Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
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This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms associated with Microsoft Outlook, specifically targeting registry modifications related to Outlook security settings or suspicious child processes (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) spawned by outlook.exe.
Detects the deletion of volume shadow copies using standard Windows utilities such as vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, or PowerShell commands. This behavior is commonly associated with ransomware or other malicious activity aimed at inhibiting system recovery by removing backups.
Detects evidence of libssh2 publickey list heap corruption exploitation, including the presence or execution of known proof-of-concept (PoC) binaries, malicious SSH server connection patterns on port 2228, and suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, calc.exe) spawned by SSH clients or daemons.
This rule detects various commands and processes used by adversaries to enumerate virtual machine software, hypervisor configurations, and virtualization-based security features on a host. This is often part of reconnaissance to understand the environment, detect sandboxing, or identify virtualization platforms for further post-exploitation activities.
Detects instances where a non-SYSTEM parent process spawns a child process running as SYSTEM, characteristic of 'Potato' family exploits (e.g., JuicyPotato, PrintSpoofer) leveraging SeImpersonatePrivilege to elevate privileges. The rule specifically filters for known legitimate SYSTEM process spawners while highlighting suspicious parent-child process relationships.
Detects OpenVPN Connect spawning unexpected child processes such as command interpreters or malicious payloads. This behavior is indicative of exploitation of the 'echo script' arbitrary code execution vulnerability where a malicious VPN server pushes arbitrary commands to be executed upon client disconnection.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell commands that leverage Windows Forms or GDI APIs (e.g., System.Windows.Forms.Screen, System.Drawing.Bitmap, CopyFromScreen) to perform screen capture. Adversaries often use these native .NET capabilities to capture desktop screenshots during post-exploitation.
Detects exploitation of the Flowise MCP environment variable case-sensitivity bypass vulnerability. Adversaries leverage this flaw to circumvent denylist validation by supplying lowercase or mixed-case variable names (e.g., node_options), facilitating malicious code preloading via '--require', unauthorized environment secret exfiltration, or spawning child processes from the Flowise application.
Detects Node.js executing the malicious setup.cjs script with the --no-warnings flag. This execution sequence is associated with the easy-day-js typosquat postinstall hook used in the Mastra npm supply chain compromise.
This rule detects when the WMI provider host process (wmiprvse.exe) spawns common scripting interpreters or command-line shells such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or wscript.exe. This behavior is a common indicator of remote command execution via WMI, often used by adversaries for lateral movement, remote code execution, or persistence within a Windows environment.
Detects the execution of known living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) such as mshta.exe, certutil.exe, bitsadmin.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe directly by explorer.exe. This pattern is indicative of a user-initiated execution, potentially triggered by social engineering lures like the 'ClickFix' technique, where a user is tricked into pasting and running malicious commands in the Windows Run dialog or a command prompt context.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks (schtasks.exe) spawned by common scripting or social engineering-related parent processes (PowerShell, Cmd, WScript, MSHTA). The rule specifically looks for payloads associated with common attack patterns, such as downloading remote content or executing encoded commands, which indicates potential persistence or payload delivery activities.
Detects potential BaoLoader drive-by compromise attempts by monitoring two stages: first, the creation of executable files in temporary or application data directories by browser processes; and second, the execution of command-line shells by processes running from those same directories where the browser acted as the grandparent.
Detects unauthorized attempts to enumerate stored Windows credentials using native command-line utilities such as vaultcmd.exe and cmdkey.exe, or by invoking CredEnumerate/Get-StoredCredential functions via PowerShell scripts. These methods are commonly used by attackers to gain access to cached passwords, tokens, or network credentials stored in the Windows Credential Manager.
Detects the use of bitsadmin.exe to initiate file transfers from remote HTTP/HTTPS locations. This behavior is frequently used by adversaries to download malicious payloads onto a host using legitimate system utilities.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe where the task action executes a scripting engine or living-off-the-land binary (LOLBin). This behavior is often indicative of adversaries attempting to establish persistence or execute code using native system tools to evade detection.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe spawning a child powershell.exe process with arguments specifically configured to execute a script file starting with 'ps_' from the 'C:\Temp' directory. This behavior is highly characteristic of JScript droppers commonly associated with malicious email attachments that write and launch secondary payloads silently in the background.
Detects instances where the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSE.exe) spawns common interactive shells, scripting interpreters, or other binaries typically associated with remote command execution. This pattern is a strong indicator of WMI being abused for lateral movement or remote code execution within a Windows environment.
Detects the LokiBot malware spawning aspnet_compiler.exe to perform process hollowing. The rule identifies this activity by monitoring process creation events and filtering out legitimate .NET build processes, targeting the specific behavior of using aspnet_compiler.exe as a host for reflective code injection.
This rule detects PowerShell commands that perform XOR decryption of an embedded payload using the hardcoded key 'Pussecretvk456' and subsequently use [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load to reflectively load the resulting .NET assembly into memory. This behavior is indicative of fileless execution patterns commonly observed in the LokiBot and Amadey malware families.
Detects a specific command-line pattern used by the Amadey loader to perform self-relocation. The process chain executed via cmd.exe includes 'taskkill', 'timeout', 'del', and 'ren' in a single command line to terminate, delete, rename, and relaunch its executable from a user-writable directory to maintain persistence and evade detection.
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