Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects command-line arguments and file names associated with the execution of Mimikatz or derived tools (such as SafetyKatz). It monitors for specific modules and flags, including credential harvesting (sekurlsa, lsadump, vault), DPAPI operations, and Kerberos manipulation, which are characteristic of adversary credential theft and privilege escalation activities.
Detects the creation of a new local user account on a Windows system using the net.exe or net1.exe command-line utilities. This is a common technique used by attackers for establishing persistent access to a compromised system.
Detects creation of scheduled tasks followed by execution of pcalua.exe on the same endpoint. This combination was observed by Huntress during RedCurl intrusions and is uncommon in legitimate enterprise activity.
Detects the execution, network activity, or installation of GSocket (gsocket/gs-netcat) tools used for creating remote access tunnels. The rule also identifies instances where the legitimate 'uptime' binary is masqueraded to execute GSocket commands or establish unauthorized network connections.
Detects the execution of known Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) such as certutil.exe, msiexec.exe, regsvcs.exe, and regasm.exe when their command line contains suspicious keywords like 'download', 'http', or 'encode'. This activity can indicate an attempt to download malicious payloads or bypass security controls.
Detects the Windows Help executable (hh.exe) launching the Windows script interpreters (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) with suspicious command-line flags. This pattern is commonly used in fileless malware delivery, script-based obfuscation, and bypass of security controls using built-in Windows utilities.
Detects suspicious execution patterns involving the Microsoft HTML Help executable (hh.exe). This includes the execution of Compiled HTML (.chm) files, or cases where hh.exe is used as a parent process to spawn common scripting or command-line interpreters such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe, or cmd.exe. These behaviors are common indicators of malicious script execution or proxy execution techniques used to bypass security controls.
Detects a persistent loading pattern attributed to the Kimsuky threat group. The rule monitors for the creation of a hidden scheduled task named 'Edge Updater' that triggers a wscript.exe process executing a disguised VBScript file named with an 'OfficeUpdater' naming convention. This detection covers both the task registration (Event ID 4698) and the subsequent execution of the malicious script via wscript.exe.
This rule detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using either the 'wevtutil.exe' command-line utility or the 'Clear-EventLog' PowerShell cmdlet. Adversaries often clear event logs to hide evidence of their activity on a compromised host.
Detects execution and file activity associated with Sysinternals AD Explorer, a tool often used by adversaries to enumerate Active Directory environments and perform snapshots.
This rule monitors for RDP connections (Windows Event ID 4624 Logon Type 10) and RDP client launches (mstsc.exe) within an environment. It enriches these events by checking against a baseline of historically observed source-to-destination host pairs. A new or previously unseen connection pair triggers an alert, helping to identify potential lateral movement.
Detects various indicators of credential dumping associated with Mimikatz and manual extraction of the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit). This includes execution of Mimikatz, use of specific modules like lsadump::dcsync and sekurlsa::logonpasswords, direct access to the LSASS process, and usage of ntdsutil or vssadmin to create shadow copies for NTDS.dit file access.
Detects unauthorized attempts to access or extract Redis credentials from the Argo CD repo-server process. The detection identifies suspicious command-line activity where environment variables are enumerated (via env or printenv) or sensitive configuration files (/etc/argocd) are accessed by the repo-server process or its children. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to exploit unauthenticated gRPC vulnerabilities to steal credentials for cache poisoning or further lateral movement within a containerized environment.
Detects the use of PowerShell to forcefully terminate 'wscript.exe' using 'Stop-Process' or 'taskkill'. This behavior is associated with adversaries, such as those in the VEIL#DROP campaign, attempting to minimize forensic evidence after executing malicious JavaScript lures via Windows Script Host.
Detects the use of the klist.exe utility with suspicious subcommands ('sessions', '-li', 'get', 'purge') to inspect, retrieve, or clear cached Kerberos tickets, which is indicative of credential discovery or post-exploitation activity.
Detects TeamPCP-associated behavior in CI/CD environments, specifically the encryption and staging of sensitive secrets using tools like OpenSSL, tar, and curl. The rule monitors for the execution of at least three distinct tools from a specified list within a short time window that interact with files in a /tmp/tmp. staging directory, indicative of preparation for data exfiltration.
Detects suspicious execution patterns on CI/CD runners involving the decoding of base64-encoded payloads piped into sudo python3, which is often used for credential harvesting. The rule identifies this behavior through two methods: sibling process correlation where 'base64 -d' and 'sudo python3' occur within 60 seconds of each other, and the observation of interpreters (sh, bash, python, etc.) launched without arguments in conjunction with runner-specific process patterns, indicative of stdin-piped execution.
Detects the abuse of the Windows Error Reporting (WER) service mechanism, specifically targeting the 'QueueReporting' scheduled task. Attackers may employ junction-based path redirection to execute a malicious wermgr.exe binary located outside of the standard system directory. The rule identifies instances where wermgr.exe is running from non-standard locations, or running at SYSTEM integrity level spawned by standard task-related parent processes, which indicates a potential privilege escalation or persistence attempt (linked to CVE-2026-50656).
This rule detects activities indicative of the RoguePlanet exploit, which utilizes NTFS junction swapping to stage malicious operations. It monitors for the creation of suspicious system-like directories within temporary paths, writing of executables (like wermgr.exe) to those paths, unprivileged manipulation of the Windows Defender Quarantine directory, and virtual disk image mounting from user-writable directories.
Detects indicators of activity associated with 'RoguePlanet', including specific command-line strings, named pipes, process spawning behaviors related to Microsoft Defender (MsMpEng.exe), and suspicious staging patterns involving 'wermgr.exe' in temporary directories.
Detects various methods of disabling or tampering with Windows Defender protections, including modifying preferences via PowerShell (Set-MpPreference), stopping the WinDefend service via sc.exe, terminating the antivirus process via taskkill, or modifying Registry keys associated with Defender policies.
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