Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,483 detections
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Detects usage of Sysinternals PsService which can be abused for service reconnaissance and tampering
Detects usage of Sysinternals PsSuspend which can be abused to suspend critical processes
This rule correlates multiple low-to-medium confidence signals across file, process, network, and registry events to detect potential ransomware activity. The rule identifies suspicious behaviors including mass file renames, creation of known ransom note file types in multiple directories, shadow copy deletion via system utilities, disabling of antivirus and security monitoring, large archive staging, unauthorized outbound network connections, and suspicious process injection. Alerts are generated based on the aggregation and frequency of these signals, indicating a high probability of ransomware-related malicious activity.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain on macOS involving a browser or mail client spawning a shell to download a file (DMG) via curl/wget, followed by the mounting of that disk image, execution of an application bundle from the mounted volume, and a subsequent outbound network connection from that application. This behavior is indicative of a user-initiated malware execution chain.
Detects a multi-stage attack pattern associated with the Qilin ransomware, beginning with suspicious VPN authentication (potential credential stuffing or bypass), moving through lateral movement attempts (SMB/RDP/WMI), and culminating in ransomware behaviors such as shadow copy deletion, mass file encryption, and ransom note creation.
Detects process creation for common RMM tools.
The idea here would be to alert on non approved RMM tools, and anything outside of the one or few approved tools would be suspicious/malicious.
The idea here would be to alert on non approved RMM tools, and anything outside of the one or few approved tools would be suspicious/malicious.
Detects the execution of common system discovery utilities (whoami, ipconfig, net, etc.) by a process named 'setup.exe' originating from suspicious directories such as 'AppData\Local\Temp\' or 'Downloads'. This behavior is often indicative of automated reconnaissance following the initial execution of a potentially malicious installer or dropper.
Detects instances of the svchost.exe process running from an unexpected parent process or with unusual command-line arguments. Legitimate svchost.exe instances are typically spawned by services.exe or wininit.exe and utilize specific command-line flags. This rule identifies potential masquerading attempts where malicious actors name a process svchost.exe to evade detection.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'OneDriveHealth', which is associated with APT28 activity. This task is used for persistence via COM hijacking; it executes 60 seconds after registration, kills and restarts explorer.exe to facilitate the loading of a hijacked COM object, and subsequently removes itself.
This rule detects potentially malicious lateral movement or persistence activities by monitoring the creation or modification of executable files in remote network shares and startup folders, as well as the use of administrative tools like sc.exe or schtasks.exe to create services or tasks. The rule specifically filters out processes signed by Microsoft, focusing on non-standard or unsigned binaries that perform these administrative actions across multiple instances, indicating potential automated lateral propagation.
Detects the use of net.exe and dsquery.exe to enumerate domain user accounts and domain groups. Adversaries often perform this reconnaissance to identify target accounts or privileged groups within an Active Directory environment.
Detects the execution of known command-line sync tools (Rclone, MEGAsync) or commands attempting to sync or move data to various cloud storage services (s3, gdrive, onedrive, mega, dropbox). The rule focuses on executions from suspicious or temporary directory paths and excludes processes signed by trusted publishers to minimize noise.
Detects the execution of known privilege escalation tools (JuicyPotato, RoguePotato, PrintSpoofer) or command-line arguments indicative of token impersonation attempts (e.g., usage of SeImpersonatePrivilege) to escalate privileges on Windows systems.
Detects instances where common Windows system processes (dllhost.exe, mmc.exe, svchost.exe) spawn known living-off-the-land binaries (LotLBin) or command-line interpreters. This behavior is often indicative of process injection or malicious activity where an adversary leverages trusted system processes to execute commands or malicious scripts.
Detects the execution of SSH or Plink processes with command-line arguments indicating local, remote, or dynamic port forwarding. Adversaries may use port forwarding to tunnel traffic through a compromised host to bypass network segment restrictions or access internal resources.
Detects the execution of known Kerberoasting tools or commands that indicate an attempt to request Kerberos service tickets for offline cracking. This activity is a core component of the Kerberoasting attack technique.
This detection identifies a pattern associated with the "ClickFix" social engineering technique, where a user is tricked into copying a malicious command and pasting it into a PowerShell terminal. The query correlates a recent clipboard operation with a subsequent suspicious PowerShell execution by the same user on the same device.
Detects the execution of common Windows utilities (diskpart, format, cipher, sdelete, eraser) when used with flags indicative of data destruction or disk wiping behavior. This rule monitors for process creations involving commands designed to irrecoverably erase data or wipe drive contents.
This rule detects potential brute force or password spraying attacks by monitoring high volumes of authentication failures on an endpoint within a 5-minute window. Additionally, it identifies the execution of processes associated with multi-factor authentication (MFA) or single sign-on (SSO) clients, which could indicate an adversary attempting to bypass or manipulate MFA mechanisms.
Detects the execution of known NTLM relay and credential harvesting tools such as Responder, Inveigh, and PetitPotam, or suspicious command-line patterns involving the use of 'net use' or common Windows binaries (e.g., powershell.exe, rundll32.exe) to access or force SMB authentication with remote IP addresses.
Detects the creation of a new scheduled task using the Windows native schtasks.exe command-line utility. This behavior is commonly associated with persistence mechanisms or lateral movement activities where attackers schedule tasks to execute malicious payloads.
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