Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,483 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
8,114
7,158
1,351
1,169
1,063
Contributors
4,878
2,724
2,695
2,646
2,356
Categories
20,483
11,867
5,884
5,164
4,867
Platforms
18,085
3,047
1,506
124
104
Products / Services
5,726
4,293
3,715
1,174
958
MITRE Techniques
9,480
7,574
3,458
2,848
2,703
CVEs
36
28
25
21
20
IDS Classtypes
1
Detects ScreenConnect client processes initiating outbound network connections to external cloud relay addresses (typically *-relay.screenconnect.com) from locations outside of standard Program Files directories. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized, standalone, or adversary-deployed ScreenConnect instances attempting to establish a Command and Control (C2) channel, bypassing standard IT-managed deployment pathways.
This rule detects the execution of node.exe or a specific binary named 'ProfileQuickHost.exe' spawned by wscript.exe. This activity is indicative of a VBScript-based loader (often referred to as 'ChainScript') executing a staged Node.js RAT or secondary payload from user-writable application folders (AppData).
A July 2026 incident used Polygon smart contracts (EtherHiding) for dynamic payload routing/C2 following a ClickFix/FileFix-style lure driven by compromised WordPress credentials.
Detects suspicious npm preinstall activity or node_modules execution patterns involving the execution of the Bun JavaScript runtime. This behavior is often indicative of supply chain compromise where malicious npm packages attempt to drop and run unauthorized binaries to facilitate secondary payload execution.
Detects a potential web shell deployment by identifying a web server process creating or modifying a file in common web directory locations, followed shortly (within 10 minutes) by the execution of that same file.
Detects execution of shell commands containing obfuscated patterns (such as base64 decoding, hex character sequences, or piped commands) when spawned by core Citrix NetScaler service processes (nsppe, httpd, or nsaaad). This behavior is often indicative of exploitation attempts or post-exploitation activities on network appliances.
Detects VMware ESXi shell activity associated with the ShinySp1d3r encryptor. This includes the termination of VM processes via esxcli or vim-cmd, the deletion of VM snapshots, and suspicious file renaming or encryption activity on datastores consistent with ransomware behaviors.
Detects indicators associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix campaign across process, network connection, DNS, and HTTP telemetry: known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, the chattypetty.com domain, and known payload-hosting URLs.
Detects git checkout of a bare 40-hex commit SHA or the literal FETCH_HEAD ref, executed by a recognized AI coding-agent process. Narrowed to the Plugin4Shell exploitation fingerprint (checkout of a pinned-SHA-shaped or FETCH_HEAD ref) rather than ordinary branch/tag checkouts, which these agents perform constantly during normal plugin installs.
Detects the abuse of WerFaultSecure.exe or similar Windows Error Reporting processes, invoked with debugging or dumping flags against security/EDR process names, or spawned by unexpected parent processes. This technique is often used to freeze security tools (EDR-Freeze) by exploiting process suspension via mini-dump handles.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands to modify file timestamps (CreationTime, LastWriteTime, LastAccessTime) on web application directories and configuration files, a technique often used by attackers to hide modifications made to webshells or malicious scripts.
Detects the establishment of persistence on a Windows host by monitoring both Registry Run/RunOnce key modifications and Scheduled Task creation. The rule specifically looks for command lines or registry values that reference common Windows binary names (e.g., Microsoft Edge/Teams update helpers, LockScreenContentServer) which are frequently used by adversaries for masquerading.
Detects instances where a Microsoft IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) executes commands such as 'findstr', 'Get-Content', or 'Select-Xml' to scan configuration files (e.g., applicationHost.config, web.config) or source code files (e.g., App_Code/*.cs) for sensitive information like passwords, connection strings, or API keys. This behavior is indicative of credential harvesting by an attacker using a webshell or compromised IIS process.
Detects instances where the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns the Windows command shell (cmd.exe) to execute common reconnaissance commands such as whoami, hostname, systeminfo, and net user. This behavior is strongly indicative of post-exploitation activity following a successful web shell deployment on a web server.
Detects instances where the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns the Windows command shell (cmd.exe) to execute common reconnaissance commands such as whoami, hostname, systeminfo, and net user. This behavior is strongly indicative of post-exploitation activity following a successful web shell deployment on a web server.
Detects WmiPrvSE.exe spawning a child process executable from a user-writable AppData\Local folder, which often results from a .NET process invoking ManagementClass(Win32_Process).Create.
Detects WmiPrvSE.exe spawning a child process executable from a user-writable AppData\Local folder, which often results from a .NET process invoking ManagementClass(Win32_Process).Create.
This rule detects attempts by an attacker to disable or modify Windows security software and features. It monitors for three distinct behaviors: execution of 'Set-MpPreference' to modify Windows Defender settings (exclusions or real-time monitoring), execution of 'sc.exe' to stop security-related services (such as EDR or AV services), and direct modification of Windows registry keys to disable Windows Defender components.
This rule detects instances where the MSP360 RMM Agent installer triggers an UAC elevation failure. The detection specifically monitors the execution of eventcreate.exe, which is often used to log events, when the command line includes strings indicating that the MSP360 installer failed to elevate privileges.
This rule monitors for various indicators of compromise (IOCs) including malicious domains, IP addresses, specific URI paths, file names, and file hashes. It aggregates telemetry from network, file, process, and certificate events to detect potential threats interacting with known bad infrastructure or executing suspicious files associated with malware campaigns.
Detects the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern where a user is instructed to copy and paste a malicious command into the Windows Run dialog. The rule triggers on PowerShell being launched from explorer.exe with 'ExecutionPolicy Bypass', utilizing 'irm' (Invoke-RestMethod) to download content, and saving it to the user's TEMP directory via 'Out-File' for subsequent execution.
Page 33 of 976