Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,483 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects the execution of Ghostscript (gswin64c.exe) by ImageMagick (magick.exe or convert.exe), where the binary location does not appear to be a standard installation path. This behavior is a common indicator of exploitation attempts against ImageMagick vulnerabilities, such as ImageTragick or subsequent Ghostscript-based file processing exploits.
This rule detects processes that are not common browsers (chrome, msedge, firefox, etc.) initiating a network connection over the STUN protocol (UDP port 3478) while simultaneously running with a command-line argument containing '--kiosk'. This pattern often indicates potential command-and-control (C2) communication or unauthorized network traversal disguised as normal traffic from kiosk-mode applications.
Detects indicators of exploitation attempts targeting the c-ares asynchronous DNS library, specifically focusing on Use-After-Free (UAF) vulnerabilities. The rule monitors for the presence of known proof-of-concept (PoC) file artifacts, execution of processes using specific command-line flags associated with c-ares exploit research, suspicious shell/calculator spawning from common network-enabled applications (curl, node, python), and anomalous high-frequency DNS-over-TCP traffic patterns.
Detects the execution of VBScript processes (wscript.exe/cscript.exe) that interact with WMI to enumerate installed antivirus products or perform external IP geolocation lookups via services like ip-api.com. This behavior is indicative of the Grandoreiro banking trojan performing environment reconnaissance and victim-targeted execution.
Detects potential exploitation attempts targeting the Flowise 3.1.2 Custom MCP (Model Context Protocol) stdio interface. The detection monitors for the bypass of environment variable validation where lowercase 'node_options' is used to circumvent security controls blocking 'NODE_OPTIONS', potentially allowing unauthorized code execution via '--require'. It also alerts on the presence of associated PoC artifacts and anomalous outbound network activity from Flowise processes.
Detects behavior patterns associated with the Grandoreiro banking trojan, specifically focusing on DLL side-loading from user-writable directories (AppData, Temp, Downloads) and the execution of randomized executables spawned by wscript.exe, which is characteristic of its VBS dropper mechanism.
Detects the presence and execution of the 'mybb_limited_acp_to_admin' PoC script, as well as suspicious child process creation originating from web server or PHP processes when the command line includes 'admincp'. This is indicative of potential web exploitation or the use of a web shell within the MyBB Administrative Control Panel environment.
Detects local privilege escalation attempts targeting AnyDesk by exploiting COM object registration. The attack involves registering a malicious COM server in HKCU to intercept the AnyDesk service's interaction with the print pipe, followed by process token impersonation to gain SYSTEM privileges. The rule monitors for unauthorized COM registration, anomalous process execution from AnyDesk, and cross-process access.
This rule detects activity associated with known Android Remote Access Trojans (RATs) such as BTMOB, CraxsRAT, CypherRAT, and SpySolr on SentinelOne-managed Android devices. It flags suspicious file creations (sideloaded APKs in user storage), specific malicious process names, SentinelOne threat indicators, and abuse of accessibility services for unauthorized remote control, keylogging, or screen overlay activities.
Detects Node.js executing the malicious setup.cjs script with the --no-warnings flag. This execution sequence is associated with the easy-day-js typosquat postinstall hook used in the Mastra npm supply chain compromise.
This rule detects the execution of VBScript files using wscript.exe or cscript.exe that are closely followed by network connections to known public IP geolocation services (ip-api.com, ipinfo.io, api.country.is). It further enhances the detection by checking if a secondary process is spawned from the same host, which may indicate a payload retrieval or execution phase typical of malware staging.
Smbexec Lateral Movement
YARA-L
Detects the command line pattern characteristic of Impacket's SMBExec, involving echoing a payload to a temporary batch file, executing, and deleting it.
Detects instances where the FFmpeg or FFplay multimedia frameworks spawn unexpected child processes. This behavior is indicative of successful exploitation of the RASC/DLTA codec heap overflow vulnerability, where a malicious media file triggers arbitrary code execution.
Detects the execution or presence of identified exploit harness binaries and scripts associated with CVE-2026-55200, an RCE vulnerability in libssh2. The rule monitors process launches for specific filenames and command-line arguments indicative of proof-of-concept or exploitation tooling from the 'exploitarium' repository.
Detects the spawning of shell or scripting processes from IDEs, code editors, or AI-assistant processes (e.g., 'claude', 'node'). The rule specifically flags potential reverse shell patterns or dangerous command-line flags often used during development or exploitation, such as '--dangerously-skip-permissions'.
This rule detects potential Mythic C2 implant or payload build activity occurring via Docker. It monitors for executions of docker.exe, docker-compose.exe, or docker commands initiated by shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) containing keywords associated with the Mythic C2 framework, while explicitly excluding common CI/CD runner parent processes to reduce noise.
Detects attempts to disable or impair Microsoft Defender Antivirus using legitimate system administration tools such as PowerShell (Set-MpPreference, Add-MpPreference), WMIC, sc.exe, or net.exe. Adversaries may use these tools to bypass security controls by disabling real-time monitoring or adding unauthorized exclusion paths.
This rule detects potential attempts to disable Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell 5.1 using reflection-based manipulation of the amsiInitFailed boolean field in the System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils class. Attackers often use obfuscation techniques such as splitting strings or using reflection methods to bypass static security signatures.
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender real-time protection by modifying the DisableRealtimeMonitoring registry key using the reg.exe utility.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands that attempt to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by dynamically creating methods using System.Reflection.Emit. It looks for specific keywords associated with reflection-based AMSI tampering, such as creating dynamic methods, accessing internal IL generators, and explicitly targeting AMSI-related memory structures like amsiContext or s_amsiInitFailed.
This rule detects potential malicious activity involving PowerShell by correlating signs of an Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass attempt with an subsequent network connection to an external, non-standard port. The rule monitors for common command-line patterns used to disable or impair AMSI functionality within PowerShell processes, followed by suspicious outbound network traffic from the same process within a five-minute window.
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