Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,483 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a common internet-facing server process (e.g., w3wp.exe, nginx.exe) spawns a potentially malicious child process (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe), followed shortly thereafter by mass file modifications on the same host, which is characteristic of ransomware behavior following initial exploitation.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a common internet-facing server process (e.g., w3wp.exe, nginx.exe) spawns a potentially malicious child process (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe), followed shortly thereafter by mass file modifications on the same host, which is characteristic of ransomware behavior following initial exploitation.
Detects execution patterns associated with known Water Hydra exploit chains, specifically targeting CVE-2023-38831 (WinRAR self-extracting archive exploitation) and CVE-2024-21412 (Mark-of-the-Web/SmartScreen bypass via nested internet shortcuts). The rule monitors process lineage for WinRAR spawning command interpreters from temporary extraction directories and command line anomalies associated with rundll32.exe triggered from internet shortcut chains.
Detects a suspicious execution sequence associated with the SectopRAT loader. The rule monitors for ReportDump.exe being launched from a ProgramData directory by common scheduling or service host processes, followed immediately by the loading of a malicious sdkcra.dll library.
Detects the specific command-line sequence used by SectopRAT for self-deletion. The malware uses 'choice' to create a delay followed by a 'del' command to remove its own executable, a technique for deleting files after the process has terminated.
Detects instances where common AI agent orchestration runtimes (e.g., LangChain, AutoGPT, CrewAI) spawn command-line or scripting interpreters as child processes. This behavior is highly suspicious and often indicative of malicious command execution triggered by prompt injection attacks, where an adversary manipulates the agent into executing arbitrary system commands.
This rule detects automated browser-based processes (such as chromedriver, msedgedriver, geckodriver, playwright, or node/python scripts leveraging browser automation frameworks) initiating network connections to domains or URLs identified in active threat intelligence as malicious. This behavior is indicative of an AI agent or automated script being steered toward attacker-controlled infrastructure, potentially for drive-by compromise or exploitation.
Detects anomalous, high-volume HTTP requests to AI agent orchestration endpoints (e.g., tool invocation, plugins, or webhooks) followed by suspicious process execution or outbound network connections from the same host. This behavior is indicative of RCE exploitation against an AI agent framework, such as insecure deserialization or SSRF within a plugin connector.
Detects the installation of known AI-powered coding assistant extensions (e.g., Copilot, Tabnine, Cursor) on a device, followed by significant source-code repository cloning or archival activity by Git within two hours. This pattern is potentially indicative of intellectual property theft or sensitive source code exfiltration facilitated by a newly introduced AI tool.
This rule monitors for network communication with a specific known malicious IP address and URL path, as well as the execution or presence of associated malicious file hashes. Additionally, it flags emails involving specific indicators identified as potentially associated with malicious activity.
Detects service-creation commands (sc create / New-Service / reg add under a Services key) whose COMMAND LINE itself references a known NeedyMantis binary name or sideload staging folder. Requiring the malicious reference to appear in the command being executed -- rather than merely in the calling process's own folder location -- removes false matches from unrelated legitimate software that happens to be installed under a similarly-named folder.
This rule detects activity involving known malicious indicators of compromise (IOCs), including specific IP addresses, domains, and file hashes. It monitors network connections, file system activity, process execution, and email attachments, filtering out common security tools to reduce noise.
This rule detects potential malicious activity where a file (in this case, a PDF) is downloaded using curl via conhost, followed shortly by a PowerShell command that searches the file for a specific marker ("cAB") and decodes/executes embedded Base64 content. This pattern aligns with known TTPs observed in Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaigns.
This rule detects potentially malicious PowerShell command execution originating from a Windows Remote Management (WinRM) process (wsmprovhost.exe). It monitors for child processes of wsmprovhost.exe launching powershell.exe or pwsh.exe combined with indicators of obfuscated command-line arguments, such as encoded commands, base64 strings, or common bypass/evasion parameters like IEX or -NoProfile.
Detects a suspicious sequence of reconnaissance activities associated with ShinyHunters campaigns targeting PeopleSoft environments. The pattern involves reading '/etc/hosts' using standard utilities ('cat', 'grep', 'awk') followed by rapid network discovery or probing attempts using 'curl', 'wget', 'nmap', or 'nc' from the same host within a 10-minute window.
Detects a suspected ClickFix-style delivery mechanism where a user visits suspicious domains mimicking legitimate CLI tools (e.g., Gemini, Claude) via web browsers. The detection correlates this initial network access with subsequent suspicious Windows RunMRU activity and the spawning of shell processes (powershell.exe, cmd.exe) from explorer.exe using encoded or download-oriented command line arguments within a 5-minute window.
Detects creation or modification of files under /etc/sudoers or /etc/sudoers.d/ by a
process outside sanctioned package- and configuration-management tooling. Writing a
passwordless sudo rule is the finishing move in CIFSwitch (CVE-2026-46243) and OVSwrap
(CVE-2026-64531) and a common root-persistence step generally. Enriched with writer
context (non-root, writable-path, shell one-liner, NOPASSWD) and a heuristic RiskScore /
TriagePriority, plus DeviceInfo host context (MachineGroup, OS, logged-on users).
Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs - Linux LPE detection framework.
process outside sanctioned package- and configuration-management tooling. Writing a
passwordless sudo rule is the finishing move in CIFSwitch (CVE-2026-46243) and OVSwrap
(CVE-2026-64531) and a common root-persistence step generally. Enriched with writer
context (non-root, writable-path, shell one-liner, NOPASSWD) and a heuristic RiskScore /
TriagePriority, plus DeviceInfo host context (MachineGroup, OS, logged-on users).
Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs - Linux LPE detection framework.
Detects anomalous child processes, such as shells or interpreters, spawned by web server processes (PHP-FPM, Apache, Nginx). This behavior is often indicative of exploitation attempts, such as Remote Code Execution (RCE) via web application vulnerabilities.
Detects a multi-stage exfiltration sequence consisting of: (1) bulk file archival/compression using common utilities, (2) suspicious OAuth grant or service principal authorization, and (3) abnormal network egress volume to common ports. This pattern suggests an adversary is preparing data, establishing or leveraging an identity/application for cloud access, and subsequently exfiltrating data.
This rule performs a point-in-time sweep for known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) associated with the NeedyMantis threat actor group. The detection logic searches for specific file, process, and image-load SHA256 hashes, communication with a known C2 domain (tripswithengine.com), and the use of a hard-coded user-agent string (Firefox/21.0) across various telemetry sources within the last 30 days.
This rule detects potential persistence via scheduled tasks that masquerade as legitimate network components (e.g., 'System Health Monitor'), as well as abnormal use of WebDav via rundll32.exe or net.exe in the context of the Star Blizzard (COLDRIVER) campaign. It monitors for task creation/updates, schtasks command lines, registry artifacts related to task scheduling, and suspicious WebDav network utility usage, while excluding common security tool processes.
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