Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,480 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
8,114
7,158
1,351
1,166
1,063
Contributors
4,878
2,724
2,695
2,646
2,356
Categories
20,480
11,864
5,882
5,162
4,867
Platforms
18,083
3,046
1,506
124
104
Products / Services
5,723
4,293
3,713
1,173
958
MITRE Techniques
9,480
7,573
3,458
2,848
2,702
CVEs
36
28
25
21
20
IDS Classtypes
1
Detects Microsoft Office applications (winword.exe or excel.exe) spawning shell processes (cmd.exe or powershell.exe). This behavior is commonly associated with malicious VBA macro execution in weaponized Office documents used for malware delivery, such as Dridex.
This rule detects suspicious persistence activity involving known tools or names that are often masqueraded. It looks for the creation of registry run keys or scheduled tasks using names associated with common tools ('Canon Configuration Reader', 'Stardock DeElevation Tool') when the initiating process is not located in the expected vendor-authorized directories. The rule specifically alerts on devices exhibiting these behaviors within a short time window.
Detects the use of Windows administrative tools (vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit) to delete Volume Shadow Copies, backup catalogs, and disable system recovery mechanisms. This behavior is highly indicative of preparatory stages for destructive wiper malware attacks, such as those historically observed by the Sandworm (Seashell Blizzard) group (e.g., CaddyWiper, Industroyer2).
Detects the execution of shortcut (.lnk) files located on removable media (USB) that spawn common Windows binaries (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe) with hidden window flags. This behavior is indicative of initial access or lateral movement techniques used by Mustang Panda (Earth Preta) for USB-based malware propagation and DLL side-loading.
This rule monitors DeviceProcessEvents for the execution of known malicious binaries associated with the SilverFox malware. It specifically looks for occurrences of three distinct SHA256 file hashes within the last 30 days.
This rule detects a sequence of suspicious activities involving files placed in 'ProgramData\Firefox'. It identifies the creation or modification of a non-standard executable within this folder, followed by its execution by a trusted process (or itself), and the subsequent creation of a Registry run key for persistence. This pattern is often used by adversaries for persistence mechanism implementation using masqueraded file names.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks (Windows), cron jobs (Linux), or systemd timers where the initiating process is a common scripting or runtime interpreter (e.g., Python, Node.js, PowerShell, Java). This activity is often indicative of persistence mechanisms being established by a compromised agent or script-based process.
Detects package manager utilities (pip, npm, yarn, conda) being executed as child processes by Python or Node.js agent runtime processes. This behavior may indicate an unauthorized installation of plugins or tools within an AI agent framework, potentially bypassing secure deployment pipelines.
Detects when an AI agent's code execution sandbox (e.g., Python, Node.js, or Shell interpreters) initiates suspicious child processes. This includes the execution of network utilities for potential C2 (e.g., curl, nc, socat), the creation of interactive reverse shells, or the execution of credential harvesting tools (e.g., mimikatz, secretsdump), which suggests the AI agent's sandbox environment has been compromised or abused.
Detects instances where the Windows Explorer process (the parent of the 'Run' dialog) spawns common command-line interpreters. This behavior is indicative of the 'ClickFix' phishing technique, where users are socially engineered to paste malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects instances where the Microsoft Edge proxy process (msedge_proxy.exe) initiates command-line interpreters such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe. This behavior is highly suspicious as a browser-related process should not typically be spawning shell interpreters, potentially indicating exploitation of browser vulnerabilities or malicious script execution.
Detects process/file hashes associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
Detects process/file hashes associated with the ChatGPT Custom GPT ClickFix
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
campaign via Windows process_creation telemetry. Split from the combined IOC
hunt: Sigma supports only one logsource per rule, so IP/domain/URL matching live
in separate network_connection and dns_query rules.
Detects instances where the Ivanti Sentry service process spawns suspicious child processes (shells, network utilities, or interpreters) while running with root privileges. This behavior is indicative of exploitation of CVE-2026-10520, an OS command injection vulnerability in Ivanti Sentry that enables unauthenticated remote code execution with root permissions.
Detects the execution of a Node.js interpreter (node.exe or node) as a child process of a Fortinet management-related process, or where the command line contains references to Fortinet. This behavior is indicative of post-exploitation activity related to CVE-2025-25249, where a heap-based buffer overflow is exploited to deploy the PivotC2 remote access trojan.
Detects the execution of script interpreters (PowerShell, Cmd, Mshta) launched directly from common web browsers (explorer, chrome, edge, firefox). The rule specifically flags common obfuscation techniques such as encoded commands, hidden window styles, or attempts to download and execute code (e.g., IEX, DownloadString) while excluding explicit file-based script executions.
Detects instances where the SQL Server process (sqlservr.exe) initiates command-line utilities such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe, and further identifies suspicious command-line arguments often associated with post-exploitation activity like discovery, credential gathering, or file manipulation.
Detects the RatHat ADB self-pairing sequence on Android devices, where an application uses shell-level access gained via ADB to stage and execute malicious binaries (such as Go Agents or FRP clients) from /data/local/tmp. The rule correlates the staging and execution of these specific binaries with subsequent network communication indicative of C2 or data exfiltration.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events characteristic of NeedyMantis's hands-on-keyboard activity. The rule identifies file staging (creation or modification of suspicious DLLs from network shares) followed by remote command execution (via Impacket-like service interaction) and subsequent execution of binaries vulnerable to DLL sideloading.
Detects the creation of persistence mechanisms through both Registry Run keys and Scheduled Tasks within a one-hour window, specifically targeting names indicative of masquerading as legitimate update or helper components.
This analytic detects suspicious use of 'mshta.exe' or 'rundll32.exe' invoking 'mshtml.dll'
or the 'RunHTMLApplication' export without including a direct HTTP/HTTPS URL in the command line.
This pattern could be associated with obfuscated script execution used by threat actors during
initial access or payload staging. The absence of a visible URL may indicate attempts to evade static
detections by embedding the URL via string concatenation, encoding (e.g., hex), or indirect script loaders
like 'GetObject()'.
or the 'RunHTMLApplication' export without including a direct HTTP/HTTPS URL in the command line.
This pattern could be associated with obfuscated script execution used by threat actors during
initial access or payload staging. The absence of a visible URL may indicate attempts to evade static
detections by embedding the URL via string concatenation, encoding (e.g., hex), or indirect script loaders
like 'GetObject()'.
Page 37 of 976