Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,483 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects Node.js executing the malicious setup.cjs script with the --no-warnings flag. This execution sequence is associated with the easy-day-js typosquat postinstall hook used in the Mastra npm supply chain compromise.
Detects attempts by LCRYX ransomware to disable security protections, including Windows Defender real-time monitoring and firewall, as well as third-party antivirus software (Bitdefender, Kaspersky). The detection monitors process creation events for malicious command-line arguments, excluding legitimate administrative processes like msiexec.exe or services.exe.
Detects execution of SharpHound (BloodHound) for Active Directory enumeration and subsequent exfiltration of collected datasets, specifically tracking activity attributed to the MexicanMafia (Operation Escaneo).
This rule detects scenarios where an Oracle database process (or associated service processes) spawns potentially malicious OS-level child processes, such as shells, network utilities, or script execution. This behavior is highly indicative of abuse of Oracle features like DBMS_SCHEDULER or UTL_FILE to execute arbitrary commands, perform network reconnaissance, or stage exploit payloads.
Detects the execution of known Impacket framework scripts such as psexec.py, wmiexec.py, and secretsdump.py, or command lines containing common indicators associated with these tools. The rule monitors process start events and filters for indicators of lateral movement and credential harvesting including administrative share access and lsass or ntds.dit interaction.
This rule detects the execution of the BloodHound or SharpHound Active Directory enumeration tools by monitoring for specific process names, command-line arguments associated with the tool's common flags (e.g., --CollectionMethod, --ZipFileName), and file paths containing these tool names.
Detects exploitation attempts of the Zerologon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) by monitoring for specific process executions related to Impacket tools (secretsdump, zerologon_tester), suspicious domain controller machine account password resets via Windows Event ID 4742, and high-frequency Netlogon authentication failures (Event ID 4776) typical of the zero-length client challenge brute force attack.
This rule monitors process execution events for the presence of the Chisel network tunneling tool. It identifies Chisel by its executable names (e.g., chisel.exe, chisel_linux) and command-line arguments typical of a Chisel client or server configuration, including SOCKS proxy setups and known indicator ports.
This rule detects lateral movement activity associated with the Impacket toolkit. It monitors for the execution of common Impacket scripts (e.g., psexec.py, smbexec.py, wmiexec.py) or binaries (psexec.exe/PsExec64.exe) spawning from suspicious parent processes or interacting with sensitive Windows shares (ADMIN$, IPC$). Additionally, it flags Python processes performing SMB connections to multiple internal hosts, as well as cmd.exe/powershell.exe instances spawned from services.exe that reference Impacket tool names in their command lines.
This rule detects the creation of suspicious child processes by 'lsass.exe' on Windows systems. LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) is a critical Windows process responsible for enforcing security policies. Under normal circumstances, LSASS should not spawn common command-line interpreters or system utilities like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or rundll32.exe. Such activity is highly indicative of post-exploitation behavior, potentially following a successful compromise like the referenced CVE-2026-41089 Netlogon RCE, where an attacker might use LSASS to execute further commands or tools.
This rule detects the DRAYN malware performing environment reconnaissance and sandbox evasion. It monitors for file access to the 'vmbusr.sys' driver, which is commonly used to identify virtual machine environments, followed by the execution of PowerShell commands to retrieve the system's UUID via Win32_ComputerSystem, a technique used for host fingerprinting.
Detects a sequence of actions often performed by the LCRYX ransomware, characterized by the suppression of Windows boot recovery settings via BCDEdit followed by the deletion of volume shadow copies (using vssadmin or wmic) or backup catalogs (using wbadmin), all executed from the same process within a 10-minute window.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities associated with LCRYX ransomware, starting with PowerShell execution containing AMSI bypass strings (e.g., AmsiInitFailed, amsiContext), followed by event log clearing using wevtutil or PowerShell Clear-EventLog, or disabling of audit policies using auditpol.
This rule detects the execution of Impacket toolkit modules (such as psexec.py, wmiexec.py, secretsdump.py) via EDR process events, as well as potential lateral movement patterns identified by NTLM authentication (Logon Type 3) to ADMIN$ or IPC$ shares. This combination of signals is indicative of credential dumping, remote service execution, or lateral movement using techniques often employed by the Impacket suite.
Detects suspicious unprivileged process behavior associated with the exploitation of CVE-2026-43503 (DirtyClone). The rule identifies non-root users invoking 'unshare' or 'clone' with namespace-related flags (CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWNET), followed by critical writes to namespace mapping files (/proc/self/uid_map, /proc/self/gid_map, /proc/self/setgroups) which are prerequisite steps for elevating to CAP_NET_ADMIN privileges.
This rule detects potentially malicious shell execution (e.g., bash -i, /dev/tcp/ reverse shells, netcat) spawned directly or indirectly by common media processing applications such as ffmpeg, ffprobe, jellyfin, or nextcloud. It identifies when these applications initiate shell processes or execute command lines that exhibit suspicious behavior or access specific media-related paths commonly targeted for abuse.
Detects execution of the Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (cmstp.exe) when initialized with an INF file from potentially suspicious directories (e.g., Temp, AppData), or when cmstp.exe is observed spawning common command-line shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or rundll32.exe, which is indicative of potential proxy execution or UAC bypass techniques.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious download-related commands (Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadFile, WebClient, IEX, DownloadString) when initiated through conhost.exe, specifically when the originating parent process is a common shell or utility associated with shortcut (.lnk) file execution or specific command patterns.
Detects anomalous network communication patterns and file system changes indicative of SoftEther VPN usage, particularly when linked to processes masquerading as VMware or communicating with known malicious C2 infrastructure. The rule monitors for network connections on common SoftEther ports, connections to specific command-and-control IP addresses, and the creation of SoftEther configuration files like 'hamcore.se2' or 'vpn_bridge.config'.
Sshpass Lateral Movement
YARA-L
Detects sshpass automation usage by administrative accounts
Detects wermgr.exe masquerading outside legitimate system directories, associated with the Nightmare Eclipse exploit chain.
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