Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,480 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects AI agent tooling (e.g., Copilot, Cursor, Ollama) that makes outbound network calls to known AI model providers followed by the execution of suspicious shell commands within a short duration. The rule flags high-severity activities such as download-cradles, credential reconnaissance, LOLBin usage, and persistence mechanisms. Informational alerts are generated for standard CLI activity within the same timeframe.
Detects MayaBot's scheduled-task persistence chain by correlating two signals on the same device within a 60-minute window: (1) schtasks.exe creating a daily task referencing a hidden batch script (update.bat/backup.bat/firewall-update.bat) under AppData\Local, spawned from wscript.exe/cscript.exe/cmd.exe, and (2) cmd.exe launching a hidden-window PowerShell process referencing the same batch scripts under AppData\Local. Requiring both signals together, anchored to the AppData\Local path, sharply reduces false positives compared to alerting on either behavior alone.
Detects the execution of known NTLM Certificate Enrollment Service (CES) relay tools alongside subsequent outbound network connections to Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) CES enrollment endpoints. This behavioral pattern indicates an adversary attempting to relay NTLM authentication to an AD CS server to request a certificate, typically for privilege escalation or persistence.
Detects instances where a browser or agentic-browser process initiates a file download and subsequently executes that same file within a five-minute window, without the intervention of a user-driven process like explorer.exe. This pattern is indicative of automated 'agentic' browser activity, potentially signifying hijacked web instructions or malicious automated tool execution flows.
Detects Node.js or NPM process executions that reference Twilio-specific credential variables (ACCOUNT_SID, AUTH_TOKEN) within the command line, likely indicating an attempt to harvest these secrets from a developer environment.
Detects indicators of RMMCRAT malware installation, which masquerades as JivaChat software. The rule identifies suspicious process execution (e.g., rmm.exe), specific file artifacts created in ProgramData, and persistence mechanisms including Windows service registration, 'Load' registry value abuse, and a unique COM CLSID hijack. The logic enforces corroboration across different signal types (process, file, registry) or triggers on the unique CLSID.
Detects the installation of a potential remote monitoring and management (RMM) agent via common tools like msiexec, nssm, or sc.exe, followed by consistent HTTPS beaconing to domains hosted on Azurewebsites.net. This pattern is indicative of unauthorized remote access tools used for command and control.
This rule detects activities associated with the MacSync backdoor, specifically focusing on persistence mechanisms such as LaunchAgent manipulation, .repair-run scripts, and suspicious GIT hook usage. It also correlates these events with the termination of macOS notification agents (BTMNotificationAgent, NotificationCenter, BackgroundTaskManagementAgent), which is a tactic used to suppress security alerts during malicious operations.
This rule detects processes command lines containing specific strings ('EmbedHtml', 'EmbedHtml::GetUrl', 'GetUrl()') associated with suspicious NSIS (Nullsoft Scriptable Install System) script behavior often linked to the OpenSUpdater malware downloader, which uses these calls to fetch additional malicious payloads.
Detects the use of package installation commands (pip, npm, npx) where the package name resembles popular AI/ML libraries (tensorflow, torch, openai, langchain) but is not an exact match for known legitimate versions. This is a common indicator of a typosquatting supply chain attack, where attackers attempt to trick users into installing malicious packages with similar names to trusted software.
This rule detects the presence of command line artifacts, filenames, and strings associated with the SilverFox malware. These strings indicate the execution of a malicious desktop monitoring component ('active_desktop_launcher.exe') or the use of specific IPC/configuration markers ('@@RAPID_CFG_START@@') characteristic of this threat's tradecraft.
Detects the specific pattern associated with Storm-2570 for enabling Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) on a target host to facilitate lateral movement. The detection looks for registry modifications to disable RDP denial (fDenyTSConnections=0), firewall rules allowing TCP port 3389 via netsh or PowerShell, and the deployment of these configurations using PsExec against a target host list file.
Detects multiple reconnaissance commands executed by PowerShell processes running as the SYSTEM account. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to enumerate domain trusts, group memberships, or user sessions on a host to facilitate lateral movement or privilege escalation.
Detects instances where common web browsers (chrome, msedge, firefox, brave) are spawned as child processes by suspicious parent applications or scripting environments such as PowerShell, CMD, WScript, MSHTA, or Office documents (Winword, Excel). This behavior is often indicative of malicious document execution, file-less malware techniques, or drive-by download attempts.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities such as findstr, cmd, powershell, or file copy utilities with recursive flags to search for files containing keywords related to internal infrastructure documentation, such as network diagrams, server inventories, firewall configs, or AD topologies. This activity is indicative of information gathering and reconnaissance by an adversary.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or PowerShell Core (pwsh) triggered by common Windows shell applications (explorer, mshta, wscript, cscript) where the command line contains indicators associated with the downloading of VelvetCake stager files, including specific GitHub raw content URLs or AppData paths referencing known stager filenames.
Detects instances where a command-line utility or scripting interpreter references a 'SKILL.md' configuration file, typically associated with agent-skill payloads, followed shortly by network-based file download activity. This behavior is indicative of a secondary payload retrieval triggered by an adversary-controlled or poisoned configuration file.
This rule monitors for network connections to known malicious domains and IP addresses, as well as the presence or execution of files with specific SHA256 hashes known to be associated with threat activity. The indicators focus on Vercel-hosted domains and specific file hashes linked to recent campaign activity.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for occurrences of known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, and C2 domains. It aggregates file creation/modification events, process execution, and network connections to detect activity associated with known malicious entities.
This rule monitors endpoint telemetry for occurrences of known malicious file hashes, C2 IP addresses, and C2 domains. It aggregates file creation/modification events, process execution, and network connections to detect activity associated with known malicious entities.
This rule monitors for file and process creation events associated with known MD5 and SHA256 hashes linked to the Vidar infostealer malware.
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