Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,499 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Hunting rule for Linux procfs heap credential harvesting: resolve a target PID
(pgrep), locate the heap mapping in /proc/<pid>/maps, then copy a bounded region
from /proc/<pid>/mem with dd (ibs=1 skip= count=). Matches Atomic Red Team
T1003.007 "Dump individual process memory with sh (Local)".
Prioritize output under /tmp, /var/tmp, or /dev/shm and parent shells that are
not debuggers or crash-analysis tooling.
(pgrep), locate the heap mapping in /proc/<pid>/maps, then copy a bounded region
from /proc/<pid>/mem with dd (ibs=1 skip= count=). Matches Atomic Red Team
T1003.007 "Dump individual process memory with sh (Local)".
Prioritize output under /tmp, /var/tmp, or /dev/shm and parent shells that are
not debuggers or crash-analysis tooling.
Hunting rule loosely modeled after Atomic Red Team T1048.002 test "Exfiltrate data in a file over HTTPS using wget". No public in-the-wild intel reference available; correlate before alerting.
Hunting rule for Linux procfs heap credential harvesting: resolve a target PID
(pgrep), locate the heap mapping in /proc/<pid>/maps, then copy a bounded region
from /proc/<pid>/mem with dd (ibs=1 skip= count=). Matches Atomic Red Team
T1003.007 "Dump individual process memory with sh (Local)".
Prioritize output under /tmp, /var/tmp, or /dev/shm and parent shells that are
not debuggers or crash-analysis tooling.
(pgrep), locate the heap mapping in /proc/<pid>/maps, then copy a bounded region
from /proc/<pid>/mem with dd (ibs=1 skip= count=). Matches Atomic Red Team
T1003.007 "Dump individual process memory with sh (Local)".
Prioritize output under /tmp, /var/tmp, or /dev/shm and parent shells that are
not debuggers or crash-analysis tooling.
Detects instances where wscript.exe or cscript.exe spawn a hidden PowerShell process that includes '-decode' arguments targeting files within the C:\ProgramData directory. This pattern is characteristic of the Kimsuky threat group, specifically the NUKESPED JSE loader, which uses Windows Script Host to execute staged, base64-encoded payloads.
Detects anomalous network connection enumeration activities associated with JFMBackdoor, where a DLL sideloaded into the legitimate Windows fltMC.exe utility spawns netstat.exe to perform discovery of active network connections on the compromised system.
Detects the Windows Filter Manager utility (fltMC.exe) executing from a temporary directory (e.g., %TEMP% or %AppData%\Local\Temp) in an unusual manner. This behavior is consistent with the JFMBackdoor malware used by Red Lamassu to achieve reflective DLL loading of malicious payloads directly in memory, bypassing traditional disk-based execution methods.
Detects evidence of file deletion activity associated with the Kimsuky NUKESPED loader chain. The rule monitors for the execution of 'del' commands via cmd.exe initiated by script interpreters (wscript.exe, powershell.exe) to remove malicious artifacts such as .jse, .a9oc files, or specific executable names like zlrenu8.exe from the system, characteristic of post-exploitation cleanup.
Detects the creation of suspicious file types (.exe, .dll, .ps1, etc.) in common staging directories (e.g., C:\Users\Public, C:\Windows\Temp) by the DllHost.exe process. The rule filters out known-good COM surrogate CLSIDs but flags instances where DllHost.exe is launched without a /Processid argument (potential WSL2 proxy activity) or with an unrecognized CLSID, suggesting potential COM hijacking or file staging.
Detects Linux processes masquerading as common daemons (smbd, httpd, sshd, crond) that are executing from non-standard file paths and establishing network connections on non-canonical ports to private (RFC1918) IP addresses. This behavior is indicative of a SOCKS5 proxy or C2 infrastructure masquerading as system services to blend in with legitimate traffic, as observed in Velvet Ant operations.
This rule detects the creation of executable or PowerShell script files in common temporary or user-writeable directories by DllHost.exe within 120 seconds of the execution of wsl.exe. This behavior is indicative of potential payload staging where Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) might be leveraged to obscure or facilitate the delivery and execution of malicious artifacts.
Detects execution and network activity associated with the NUKESPED (ThreatNeedle) backdoor component identified as 'zlrenu8.exe'. The rule monitors for outbound network connections to Fastly CDN infrastructure, which is frequently used by this actor for command-and-control or data exfiltration, as well as file operations within the 'ProgramData' directory indicative of staging activity.
Detects malicious shell script execution on Linux edge/IoT devices associated with the JDY botnet exploitation of CVE-2026-35616. The rule identifies processes checking for MIPS-based architectures, using download utilities (wget, curl) for payload retrieval, and subsequent file deletion activity indicative of post-exploitation cleanup.
Detects web browsers and browser-related applications (e.g., Chrome, Edge, ChatGPT, Electron apps) spawning suspicious child processes that are commonly used for command-line execution or script interpretation. This behavior is often indicative of malicious extensions, browser exploits, or attempts to leverage browser processes for initial execution or lateral movement.
Detects the execution of known Impacket relay tools such as ntlmrelayx and smbrelayx, which are commonly used by adversaries to perform NTLM relay attacks to gain unauthorized access or execute code on remote systems.
Detects web browsers and browser-related applications (e.g., Chrome, Edge, ChatGPT, Electron apps) spawning suspicious child processes that are commonly used for command-line execution or script interpretation. This behavior is often indicative of malicious extensions, browser exploits, or attempts to leverage browser processes for initial execution or lateral movement.
Detects the execution of a JSE file by a script host (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) followed by the immediate deletion of that same file within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a 'fileless' or 'dropper' style execution pattern where a script is executed to perform malicious activity and then self-deleted to remove artifacts.
This rule detects suspicious execution of 'RUNDLL32.EXE' with specific command-line arguments. It looks for instances where 'RUNDLL32.EXE' is executed with both a backslash and a comma in the command line, combined with specific DLL names or keywords like 'iamnotarobot.dll', 'checkme.dll', 'machinerie.dll', 'humanCheck', or 'verifyme'. This pattern is often indicative of malicious DLL loading or persistence mechanisms.
Detects instances where msbuild.exe is used to execute project files (.proj) from suspicious or uncommon directories. Adversaries may abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code, often placing these project files in temporary or public user directories to evade detection.
Detects the use of the rclone tool with data transfer commands (copy, move, sync, copyto, moveto) originating from a GoAnywhere server process or common interactive shell processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe). This activity is highly suspicious and could indicate data exfiltration.
Detects the use of npm to install known malicious npm packages, which is indicative of a supply chain compromise attempt via typosquatting or malicious dependency injection.
Detects the execution of known NTLM relay and coercion tools (such as PetitPotam, EfsPotato, PrinterBug, DFSCoerce, or Coercer) when attempting to coerce a local authentication or credential relay using the local loopback address. These tools leverage various RPC-based techniques to force the local machine to authenticate to an attacker-controlled source, facilitating NTLM relay attacks.
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