Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
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This rule detects potentially malicious activity related to the 'node-gyp' build tool used by npm. It monitors for two patterns: 1) npm spawning node-gyp, which can be an automated trigger for malicious binding.gyp files, and 2) node-gyp spawning node.exe with command-line arguments indicative of obfuscated JavaScript (e.g., base64 encoding, eval, AES-GCM patterns), a technique often seen in malicious Node.js packages.
This rule detects potential Remote Access Trojan (RAT) activity by identifying specific indicators associated with Nuitka-compiled binaries, specifically the 'chost.exe' filename or paths containing 'win-driver-xd7d'. Additionally, it monitors for suspicious Python-based loader executions ('loader.py') initiated from temporary directories, which is a common persistence or execution technique for such malware.
Detects suspicious usage of the Bun runtime, specifically when it is spawned by common Node.js development processes (like npm or node-gyp) or downloaded from non-official sources using command-line tools or browsers. This behavior is associated with the Miasma malware campaign, which abuses the Bun runtime for malicious operations.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook, OneNote, Access, Publisher) spawning common command interpreters or scripting engines. This behavior is a common indicator of macro-based malware or malicious document exploitation where Office applications are used as an initial access vector to execute arbitrary code.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell processes. The rule looks for known bypass strings, memory patching via Marshal, reflection-based disabling of AmsiUtils, or base64-encoded AMSI patch targets.
Detects execution of PowerShell processes (powershell.exe, pwsh.exe) containing command-line arguments indicative of Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass attempts. This includes known bypass strings, reflection-based patching of memory internals (AmsiUtils, GetDelegateForFunctionPointer), and base64-encoded fragments of common bypass techniques.
Detects modification or creation of Windows Registry Run keys by non-Microsoft signed instances of reg.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe. This activity is a common method for achieving persistence by ensuring malicious code executes automatically upon user login.
This rule detects attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies (VSS) using native Windows utilities such as vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, or PowerShell. Attackers often perform this action during the impact phase to prevent file recovery after ransomware deployment or other data destruction activities.
Detects modifications to the WDigest UseLogonCredential registry value, which is a known technique to force Windows to store plaintext credentials in memory. This is often performed by adversaries using tools like Mimikatz to facilitate credential dumping from the LSASS process.
Detects the abuse of the Windows utility mshta.exe to execute potentially malicious scripts or remote HTML applications (HTA). The rule looks for command-line arguments involving remote URL fetches (HTTP/HTTPS/UNC) or inline script execution (vbscript/javascript), which are common techniques for bypassing security controls and executing payloads.
Detects unauthorized attempts to access or list stored credentials via Windows Credential Manager using standard administrative tools (cmdkey.exe, vaultcmd.exe) or PowerShell, as well as direct unauthorized access to credential storage files within the AppData directory.
Detects the creation or configuration of Windows services using sc.exe or PowerShell where the binary path points to suspicious, writable directories (Temp, AppData, or ProgramData). This behavior is often associated with persistence mechanisms where adversaries place malicious binaries in user-writable locations to execute with higher privileges.
Detects attempts to clear Windows event logs using the native command-line utility 'wevtutil' or PowerShell cmdlets 'Clear-EventLog' and 'Remove-EventLog'. Adversaries often perform this action to remove evidence of their activities from security, system, and application logs. The rule includes exclusions for common administrative, backup, and security-related processes to minimize false positives.
Detects attempts to disable or modify Windows Firewall settings using netsh, PowerShell, or direct registry modifications. Adversaries often perform these actions to evade detection and maintain uninhibited network communication for C2 or data exfiltration.
This rule detects unauthorized or suspicious queries against Windows Registry paths known to contain sensitive information, including security hives (SAM, SECURITY), application-specific secrets (PuTTY, OpenSSH, RealVNC), and system autologon credentials. It monitors both command-line executions of 'reg.exe' and PowerShell commands targeting these registry keys.
Detects the use of legitimate command-line utilities such as rclone, AWS CLI, AzCopy, curl, and wget to upload data to cloud storage endpoints, which is a common technique used for data exfiltration.
This rule detects potentially malicious modification of sensitive configuration files (e.g., /etc/ssh/sshd_config, /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow) or the execution of chmod/chown commands on sensitive files. It also flags common persistence/backdoor techniques such as modifying SSH settings to allow root login or applying dangerous permissions (777, setuid, setgid) to binaries, which could facilitate privilege escalation.
Detects Visual Studio Code or Cursor IDE spawning a node.js process that executes a payload disguised as a .woff2 font file. This behavior is associated with supply chain attacks where malicious npm packages use hidden VS Code workspace tasks (e.g., folderOpen) to execute arbitrary code.
Detects instances where a Python process is spawned by npm or node and subsequently attempts to access sensitive browser or cloud credential files. This pattern is characteristic of malicious npm packages used for credential theft.
Detects npm or node processes spawning shell interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) during package installation, which subsequently execute download utilities (curl, wget, certutil, bitsadmin). This behavior is characteristic of malicious npm packages attempting to stage payloads during the 'preinstall' or 'postinstall' hooks.
Detects the execution of the Windows Remote Desktop Client (mstsc.exe) spawned from an email client, browser, or archival application following the opening of a .rdp file attachment. This behavior is consistent with Turla's STOCKSTAY campaign, where malicious RDP configuration files are used to target sensitive entities.
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