Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
1
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process named RMM.Agent.exe executes a PowerShell command to download and install 'ClientSetup.msi' via msiexec.exe, followed closely by the execution of a ScreenConnect client process. This chain of activity is consistent with unauthorized or potentially malicious deployment of ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) for persistent remote access.
Detects the execution of known browser credential harvesting tools (WebBrowserPassView, WebBrowserBookmarksView, or WS_Password variants) from ScreenConnect temporary directories. This behavior often indicates post-compromise activity where an adversary uses an existing Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) session to extract credentials from browsers.
The following analytic identifies `node.exe` directly executing a single `.js` script located in the same directory it was launched from, where that directory is an unusual location such as a user profile, PerfLogs, ProgramData, or Temp folder.
Legitimate Node.js application, module, and package manager directories are excluded.
This pattern is commonly associated with malware loaders and second-stage payloads that leverage the Node.js runtime to execute JavaScript outside of a typical development or application context.
Legitimate Node.js application, module, and package manager directories are excluded.
This pattern is commonly associated with malware loaders and second-stage payloads that leverage the Node.js runtime to execute JavaScript outside of a typical development or application context.
Detects msiexec.exe being executed with a remote HTTP(S) URL argument that includes a token-based query parameter. This pattern is characteristic of ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a user is tricked into manually executing a command to download and run a malicious MSI file.
Detects the spawning of script interpreters or loaders by Visual Studio Code (Code.exe) shortly after a workspace is initialized, specifically looking for command-line arguments referencing .vscode or tasks.json. This behavior is consistent with exploitation techniques where a user accepts a 'Trust Workspace' prompt, allowing malicious tasks defined in a repository's .vscode folder to execute.
This analytic detects the macOS osascript utility executing JavaScript for Automation (JXA) code, identified by
the "-l JavaScript" interpreter flag, with references to the Objective-C bridge. Adversaries may abuse JXA and
Objective-C APIs to interact with macOS applications, access native system functionality, execute commands, or
perform post-exploitation activity.
the "-l JavaScript" interpreter flag, with references to the Objective-C bridge. Adversaries may abuse JXA and
Objective-C APIs to interact with macOS applications, access native system functionality, execute commands, or
perform post-exploitation activity.
Detects signs of the ClosedQuorum implant by correlating at least two redundant persistence mechanisms (Registry Run keys, Scheduled Tasks, WMI execution) on the same host within a 10-minute window. The rule focuses on artifacts originating from suspicious user-writable paths or unsigned binaries, while excluding known legitimate installation paths.
Detects potential remote code execution triggered by loading untrusted AI model files (e.g., pickle, .pt, .pth, .ckpt) in Python-based environments. The rule identifies suspicious child process execution or the presence of known dangerous deserialization/payload indicators (like os.system, subprocess, or socket) within the command line of common model-loading applications, suggesting a model-based supply chain compromise.
Detects the execution of 'rnpkeys.exe' originating from the 'C:\ProgramData\keyroll' directory, which is a non-standard location for executable files and may indicate malicious activity.
Detects instances where 'rnpkeys.exe', residing within a 'keyroll' directory, initiates suspicious child processes or executes suspicious command lines. This includes triggering common scripting engines like PowerShell or cmd.exe, using execution policy bypass flags, or executing binaries from Temp directories, which are characteristic of malicious post-exploitation or persistence activities.
Detects an outbound network connection initiated by 'rnpkeys.exe' when executing from a non-standard 'ProgramData\keyroll' directory. This behavior is associated with the early stages of a Command and Control (C2) registration sequence, where an encrypted loader initiates network contact before subsequent staged communication.
Detects execution of staged payloads within the %TEMP% directory initiated by processes associated with the Sauron Loader (rnpkeys.exe or processes running from ProgramData\keyroll). The rule monitors for common living-off-the-land binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msiexec.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe) acting as task handlers for the loader.
Detects potential vishing activity associated with the Sauron Loader threat. The rule identifies a pattern of a mailbox receiving a high volume of inbound emails (spam or subscription bombs) within a short window, followed by the user launching remote assistance tools like Quick Assist or AnyDesk on the same endpoint, indicating an attacker-guided remote session.
Detects a specific social-engineering pattern known as 'ClickFix' where a user is manipulated into opening the Windows Run dialog (explorer.exe) to manually execute commands. The rule identifies suspicious command-line arguments typically associated with initial access (e.g., PowerShell hidden/encoded execution, web downloads) followed by the execution of MSI installers or related malicious binaries (e.g., rnpkeys.exe) within a 30-minute window, indicative of the Sauron Loader infection chain.
Detects various system utilities executing files or payloads staged in user-specific temporary directories (%AppData%\Local\Temp). This pattern is consistent with malware loaders (such as the Sauron Loader) that write payloads to the Temp folder before utilizing trusted Windows binaries (LOLBins) like rundll32, regsvr32, powershell, or wscript for execution. It also tracks potential driver installation or direct process memory access attempts from the same location.
Detects a sequence of events where a single user receives an unusually high volume of inbound emails (potentially vishing-related), followed shortly thereafter by the user executing common remote assistance or remote access tools (e.g., Quick Assist, AnyDesk). This pattern is consistent with social engineering tactics used in IT-support impersonation scams to facilitate the delivery of malware such as Sauron Loader.
Detects the execution of various system binaries (e.g., rundll32.exe, powershell.exe, regsvr32.exe) launched from a Temp directory where the parent or actor process is identified as rnpkeys.exe or rnp.dll. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity where legitimate tools or utilities (GnuPG/RNP) are being abused to proxy the execution of secondary payloads or scripts.
Detects instances where attrib.exe is executed with minimal or no command-line arguments, launched by processes other than standard Windows shell processes like cmd.exe, explorer.exe, or powershell.exe. This pattern is often indicative of potential masquerading, where malicious binaries are renamed to mimic legitimate Windows system utilities to evade detection.
Detects attempts by an adversary to disable or clear Windows Event logs using standard administrative utilities such as wevtutil, PowerShell, auditpol, net, sc, or wmic to cover tracks or hinder forensic analysis.
Detects persistence attempts via Windows Registry run keys and Startup folders. The rule identifies suspicious modifications to run/runonce registry keys involving common user-writable paths (e.g., Temp, AppData) or the execution of PowerShell commands with common obfuscation flags (e.g., -enc). Additionally, it detects the creation of executable files (.lnk, .ps1, .vbs, .bat) within user Startup folders.
Detects attempts to inhibit system recovery by deleting the Windows backup catalog or modifying boot configuration data to disable automatic repair features using built-in utilities like wbadmin.exe and bcdedit.exe. This activity is commonly associated with ransomware or destructive attacks attempting to prevent system restoration.
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