Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe that executes a command interpreter or script engine (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, wscript) where the parent process is not signed by Microsoft. This behavior is often associated with the execution of malicious payloads, persistence mechanisms, or lateral movement.
Monitors IIS web servers for signs of potential exploitation by tracking suspicious child processes spawned by worker processes (w3wp.exe/iisexpress.exe), tracking unexpected WER (Windows Error Reporting) crashes associated with IIS workers, aggregating IIS-related application crashes, and detecting anomalous W3C IIS log request patterns (e.g., malformed content-length, negative bytes, or suspicious URI characteristics).
This rule detects the execution of the Rubeus tool or the usage of common command-line arguments associated with Kerberoasting activities (e.g., GetUserSPNs, Request-SPNTicket). Kerberoasting is a technique used to extract service account password hashes from Active Directory by requesting service tickets for accounts with Service Principal Names (SPNs). These hashes can then be cracked offline to obtain cleartext credentials.
Detects the execution of vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe with command-line arguments intended to delete or resize Volume Shadow Copies. This is a common technique used by ransomware to prevent system recovery and inhibit administrative rollback of file changes.
This rule detects the creation or registration of scheduled tasks that involve the 'PerfWatson2.exe' utility or execution paths originating from within the local AppData directory. These patterns are often associated with persistence mechanisms used by malware or malicious scripts to maintain execution after reboots.
Detects instances where common web server processes initiate command interpreters or system utilities. This behavior is a common indicator of web shell execution, where an adversary uses a web application vulnerability to gain remote code execution on the underlying server.
Detects common lateral movement patterns associated with Pass-the-Hash (PtH) attacks, specifically identifying remote execution via WMI/services, the use of explicit credentials in management utilities (wmic/net), and suspicious network connections from known administration tools over lateral movement ports.
Detects potential PrintNightmare or Print Spooler exploitation by monitoring for the spoolsv.exe service spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd, powershell, rundll32) and unauthorized files being dropped into the printer driver directory.
Detects potential defense evasion using common Windows LOLBins (Living off the Land Binaries) to execute code from untrusted locations or remote sources. Specifically targets mshta.exe loading remote HTA files, regsvr32.exe performing Squiblydoo-style COM scriptlet execution via URL, and rundll32.exe executing DLLs from user-writable directories like Temp or AppData.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility with command-line arguments indicating persistence triggers ('onlogon', 'onstart') or elevation to the 'SYSTEM' account. Adversaries commonly use these methods to ensure malicious code executes automatically upon system startup or with high privileges to facilitate further exploitation.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin or PowerShell 'Start-BitsTransfer' to initiate background data transfer jobs pointing to non-Microsoft or non-Windows Update domains. This technique is commonly used by adversaries for C2 communication or to download malicious payloads.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with encoded commands that include signs of web-based downloads or unusually long payloads, which are often used to hide malicious scripts or execute stagers. The rule filters out trusted signers and common administrative management tools to reduce noise.
Detects evidence of file timestomping, a technique used by attackers to modify file system timestamps (Create, Access, Modify, Change) to evade forensic detection or masquerade malicious files. The rule monitors for explicit usage of timestomping tools (e.g., Invoke-TimeStomp), abuse of system utilities like fsutil.exe for timestamp modification by suspicious parent processes, and unauthorized or unsigned processes performing timestamp modification on sensitive file types.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the wevtutil command-line utility or PowerShell cmdlets (Clear-EventLog, Remove-EventLog). Adversaries often clear event logs to hinder forensic investigations and remove evidence of their malicious activity.
Detects signs of access token manipulation and impersonation, including the use of 'runas' with saved credentials, suspicious PowerShell API calls for identity management, usage of known token-manipulation tools (e.g., incognito), and reconnaissance using 'whoami /priv'. These activities are indicative of privilege escalation attempts or lateral movement.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities such as shutdown.exe, wmic, powershell, and rundll32 to trigger an immediate system shutdown or restart, which may be indicative of unauthorized system disruption or malicious activity.
Detects potential credential dumping activities and unauthorized access to sensitive system files. The rule monitors for three primary indicators: raw disk device access (often associated with volume shadow copy dumping), suspicious DiskShadow utility execution, and NTDS.dit extraction using ntdsutil. Known administrative and backup software processes are excluded to minimize noise.
Detects instances where common Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook) launch suspicious child processes often associated with malicious command execution, such as command shells, scripting interpreters, or system utilities.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin or the PowerShell Start-BitsTransfer cmdlet for downloading files from the internet or local network, often used by attackers to perform ingress tool transfer or to maintain persistence via BITS jobs.
This rule monitors for potential Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) exploitation by detecting web application processes (such as Java, Python, or Web Server binaries) that initiate child processes (such as shell interpreters or script engines) while their command line contains common SSTI markers or exploitation patterns like '{{7*7}}', 'subprocess.Popen', or 'java.lang.Runtime'. This indicates an attacker has successfully escalated from template injection to remote code execution.
Detects the execution of processes containing the string 'detect_sandbox' in their command-line arguments. This pattern is commonly used by malicious code or automated tools attempting to determine if they are running within a virtualized or sandbox analysis environment.
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