Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,483 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects the execution of potentially malicious processes originating from common mail client attachment cache directories, the use of suspicious double extensions in file names, or common command-line interpreters being spawned by Microsoft Office applications, which are high-confidence indicators of phishing or malicious document exploitation.
Detects the execution of command shells or common post-exploitation utilities as child processes of network appliance management services (e.g., VPN gateways, firewalls, web servers). This pattern indicates potential exploitation of public-facing infrastructure where an attacker achieves code execution through the management daemon or its web components.
Detects ScreenConnect client processes initiating outbound network connections to external cloud relay addresses (typically *-relay.screenconnect.com) from locations outside of standard Program Files directories. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized, standalone, or adversary-deployed ScreenConnect instances attempting to establish a Command and Control (C2) channel, bypassing standard IT-managed deployment pathways.
Detects ScreenConnect client processes initiating outbound network connections to external cloud relay addresses (typically *-relay.screenconnect.com) from locations outside of standard Program Files directories. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized, standalone, or adversary-deployed ScreenConnect instances attempting to establish a Command and Control (C2) channel, bypassing standard IT-managed deployment pathways.
Detects ScreenConnect client processes initiating outbound network connections to external cloud relay addresses (typically *-relay.screenconnect.com) from locations outside of standard Program Files directories. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized, standalone, or adversary-deployed ScreenConnect instances attempting to establish a Command and Control (C2) channel, bypassing standard IT-managed deployment pathways.
Detects the deployment and activity of the MeshCentral remote management agent (meshagent), including process execution, service creation, and network communication to MeshCentral infrastructure. This behavior is indicative of unauthorized persistence and remote command-and-control, often associated with post-compromise activity such as that observed by ShinyHunters.
Detects the execution of the GigaWiper malware or the use of common system commands associated with destructive data activities, such as recursive file removal, disk formatting, or secure data overwriting, often used by threat actors for extortion.
Detects the installation or first execution of common remote monitoring and management (RMM) software, specifically AnyDesk, TeamViewer, or ScreenConnect, shortly after an identity change or MFA reset event, indicative of social engineering vishing-to-remote-access techniques often employed by threat actors such as Scattered Spider (UNC3944).
Detects processes attempting to enumerate Active Directory objects (users, groups, trusts) while simultaneously establishing a network connection to Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) on port 9389. This behavior is characteristic of tools like SharpADWS, which performs AD enumeration via the ADWS protocol rather than traditional LDAP, potentially bypassing legacy detection mechanisms.
Detects the use of the sc.exe command-line utility to stop or disable the Microsoft Defender Antivirus service (WinDefend). This activity is often associated with ransomware, such as Nova ransomware, to bypass security controls prior to malicious encryption or data destruction.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender exclusion paths by adding root drive letters or temporary directory paths. This behavior is indicative of defense evasion techniques often employed by ransomware families, such as Nova or Gentlemen, to prevent the scanning of files immediately prior to encryption.
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes (AV/EDR) using common administrative tools including taskkill.exe, wmic.exe, and PowerShell Stop-Process. This behavior is frequently observed during the pre-encryption phase of ransomware attacks, such as Nova and Gentlemen, to evade detection.
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes (AV/EDR) using common administrative tools including taskkill.exe, wmic.exe, and PowerShell Stop-Process. This behavior is frequently observed during the pre-encryption phase of ransomware attacks, such as Nova and Gentlemen, to evade detection.
Detects the manual enablement of network discovery services (fdrespub, fdPHost, SSDPSRV, upnphost) and the associated Windows Firewall rules. This activity is a known tactic used by Gentlemen ransomware to facilitate lateral movement and network share enumeration by making the compromised host visible to others and allowing it to discover peers.
Detects instances where Node.js, Python, or Go processes spawn command shell interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, etc.). This behavior is often indicative of C2 command execution by malware, such as the Graphalgo RAT, which may use these languages to execute shell-level commands after initial infection or payload execution.
This rule detects when common web server processes or service accounts spawn unexpected interpreter, shell, or reconnaissance tools, which is a common indicator of post-exploitation activity following a successful Remote Code Execution (RCE) attempt.
Detects a low-privileged account manually triggering the 'CreateObjectTask' scheduled task, which is a known technique to force the 'Shell Create Object Handler' (dllhost.exe) to start under the SYSTEM context. This behavior is often associated with pre-exploitation steps for privilege escalation vulnerabilities, specifically those involving OBJREF marshaling targeting specific COM objects.
Detects an suspicious progression of activities originating from identified AI assistant/agent processes. The rule monitors for a chain of behaviors occurring within a 15-minute window: execution of an AI agent/tool, followed by host discovery (network/system enumeration), access to sensitive local credential files, archival of data, and outbound network communication to common file-sharing/exfiltration platforms.
Detects a sequence of events where a potential multimedia lure (PDF, image, or media file) is created or downloaded via a web browser or communication client, followed by an AI agent (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) accessing the file, and subsequently initiating a shell execution process (PowerShell, CMD, etc.) involving suspicious command-line patterns or references to the original file. This behavior is indicative of an AI-assisted prompt injection attack where malicious content is processed and executed through agent tooling.
Detects a sequence of events where a potential multimedia lure (PDF, image, or media file) is created or downloaded via a web browser or communication client, followed by an AI agent (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude) accessing the file, and subsequently initiating a shell execution process (PowerShell, CMD, etc.) involving suspicious command-line patterns or references to the original file. This behavior is indicative of an AI-assisted prompt injection attack where malicious content is processed and executed through agent tooling.
Detects anomalous, rapid enumeration of system, network, process, and software configuration settings by AI coding assistant processes (e.g., Claude, Cursor, ChatGPT). This behavior often signifies an AI agent being coerced or configured to perform environment discovery or credential gathering, indicating potential compromise or abuse of the LLM-integrated development environment.
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