Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
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Detects a suspicious sequence of events characteristic of NeedyMantis's hands-on-keyboard activity. The rule identifies file staging (creation or modification of suspicious DLLs from network shares) followed by remote command execution (via Impacket-like service interaction) and subsequent execution of binaries vulnerable to DLL sideloading.
Detects the creation of persistence mechanisms through both Registry Run keys and Scheduled Tasks within a one-hour window, specifically targeting names indicative of masquerading as legitimate update or helper components.
This analytic detects suspicious use of 'mshta.exe' or 'rundll32.exe' invoking 'mshtml.dll'
or the 'RunHTMLApplication' export without including a direct HTTP/HTTPS URL in the command line.
This pattern could be associated with obfuscated script execution used by threat actors during
initial access or payload staging. The absence of a visible URL may indicate attempts to evade static
detections by embedding the URL via string concatenation, encoding (e.g., hex), or indirect script loaders
like 'GetObject()'.
or the 'RunHTMLApplication' export without including a direct HTTP/HTTPS URL in the command line.
This pattern could be associated with obfuscated script execution used by threat actors during
initial access or payload staging. The absence of a visible URL may indicate attempts to evade static
detections by embedding the URL via string concatenation, encoding (e.g., hex), or indirect script loaders
like 'GetObject()'.
This detection identifies execution of the file synchronization utility "rclone".
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs, specifically flow data in order to capture process executions
initiating network connections.
While rclone is a legitimate command-line tool for syncing data to cloud storage providers, it has been widely abused by threat actors for data exfiltration.
This analytic inspects process name and arguments for rclone and flags usage of suspicious flags.
If matched, this could indicate malicious usage for stealthy data exfiltration or cloud abuse.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs, specifically flow data in order to capture process executions
initiating network connections.
While rclone is a legitimate command-line tool for syncing data to cloud storage providers, it has been widely abused by threat actors for data exfiltration.
This analytic inspects process name and arguments for rclone and flags usage of suspicious flags.
If matched, this could indicate malicious usage for stealthy data exfiltration or cloud abuse.
This analytic detects suspicious use of `rundll32.exe` in combination with `mshtml.dll` and the export `RunHTMLApplication`.
This behavior is often observed in malware to execute JavaScript or VBScript in memory, enabling payload staging or
bypassing script execution policies and bypassing the usage of the "mshta.exe" binary.
The detection leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module telemetry which offers network flow activity
along with process information such as command-line arguments
If confirmed malicious, this activity may indicate initial access or payload download.
This behavior is often observed in malware to execute JavaScript or VBScript in memory, enabling payload staging or
bypassing script execution policies and bypassing the usage of the "mshta.exe" binary.
The detection leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module telemetry which offers network flow activity
along with process information such as command-line arguments
If confirmed malicious, this activity may indicate initial access or payload download.
This analytic detects script execution (`wscript.exe` or `cscript.exe`) triggered from compressed files opened directly using
`explorer.exe`, `winrar.exe`, or `7zFM.exe`.
When a user double clicks on a ".js" file from within one of these compressed files. Its extracted temporally in the temp directory in folder with certain markers.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data, in order to look for a specific parent/child relationship and an initiated network connection.
This behavior is exploited by threat actors such as Scarlet Goldfinch to deliver and run malicious scripts as an initial access technique.
`explorer.exe`, `winrar.exe`, or `7zFM.exe`.
When a user double clicks on a ".js" file from within one of these compressed files. Its extracted temporally in the temp directory in folder with certain markers.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data, in order to look for a specific parent/child relationship and an initiated network connection.
This behavior is exploited by threat actors such as Scarlet Goldfinch to deliver and run malicious scripts as an initial access technique.
This analytic detects suspicious downloads from common file sharing and content delivery platforms using known living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins)
such as 'curl.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'wmic.exe', and others.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path,
and parent process information. These tools are often abused by adversaries and malware to retrieve payloads from public hosting platforms
such as GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin.
This detection helps identify potential initial access, payload staging, or command and control activity using legitimate services.
such as 'curl.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'wmic.exe', and others.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path,
and parent process information. These tools are often abused by adversaries and malware to retrieve payloads from public hosting platforms
such as GitHub, Discord CDN, Transfer.sh, or Pastebin.
This detection helps identify potential initial access, payload staging, or command and control activity using legitimate services.
This analytic identifies the use of Chromium-based browsers (like Microsoft Edge) running in headless mode with the `--dump-dom` argument.
