Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects the creation of Windows scheduled tasks using 'schtasks.exe' where the executable being registered or the task itself is associated with suspicious directories like %LOCALAPPDATA%, %APPDATA%, or %TEMP%. The rule further filters for specific suspicious strings often used in malicious task configurations, indicating potential persistence or malicious command execution.
Detects the AWS CLI being spawned by processes associated with AI coding extensions (e.g., VS Code extension hosts, Cursor, Windsurf) while executing commands indicative of cloud credential discovery or harvesting (e.g., sts, get-caller-identity, configure export). This activity is indicative of a supply chain compromise or exploitation where an adversary leverages an AI coding tool environment to access cloud credentials stored on the developer's workstation.
Detects unauthorized execution of AWS CLI commands within a shell spawned by Amazon Q or AWS language server processes. This activity typically involves the 'aws sts get-caller-identity' command being piped to 'curl' for remote exfiltration of cloud credentials, a behavior associated with the exploitation of CVE-2026-12957 in MCP auto-execution.
Detects evidence of arbitrary command execution originating from OpenVPN Connect, potentially via an echoed script payload that executes commands upon disconnect, bypassing security controls. The rule identifies suspicious child processes spawned by OpenVPNConnect.exe and detects the creation of a known proof-of-concept marker file.
Detects artifacts, execution patterns, and post-exploitation behaviors associated with the exploitation of the libssh2 heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability (CVE-2026-55200). The rule monitors for the presence of known proof-of-concept files, malicious SSH server orchestration via Python, outbound network traffic to the PoC's default non-standard port (2222) from SSH-capable applications, and post-exploitation shell or calculator spawns.
Detects Bumblebee loader delivery via trojanized MSI installers. The rule identifies suspicious process chains originating from common web browsers, identifies DLL side-loading or loader execution from msiexec.exe child processes in temporary directories, and flags network connections to known Bumblebee delivery domains.
Detects command-line execution of bcdedit.exe used to force the system into Safe Mode boot, or reg.exe modifying SafeBoot configuration keys to inject persistent drivers/services.
This rule detects the extraction of files from RAR5 archives using 7-Zip (7z.exe/7zG.exe), followed closely by the execution of a file from a user-writable directory (e.g., Downloads, Temp, AppData). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to bypass Mark-of-the-Web (MotW) protections, as files extracted from certain container formats may not inherit the original MotW Zone.Identifier alternate data stream, potentially allowing malicious files to execute without standard Windows security warnings.
This rule detects two suspicious behaviors associated with PowerShell: 1) attempts to disable SSL/TLS certificate validation (often used by malicious scripts to bypass security checks when downloading payloads) and 2) outbound network connections by non-Microsoft signed processes on non-standard ports (8000-9000), which is common in C2 beaconing activities.
Detects the execution of setup scripts (e.g., install.sh, Makefile) by shell interpreters that were spawned from common developer-oriented applications (e.g., IDEs, code editors, Python) within a short window after a git clone operation. This behavior is indicative of potential supply chain compromise or malicious project initialization.
Detects attempts to stop or delete security-related processes and services, such as Sysmon, SentinelOne agents, Windows Defender, and logging agents like Filebeat. This is often an indicator of an adversary attempting to impair security defenses to hide malicious activities.
Detects execution of WinRAR utilities (rar.exe, winrar.exe) where the command line contains the '-a' (add to archive) flag or involves paths typically associated with data staging (Temp, AppData, Users, or Public directories), which may indicate an attempt to archive collected data prior to exfiltration.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands initiated directly from explorer.exe that contain indicators of the 'ClickFix' attack vector, specifically commands designed to extract data from the clipboard (e.g., Get-Clipboard) or download/execute remote content (e.g., iwr, iex). This activity typically occurs when a user is socially engineered into copying and pasting malicious instructions into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects anomalous file creation or modification events in sensitive Windows System32 directories originating from the Microsoft Defender process (MsMpEng.exe). Additionally, it detects when MsMpEng.exe spawns interactive shells (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe), which is indicative of potential exploitation of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2026-33825, where attacker-controlled file operations are redirected via junction points.
Detects malicious activity related to the 'RoguePlanet' exploit (referencing CVE-2026-50656) which involves manipulating NTFS junctions to redirect system file operations. The rule monitors for specific staging directory patterns (RP_<UUID>), the creation of named pipes associated with RoguePlanet, and the execution of suspicious binaries or staging of files in system paths.
Detects instances where Microsoft Teams or its associated process spawns remote assistance utilities such as Quick Assist, Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra), or Remote Desktop Connection Manager (msrdcw). This behavior may indicate an attacker abusing legitimate remote access software for command and control or unauthorized remote control.
This rule detects the execution of the QEMU virtualization engine (qemu-system-x86_64.exe) when associated with specific toolset files (e.g., BloodHound, Metasploit) or suspicious network activity patterns indicative of lateral movement, such as connecting to administrative ports (SMB, RDP, WinRM) on external or sensitive network ranges. The rule calculates a risk score based on the presence of these indicators.
Detects User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts involving registry hijacking of 'mscfile' or 'ms-settings' classes to execute arbitrary commands, and monitors for associated suspicious child process spawning from eventvwr.exe or fodhelper.exe.
Detects signs of persistence via suspicious scheduled task creation or local user creation/group escalation, and C2 activity involving a specific IP address or unauthorized connections to the Telegram bot API.
Detects coordinated malicious behaviors associated with BQTLock ransomware, specifically identifying external IP reconnaissance, direct communication with known C2 infrastructure, abuse of the Telegram API for command-and-control or exfiltration, and host enumeration via system utilities by non-standard processes. The rule aggregates these suspicious signals and triggers an alert when multiple events occur within the same process storyline.
Detects the execution of known Impacket framework tools (such as secretsdump, wmiexec, smbexec, atexec, GetUserSPNs, or ntlmrelayx) which are commonly used for credential dumping, remote service execution, and lateral movement.
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