Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,501 detections
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Detects the execution of Mimikatz or the use of specific command-line arguments (e.g., sekurlsa::logonpasswords) known for extracting sensitive credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process memory. The rule monitors both process creation command lines and raw process memory read operations targeted at lsass.exe.
Detects PowerShell or WMIC commands used by Starland RAT to gather system hardware identifiers, RAM capacity, and installed antivirus products via CIM/WMI queries during victim profiling.
Detects potential execution of malicious HTA files or encoded PowerShell commands initiated from the Windows Explorer Run dialog. This behavior is consistent with 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks where users are tricked into copying and pasting commands into the Run dialog to bypass security controls under the guise of verifying a fake CAPTCHA.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a non-standard process writes to the Windows Installer TempPackages registry key, followed by the msiexec.exe process running as SYSTEM deleting the C:\Config.Msi folder. This behavior is indicative of potential privilege escalation or exploitation, such as CVE-2025-27727, where an attacker leverages msiexec's high-privilege context to perform unauthorized file operations.
Detects potential misuse of an Azure Managed Identity token on a Linux host, where 'curl' is used to interact with the Azure Key Vault API (vault.azure.net/secrets) while presenting an Authorization bearer token. This pattern can indicate an adversary who has obtained a Managed Identity token (e.g., via the Instance Metadata Service) and is attempting to exfiltrate or access sensitive secrets stored in Azure Key Vault.
Detects the execution of binaries (exe, dll, msi) or scripts via rundll32/msiexec from the user's Local AppData Temp directory. This behavior is commonly associated with staging and executing secondary payloads by malware such as the Starland RAT, which frequently drops and runs its payloads from these locations to evade detection.
Detects pythonw.exe or python.exe process execution running under the WDAGUtilityAccount user context, which Starland RAT checks against its hardcoded sandbox-account blacklist before continuing execution. Observing this account name paired with the Python runtime used by the RAT's loader chain is a strong indicator of the malware executing (or attempting to execute) inside a sandboxed analysis environment.
This rule detects the execution of Java JAR files from suspicious or unconventional directories (such as Temp, AppData, Downloads, or Public folders). It filters out known build tools and CI/CD agents to focus on potentially malicious or unauthorized execution of JAR files that might indicate payload staging or execution in high-risk locations.
Detects PowerShell execution initiating WMI queries to gather information about antivirus products, network adapter configurations, or User Account Control (UAC) policy settings. This behavior is indicative of system and defensive environment reconnaissance.
This rule detects two suspicious patterns: 1) Using the sc.exe utility to create a new Windows service configured to start at boot, often used for persistence or to execute malicious payloads with system privileges. 2) The execution of PowerShell.exe directly by the service control manager (services.exe), which is highly atypical for normal system operations and often indicates malicious script execution initiated as a service.
Detects malicious downloader activity where mshta.exe or a spawned runexe.bat script utilizes PowerShell's Net.WebClient to download and execute secondary payloads. This is a common pattern for stage-two malware delivery.
Detects the execution of the 's5cmd' tool from the 'C:\ProgramData' directory. 's5cmd' is a common command-line tool used for interacting with object storage systems like Amazon S3 and is frequently leveraged by attackers for data exfiltration due to its efficiency.
Detects instances where the command shell 'cmd.exe' is launched as a child process of 'nvidia-sysruntime.exe'. This behavior is anomalous as 'nvidia-sysruntime.exe' typically does not spawn command interpreters, suggesting potential masquerading or process hollowing where an attacker is using a disguised malicious binary to execute shell commands.
This rule detects command line execution containing environment variable keys associated with the LabubaRAT malware family (e.g., ZM_ORG, ZM_KEY, ZM_SERVER). These variables are used to configure the malware's communication parameters, polling intervals, and C2 server settings during its execution.
Detects the execution of an executable named 'nvidia-sysruntime.exe', which is used by the LabubaRAT malware family to masquerade as a legitimate NVIDIA component to maintain persistence and evade detection.
Detects the execution of an executable named 'nvidia-sysruntime.exe', which is used by the LabubaRAT malware family to masquerade as a legitimate NVIDIA component to maintain persistence and evade detection.
Detects the LabubaRAT implant (masquerading as nvidia-sysruntime.exe) performing file system checks against Chrome, Firefox, Microsoft Edge, and Brave installation paths as part of its enumerate_browsers() host profiling routine.
Detects the execution of nvidia-sysruntime.exe, a process name used by LabubaRAT for host reconnaissance. The detection relies on identifying this specific filename, which in the context of the malware is often unsigned or associated with malicious activity as opposed to legitimate NVIDIA Container Toolkit components.
Detects the execution of Microsoft Edge WebView2 (msedgewebview2.exe) as a child process of the NVIDIA system runtime (nvidia-sysruntime.exe). This pattern is associated with LabubaRAT, where the legitimate NVIDIA process is abused to launch WebView2 for command-and-control (C2) communication and data exfiltration.
Detects the use of GDI functions (GetDC, CreateCompatibleBitmap, BitBlt, GetDIBits) combined with suspicious base64 encoding activity by a process masquerading as an NVIDIA binary (nvidia-sysruntime.exe). This behavior is indicative of screen capture and exfiltration attempts typical of the LabubaRAT implant.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized database manipulation of the 'xadmin' platform, including suspicious administrative role modifications and deletions. It also monitors for suspicious Python script execution involving the 'bcrypt' library, which can be used to generate or verify password hashes in potentially malicious scripts.
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