This behavior has been observed in attack campaigns such as DUCKTAIL, where browsers are automated to stealthily download content from the internet using direct URLs or suspicious hosting platforms.
The detection focuses on identifying connections to known file-sharing domains or direct IPs extracted from command-line arguments and cross-checks those against the destination of the flow.
Since it leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module telemetry, the rule triggers only if a network connection is made.
This behavior has been observed in attack campaigns such as DUCKTAIL, where browsers are automated to stealthily download content from the internet using direct URLs or suspicious hosting platforms.
The detection focuses on identifying connections to known file-sharing domains or direct IPs extracted from command-line arguments and cross-checks those against the destination of the flow.
Since it leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module telemetry, the rule triggers only if a network connection is made.
Detects the FileFix execution chain, where victims are socially engineered into pasting a malicious path into the Windows Explorer address bar. This action results in explorer.exe launching suspicious command-line tools (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe) with suspicious flags or unusually long, potentially obfuscated arguments characteristic of a 'ClickFix' style attack.
Detects various indicators of compromise (IOCs) including known malicious file hashes, suspicious file names commonly associated with staging or initialization in web directories, and network communication to known malicious domains or URLs. It also monitors process execution command lines for references to these IOCs, excluding common browser processes.
Detects an suspicious progression of activities originating from identified AI assistant/agent processes. The rule monitors for a chain of behaviors occurring within a 15-minute window: execution of an AI agent/tool, followed by host discovery (network/system enumeration), access to sensitive local credential files, archival of data, and outbound network communication to common file-sharing/exfiltration platforms.
Detects the execution of the Windows finger.exe utility with a command-line argument containing an '@' symbol, which indicates a request to a remote host. This technique is often abused by adversaries for reconnaissance or to retrieve remote stagers or other payloads, as the finger protocol is rarely used in modern enterprise environments.
Detects C:\Windows\System32\wsl.exe spawning a child wsl.exe process from outside the legitimate WSL install locations.
When WSL or bash is invoked, the System32 stub (wsl.exe) looks up the InstallLocation registry key and executes the wsl.exe found there.
An attacker who modifies InstallLocation to a controlled path causes the stub to transparently proxy execution to a malicious payload,
which then appears as a wsl.exe child of the legitimate System32 stub.
When WSL or bash is invoked, the System32 stub (wsl.exe) looks up the InstallLocation registry key and executes the wsl.exe found there.
An attacker who modifies InstallLocation to a controlled path causes the stub to transparently proxy execution to a malicious payload,
which then appears as a wsl.exe child of the legitimate System32 stub.
This rule monitors for activity associated with specific known malicious file names (killer.exe, kill.exe) and network connections to a set of identified malicious IP addresses. It aggregates events from DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents to identify potential communication or presence of these malicious artifacts.
This rule detects activity involving known malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs), including specific IP addresses, domains, and file hashes. It monitors network connections, file system activity, process execution, and email attachments, filtering out common security tools to reduce noise.
This rule detects potential persistence via scheduled tasks that masquerade as legitimate network components (e.g., 'System Health Monitor'), as well as abnormal use of WebDav via rundll32.exe or net.exe in the context of the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for task creation/updates, schtasks command lines, registry artifacts related to task scheduling, and suspicious WebDav network utility usage, while excluding common security tool processes.
Detects instances where the Windows command shell (cmd.exe) is used to execute 'dotnet --list-runtimes' with output redirected to sensitive locations (e.g., NUL, temp folders, or text/log files). This pattern is often observed during post-exploitation activities by RMM agents or unauthorized processes attempting to profile the .NET environment while hiding their command output.
Detects execution of potentially malicious or dual-use tools (such as credential dumpers or security-bypass utilities) from within ScreenConnect temporary directories via the 'RunFile' command. This is indicative of an attacker leveraging legitimate remote support software to deploy secondary payloads.
This rule detects potential unauthorized or suspicious installation of an RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) agent on a Windows host. It flags cases where a process performs multiple suspicious actions within a 24-hour window, specifically combining the installation or starting of a service related to an RMM agent, the creation of a Windows Firewall rule for the RMM agent executable, and/or the creation of log events related to the installer.
Detects the use of common command-line utilities (net, powershell, cmd) to perform user account creation or local group membership modification, which are behaviors often associated with adversary persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects the installation sequence of the CosmicPulse (YESROBOT) backdoor, characterized by a registry value write under HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis followed by the execution of a Python 3.8 bootstrapper from a non-standard, suspicious directory such as AppData, ProgramData, or Temp.
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