Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,483 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects attempts to inhibit system recovery by deleting Volume Shadow Copies or modifying Windows Boot Configuration Data, a technique commonly employed by LockBit and other ransomware families prior to file encryption.
Detects msiexec.exe spawned from explorer.exe, consistent with a user double-clicking a malicious .lnk shortcut, where the command line triggers the installation of an MSI package hosted on a remote HTTP/HTTPS server. This behavior is a known initial access technique used by FIN7 to deliver malicious payloads.
Detects command-line indicators associated with destructive disk-wiping activity, specifically targeting disk structure corruption to render systems unbootable. This rule monitors for unauthorized use of the Windows 'diskpart' utility, direct raw physical drive access, and specific file system utility commands (fsutil) frequently observed in wipers attributed to APT44 (Sandworm).
Detects the installation and execution of MeshAgent, a remote monitoring and management (RMM) tool, by identifying specific command-line arguments, service names, and renamed binary execution. Adversaries often use RMM tools for persistent remote access and command and control.
Detects a suspicious execution sequence associated with the SectopRAT loader. The rule monitors for ReportDump.exe being launched from a ProgramData directory by common scheduling or service host processes, followed immediately by the loading of a malicious sdkcra.dll library.
Detects the execution of RatHat, a Go-based Android native daemon masquerading as 'liblocal-service.so'. The rule identifies the malware's use of ADB-derived shell commands to bypass Android Doze mode, prioritize background execution, and tamper with installed applications via pm (package manager) commands.
Detects usage of the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) 'pair' command initiated by processes other than known legitimate Android development tools (e.g., adb.exe, Android Studio). This may indicate an attacker attempting to wirelessly pair a malicious device or gain unauthorized access to an Android device over the network.
Detects anomalous process execution (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wmic.exe, tasklist.exe, taskkill.exe) initiated by the process 'ReportDump.exe'. This activity is indicative of the SectopRAT payload performing remote shell, file management, or process control tasks initiated via a C2 channel.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks (Windows), cron jobs (Linux), or systemd timers where the initiating process is a common scripting or runtime interpreter (e.g., Python, Node.js, PowerShell, Java). This activity is often indicative of persistence mechanisms being established by a compromised agent or script-based process.
Detects instances where AI agent runtime processes (e.g., Python, Node.js) initiate child processes using common Windows Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBAS). This behavior may indicate an AI agent has been compromised or misused to execute unauthorized system commands for defense evasion or post-exploitation activities.
Detects the abuse of the CMSTPLUA COM object, a known technique for UAC bypass, to execute a hidden and non-profile PowerShell process. This behavior is associated with malicious activity chains like RemotePanel or BoundSiphon that aim to achieve elevated execution.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe where the process image is located in the user's local AppData directory under specific suspicious folder names. This behavior is indicative of a user-land installer or potential malware attempting to maintain persistence or execute malicious packages while masquerading as common applications.
Detects a sequence of events where a suspected sideloaded process (e.g., masquerading as common tools like curl or vim) is followed within 30 minutes by the registration of a new Windows service, a behavioral pattern associated with the NeedyMantis threat group.
Detects the execution of taskkill.exe to terminate known security software processes, when the command is initiated from sqlservr.exe or via a command shell child process of sqlservr.exe. This activity is a common post-exploitation step after abusing xp_cmdshell to neutralize defenses before deploying further payloads.
Detects the execution of the encryptbase64.ps1 PowerShell script when invoked by a process other than PowerShell or PowerShell Core. This behavior is indicative of NeedyMantis malware attempting to evade detection by executing scripts outside standard script hosts.
Detects instances where a Python process spawns a command-line shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or bash) within 15 seconds of starting, while executing common reconnaissance or utility commands. This behavior is indicative of malicious code executing at import-time, a technique often associated with supply chain compromises in Python packages.
This rule detects potential persistence via Python environment variable manipulation (PYTHONPATH) followed by suspicious network activity from a child process of python.exe. It specifically looks for the modification of the PYTHONPATH environment variable using PowerShell on Windows or shell configuration files on Unix-like systems, followed by a python.exe-initiated network connection (like curl) to external domains, which may indicate the execution of a malicious sitecustomize.py hook.
This rule detects instances where Python package management processes (pip or python) perform build or installation tasks, immediately followed by an outbound network connection initiated by the same process tree to a non-PyPI domain. This behavior is indicative of a supply chain attack where a malicious package contains code (e.g., in setup.py) that beacons to an attacker-controlled server upon installation.
Detects the execution of the 'fanout.sh' utility from the /tmp directory, which subsequently spawns 'sshpass' child processes to perform rapid, non-interactive SSH authentication attempts ('StrictHostKeyChecking=no') against multiple internal hosts within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated lateral movement, specifically observed by threat actor UNC6240.
Detects the execution of 'sqlcmd.exe' when spawned by web application pools (w3wp.exe) or general command shell (cmd.exe) processes that do not appear to be related to authorized database administration or IIS appcmd activity.
Detects the use of 'findstr' or PowerShell to query sensitive configuration files (such as web.config or applicationHost.config) for credential-related keywords like 'connectionString', 'AccountKey', or 'machineKey'. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to harvest credentials or sensitive configuration data stored in cleartext on the filesystem.
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