Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects activities associated with the Star Blizzard (also known as APT28 or Callisto) group's CosmicPulse malware, specifically the downloader and Python-based backdoor. It monitors for suspicious CPL file execution via UNC paths by rundll32.exe or control.exe, unauthorized modifications to the HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis registry key used for COM hijacking, and anomalous spawning of Python executables from control host processes in user-writable directories.
This rule detects instances where the Faronics Deploy Agent process initiates the installation or download of ScreenConnect remote access software via PowerShell or the Windows Installer (msiexec.exe). This pattern is often indicative of authorized RMM deployment, but it is also a common tactic for adversaries to establish persistent remote access to endpoints.
Detects the installation sequence of the CosmicPulse (YESROBOT) backdoor, characterized by a registry value write under HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis followed by the execution of a Python 3.8 bootstrapper from a non-standard, suspicious directory such as AppData, ProgramData, or Temp.
Detects the installation sequence of the CosmicPulse (YESROBOT) backdoor, characterized by a registry value write under HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis followed by the execution of a Python 3.8 bootstrapper from a non-standard, suspicious directory such as AppData, ProgramData, or Temp.
Detects the Kothamine UAC-bypass technique, which uses fodhelper.exe to spawn an elevated PowerShell process. The rule monitors for fodhelper.exe being launched without arguments (a common indicator of this bypass) followed immediately by an elevated PowerShell process containing indicators like 'elevated.ps1' or 'TailscalePortable' paths.
Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
This analytic detects the macOS osascript utility being used with an interactive Bash invocation, identified by the presence
of "bash -i" in the command line.
Adversaries may abuse osascript and AppleScript's shell execution capabilities to launch
interactive shells, establish remote access, or execute post-exploitation commands.
of "bash -i" in the command line.
Adversaries may abuse osascript and AppleScript's shell execution capabilities to launch
interactive shells, establish remote access, or execute post-exploitation commands.
Detects the Windows Installer service (msiexec.exe) being launched by known remote access software processes like msra.exe (Microsoft Remote Assistance) or anydesk.exe. This behavior is often associated with unauthorized software installation or payload delivery via remote support tools.
Detects instances where the 'curl' utility is used to download files while simultaneously piping the output directly into a shell interpreter (bash/sh) or using download flags ('-o', '-O') in a way that suggests staging or immediate execution of remote scripts, often associated with force-flag bypass patterns.
Detects the download of a dataset from an unapproved source that lacks hash verification, followed shortly by the launch of a model training process on the same host. This behavior is indicative of potential supply chain compromise or poisoning of the training data used in machine learning workflows.
Detects the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, bash, wget) spawned by processes associated with public-facing appliances like Fortinet SSL-VPN, Veeam Backup & Replication, Citrix ADC, and cPanel/WHM. This behavior is often indicative of exploitation of public-facing applications (T1190) for initial access, frequently associated with ransomware actors targeting unpatched infrastructure.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying processes spawned via WMI (e.g., wmic.exe, WmiPrvSE.exe) or PowerShell Remoting (WinRM, Invoke-Command, Enter-PSSession) that occur shortly after a successful network or remote interactive logon on the same host.
Detects unauthorized attempts to access sensitive Veeam Backup and Replication credentials by querying the backend SQL database or directly accessing DPAPI Master Key files. This activity is indicative of an attacker attempting to decrypt backup credentials stored by the Veeam service.
Detects a burst of lateral movement activity characterized by the use of administrative tools like PsExec or NetExec/CrackMapExec to execute commands or services on multiple distinct target hosts from a single source host within a short window. This pattern is commonly associated with ransomware affiliates or threat actors performing reconnaissance and mass deployment of malicious payloads prior to encryption.
Detects remote command execution patterns associated with the Impacket suite (e.g., wmiexec.py, atexec.py, smbexec.py). The detection identifies cmd.exe processes spawned by WmiPrvSE.exe or svchost.exe that contain specific command-line arguments indicative of Impacket's remote execution behavior, such as output redirection to hidden administrative shares or temporary files.
Detects unauthorized attempts to dump credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process. This includes the execution of known credential-harvesting tools (e.g., Mimikatz, LaZagne, pypykatz), the use of system utilities like procdump and comsvcs.dll to dump process memory, and anomalous direct handle access to lsass.exe by non-system processes. This activity is associated with Storm-2570 post-compromise tradecraft.
Detects the execution of reconnaissance commands designed to enumerate Active Directory domain trust relationships. Attackers, including those associated with ransomware operations like INC Ransom, use these tools to map organizational structures and identify pathways for lateral movement and cross-domain propagation.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows administrative utilities (vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit, wbadmin) to delete volume shadow copies, clear backup catalogs, or modify boot configuration to prevent automatic system recovery. This behavior is a common indicator of ransomware preparing for encryption by removing local recovery options.
Detects the execution of known Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBAS) like mshta, rundll32, regsvr32, and others, when the command line includes indicators of external network retrieval (http/ftp), script execution (javascript/vbscript), or common obfuscation/decoding patterns (base64, encodedcommand). The rule excludes paths within System32 and SysWOW64 to focus on potentially suspicious locations or renamed binaries.
Detects common Windows system binaries (svchost.exe, csrss.exe, lsass.exe, explorer.exe) executing from non-standard directories, which is a common indicator of process masquerading to evade detection.
Detects endpoint-based retrieval of potential malicious payloads or configurations from blockchain-hosted infrastructure (e.g., Infura, Alchemy, public RPC nodes) using web-based RPC calls, followed by the execution of a script interpreter (e.g., PowerShell, WScript, MSHTA). This pattern is characteristic of 'EtherHiding' campaigns where smart contracts are used as decentralized and takedown-resistant storage for second-stage delivery.
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