Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,483 detections
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IDS Classtypes
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This rule correlates events across the end-to-end kill chain of an enterprise intrusion, specifically tracking the progression from initial endpoint-based infostealer activity (credential access), through anomalous or non-interactive sign-in activity, into privilege escalation or mailbox delegation within the cloud environment, and finally to mass data exfiltration or mail access. It detects accounts involved in at least three distinct stages of this progression within a 72-hour window.
This rule detects the installation or execution of common Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools (e.g., AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Atera, Splashtop, TeamViewer) on Windows endpoints within a 4-hour window of associated cloud identity risk activity (such as risky sign-ins, MFA changes, or privilege grants). It filters out legitimate activity initiated via standard software management pipelines (e.g., SCCM, Intune) to identify potential unauthorized use of remote access software by adversaries following account compromise.
Detects the use of common archiving utilities (7zip, WinRAR, Tar, or PowerShell Compress-Archive) to bundle sensitive Google Chrome user data, such as cookies, login data, or the entire user data profile directory. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to stage sensitive information for exfiltration.
This rule detects the execution of common command-line cloud synchronization and file transfer utilities (such as rclone, rsync, and MEGAcmd) when invoked with flags or patterns indicative of data staging or exfiltration, such as copy, sync, or targeting remote cloud storage locations.
Detects instances of potential lateral movement using PsExec or WMI following an alert related to credential compromise, infostealers, or session hijacking, where the same user account is involved in both events.
Detects unauthorized non-browser processes attempting to access Chrome browser master keys or bypass App-Bound Encryption by interacting with the Chrome IElevator service, DPAPI routines, or the 'Local State' configuration file. This behavior is indicative of infostealer activity aiming to decrypt browser-stored session cookies and credentials.
Detects activity indicative of the 'ClickFix' social engineering technique, where users are tricked into manually executing obfuscated commands (often from fake CAPTCHA or error prompts) via the Windows Run dialog or command-line interfaces. The rule correlates suspicious process execution (e.g., mshta, powershell, certutil, curl) originating from explorer.exe with the detection of common encoded/obfuscated command line patterns, or interactions with the Windows RunMRU registry key, which logs commands typed into the Run dialog.
Detects the GitHub Actions runner executing the Bun runtime to run a hidden index.js payload, specifically associated with the compromised 'actions-cool/issues-helper' or 'actions-cool/maintain-one-comment' actions. The rule filters for process execution context tied to GitHub runner internals and validates that the Bun execution follows the pattern observed in these supply chain attacks.
Detects the mounting of VHDX files via disk imaging tools or PowerShell, followed shortly (within 15 minutes) by the execution of a shell process with hidden window flags. This behavioral pattern is associated with the delivery of malicious payloads, such as those observed in Star Blizzard's RedFlick delivery chain for CosmicPulse.
Detects the creation of specific decoy scheduled tasks ('Internet Quality Test Connection', 'Network Configuration Manager', 'System Health Monitor') identified as part of the Star Blizzard actor's CosmicPulse delivery mechanism. The rule monitors for the creation of these tasks via schtasks.exe or system events, specifically when the task configuration references execution via rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, control.exe, or remote/UNC-based payloads.
Detects the startup or configuration of the WebClient service, commonly associated with WebDAV redirection, followed within 15 minutes by a process (e.g., control.exe, rundll32.exe, svchost.exe) interacting with a WebDAV-style UNC path. This behavioral pattern is indicative of attackers, such as the Star Blizzard group, abusing built-in Windows functionality to facilitate credential theft or remote file execution via malicious WebDAV shares.
This rule detects unauthorized process creation from the SharePoint worker process (w3wp.exe). It specifically monitors for the spawning of command-line shells or scripting engines, which is indicative of exploitation activity such as remote code execution (RCE) attempts against SharePoint services, including deserialization attacks.
This rule detects unauthorized process creation from the SharePoint worker process (w3wp.exe). It specifically monitors for the spawning of command-line shells or scripting engines, which is indicative of exploitation activity such as remote code execution (RCE) attempts against SharePoint services, including deserialization attacks.
Detects coordinated activity characteristic of NotPetya-like lateral movement. It identifies a local account authenticating across multiple hosts (credential reuse), followed by the creation of a transient Windows service (typically for remote command execution) and the invocation of rundll32.exe to execute a DLL export by ordinal on the same device.
This rule detects potential unauthorized access to Azure Key Vault secrets by correlating AI agent process execution on an endpoint with subsequent Key Vault API activity by the same user account. It tracks common AI coding/assistant tools running locally on a device and triggers an alert if the same identity accesses cloud-plane Key Vault operations within 5 minutes. Additionally, it identifies anomalous bulk secret enumeration patterns in Key Vault audit logs to detect potential automated exfiltration.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with threat activity. The indicators focus on Vercel-hosted domains and specific file hashes linked to recent campaign activity.
Detects anomalous execution of the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (msdt.exe) or its host process (sdiagnhost.exe) when spawned by Microsoft Office applications or when invoked with specific command-line arguments indicative of the CVE-2022-30190 (Follina) exploit.
Detects multiple methods of tampering with Windows Defender security controls within a short time window. This includes PowerShell commands to modify Defender preferences (e.g., disabling Real-time Monitoring or adding exclusions), modifications to Defender-related registry keys, and attempts to stop or disable the WinDefend service.
Detects the use of PowerShell Set-MpPreference commands to disable multiple Microsoft Defender security features, including real-time monitoring, behavioral scanning, and threat detection actions. This activity is consistent with ransomware behavior, such as Nova or The Gentlemen families, attempting to neutralize endpoint protection before proceeding with malicious actions like file encryption.
Detects suspicious execution of command-line utilities (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, conhost.exe) directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe), which is often indicative of fileless malware execution, downloader activity, or 'ClickFix' style social engineering attacks.
This rule detects suspicious persistence activity involving known tools or names that are often masqueraded. It looks for the creation of registry run keys or scheduled tasks using names associated with common tools ('Canon Configuration Reader', 'Stardock DeElevation Tool') when the initiating process is not located in the expected vendor-authorized directories. The rule specifically alerts on devices exhibiting these behaviors within a short time window.
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