Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,483 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects the two-stage execution chain associated with Raspberry Robin (Gamarue) propagation via removable media. The rule correlates the initiation of suspicious processes (msiexec.exe, rundll32.exe, or explorer.exe) from removable drive paths containing disguised DLLs or LNK files with subsequent obfuscated rundll32.exe execution command lines within a 30-minute window.
Detects ClickFix-style activity where a user is tricked into entering or pasting malicious command strings into the Windows File Explorer address bar. This activity results in the spawning of common utilities like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or certutil.exe with arguments associated with UNC paths, Base64 encoding, or download cradles (e.g., IEX, bitsadmin, or URLCache operations).
Detects execution of potentially malicious processes (mshta, powershell, cmd, conhost) which are common vectors for ClickFix-style attacks, where a user is socially engineered into copying and pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog or a command prompt.
Detects ClickFix-style activity where a user is tricked into entering or pasting malicious command strings into the Windows File Explorer address bar. This activity results in the spawning of common utilities like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or certutil.exe with arguments associated with UNC paths, Base64 encoding, or download cradles (e.g., IEX, bitsadmin, or URLCache operations).
Detects the two-stage execution chain associated with Raspberry Robin (Gamarue) propagation via removable media. The rule correlates the initiation of suspicious processes (msiexec.exe, rundll32.exe, or explorer.exe) from removable drive paths containing disguised DLLs or LNK files with subsequent obfuscated rundll32.exe execution command lines within a 30-minute window.
Detects ClickFix-style activity where a user is tricked into entering or pasting malicious command strings into the Windows File Explorer address bar. This activity results in the spawning of common utilities like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or certutil.exe with arguments associated with UNC paths, Base64 encoding, or download cradles (e.g., IEX, bitsadmin, or URLCache operations).
Detects the two-stage execution chain associated with Raspberry Robin (Gamarue) propagation via removable media. The rule correlates the initiation of suspicious processes (msiexec.exe, rundll32.exe, or explorer.exe) from removable drive paths containing disguised DLLs or LNK files with subsequent obfuscated rundll32.exe execution command lines within a 30-minute window.
This rule detects potential command and control or malicious file staging activity by correlating DNS TXT record queries (often used for data exfiltration or staging configuration) performed by common system utilities (nslookup, PowerShell) with the subsequent execution of files from suspicious directories (Downloads, Temp) within a 30-minute window on the same device.
Detects the invocation of Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) binaries (wsl.exe or wslconfig.exe) using command-line arguments that enable arbitrary command execution, such as -e, --exec, or shell interpreters (bash -c, sh -c), or web-based retrieval tools like curl/wget. This technique is often used to execute commands or download payloads within a Linux environment on Windows, potentially bypassing security controls focused on native Windows processes.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a known web server process (e.g., IIS, Nginx, Apache) spawns a command shell process, followed shortly by the creation of a file with a web shell-like extension (.aspx, .jsp, .php) in the same environment. This pattern is indicative of an adversary exploiting a public-facing application to upload and potentially access a web shell.
Detects a multi-stage evasion sequence where a process first queries the system for virtualization or sandbox artifacts (e.g., VM tools, system information), followed by an intentional sleep or delay to bypass sandbox analysis, and concluding with subsequent process activity. This pattern is characteristic of malware attempting to detect and evade automated analysis environments.
Detects a multi-stage evasion sequence where a process first queries the system for virtualization or sandbox artifacts (e.g., VM tools, system information), followed by an intentional sleep or delay to bypass sandbox analysis, and concluding with subsequent process activity. This pattern is characteristic of malware attempting to detect and evade automated analysis environments.
Detects potential browser-based infostealer activity where a non-standard process, launched from temporary or user-download directories, accesses sensitive browser data files (cookies, login data) followed by a suspicious outbound network connection to a previously unseen domain, matching common patterns for LummaStealer or Vidar malware.
Detects potential 'ClickFix' activity where a browser or file explorer process initiates a shell (e.g., cmd, powershell, osascript) with command arguments indicative of remote script execution, obfuscated commands, or web-based payload downloading. This pattern matches known social engineering tactics that entice users to copy-paste malicious code into a system shell.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell command lines indicative of malicious file downloading and execution. The detection logic searches for specific indicators such as 'scriptblock', '::create', and numeric obfuscation patterns paired with common .NET web client methods ('net.webclient', 'downloadfile', 'downloadstring') used for staged payloads.
Detects a suspicious behavior pattern where PowerShell initiates an 'msiexec.exe' process to install an MSI file located in a temporary directory, followed by that MSI process launching a secondary executable from a '%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\' folder. This pattern is commonly associated with malware installation or post-exploitation activities where an attacker attempts to masquerade an executable as a legitimate program.
This rule detects potential malicious activity where the binaries 'COTFileReadApp.exe' or 'DeElevate64.exe' initiate child processes or are themselves parent processes to suspicious binaries such as 'rundll32.exe', 'regsvr32.exe', 'msiexec.exe', 'powershell.exe', or script hosts ('wscript.exe', 'cscript.exe'). This pattern is indicative of a RAT (Remote Access Trojan) or sideloading chain dropping and executing follow-on payloads.
Detects the FileFix (ClickFix) social engineering technique, where an attacker tricks a user into pasting malicious command lines into the Windows File Explorer address bar. The rule correlates a process execution (PowerShell, Cmd, Mshta) originating from explorer.exe with recent registry writes to shell history artifacts (RunMRU, TypedPaths, or ShellBags) within a 120-second window, identifying the characteristic 'paste-and-execute' behavior.
Detects a suspicious pattern consistent with rapid handoff from an initial access broker to an operator: a user account is added to a privileged group (e.g., Domain Admins) followed within 5 minutes by successful logins to 3 or more distinct hosts. This behavior indicates immediate privilege escalation followed by rapid lateral movement.
Detects evidence of persistence mechanisms associated with the CARBONATO botnet on Linux systems. This includes the application of chattr +i to the malicious watchdog binary, the execution of the auto-persist-host.sh script, the enabling of the docker-network-resolver systemd timer, or modifications to crontab for watchdog execution.
Detects instances where the XMRig cryptominer is masquerading as the legitimate systemd-logind process on Linux hosts. The rule triggers on process execution of /usr/sbin/systemd-logind coupled with suspicious outbound network connections to known mining pools or mining-related ports.
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