1218.005 Mshta, T1218.010 Regsvr32, T1218.011 Rundll32 Defense Evasion
T1197 (BITS Jobs) Defense Evasion, Persistence
T1140 (Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) — via certutil Defense Evasion
Data Source
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — DeviceProcessEvents
Logic Summary
Flags process creation events over the last 30 days where:
The initiating (parent) process is winword.exe, excel.exe, powerpnt.exe, or outlook.exe, and
The spawned (child) process i
Detects a rapid multi-stage infection chain on macOS, typically associated with the ClickFix campaign. The rule monitors for a sequence of process events starting from a shell, followed by a curl-based download, data decoding via base64 or openssl, execution of the decoded content via shell/python/perl, and finally persistence mechanisms using launchctl or osascript, all occurring within 28 seconds.
Detects the execution of malicious 'node.exe' processes that invoke 'setup.mjs' or 'math_init.js' scripts from within .vscode or .claude configuration directories. This pattern is characteristic of the ChainDrop/Shai-Hulud npm supply chain worm, which leverages VS Code tasks or Claude Code session hooks to achieve persistent execution of dropper scripts without triggering standard npm installation flows.
Generic rule content from file: Translated CQL Rule
Detects a Claude Code shell-snapshot source invocation followed by additional chained commands (e.g. curl, jq, eval) rather than a clean startup guard, indicating anomalous use of the coding agent's session-init mechanism to smuggle in follow-on actions.
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