Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Impacket-style hands-on-keyboard staging: a NeedyMantis bundle file dropped by cmd.exe/wmiprvse.exe/services.exe carrying the distinctive remote-execution fingerprint (ADMIN$ share reference, %COMSPEC% invocation, or 2>&1 output redirection used by wmiexec/smbexec/atexec), followed within 15 minutes by execution referencing the same bundle folder with the same fingerprint. Requiring the ADMIN$/%COMSPEC%/redirection fingerprint on both the copy and the execution -- rather than just matching on common process names like cmd.exe or svchost.exe -- removes the bulk of ordinary software installation and update activity that also uses cmd.exe to stage files.
Detects Impacket-style hands-on-keyboard staging: a NeedyMantis bundle file dropped by cmd.exe/wmiprvse.exe/services.exe carrying the distinctive remote-execution fingerprint (ADMIN$ share reference, %COMSPEC% invocation, or 2>&1 output redirection used by wmiexec/smbexec/atexec), followed within 15 minutes by execution referencing the same bundle folder with the same fingerprint. Requiring the ADMIN$/%COMSPEC%/redirection fingerprint on both the copy and the execution -- rather than just matching on common process names like cmd.exe or svchost.exe -- removes the bulk of ordinary software installation and update activity that also uses cmd.exe to stage files.
Detects a .ps1-named file being loaded as an executable image or created as a process's own file name (both anomalous under normal Windows semantics, since PowerShell always runs scripts via powershell.exe/pwsh.exe as the process image, never as the .ps1 itself). Anchored to the known NeedyMantis sideload staging folders to exclude unrelated developer/test tooling elsewhere on disk that might trip a similar anomaly.
Detects a .ps1-named file being loaded as an executable image or created as a process's own file name (both anomalous under normal Windows semantics, since PowerShell always runs scripts via powershell.exe/pwsh.exe as the process image, never as the .ps1 itself). Anchored to the known NeedyMantis sideload staging folders to exclude unrelated developer/test tooling elsewhere on disk that might trip a similar anomaly.
Detects a .ps1-named file being loaded as an executable image or created as a process's own file name (both anomalous under normal Windows semantics, since PowerShell always runs scripts via powershell.exe/pwsh.exe as the process image, never as the .ps1 itself). Anchored to the known NeedyMantis sideload staging folders to exclude unrelated developer/test tooling elsewhere on disk that might trip a similar anomaly.
This rule detects potential backdoor deployment or persistence mechanisms in AI coding assistants like Claude Code and Cursor. It identifies when specific configuration or hook files (e.g., settings.json, hooks.js) are modified, followed within a two-hour window by the execution of suspicious child processes (e.g., powershell.exe, curl.exe, python) initiated by the coding assistant's CLI tool.
Detects the creation of potential hook or startup scripts within hidden AI coding assistant directories (.claude, .vscode, .cursor) followed by the execution of a process from those same directories. This pattern is consistent with supply chain compromises where trojanized extensions or MCP servers are leveraged for code execution.
Detects anomalous child processes spawned by a Langflow server process that subsequently search for sensitive information, such as cloud credentials or database connection strings, within the command line arguments. This behavioral pattern is indicative of remote code execution exploitation followed by credential harvesting, potentially targeting vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-33017.
Detects a suspicious execution chain where explorer.exe (typically via the Run dialog) executes PowerShell, which subsequently launches msiexec.exe to silently install the PuTTY SSH client. This sequence is characteristic of the 'ClickFix' technique, which uses social engineering to trick users into running malicious commands for remote access deployment.
Detects execution of Mimikatz or usage of its specific command-line arguments (such as sekurlsa or lsadump modules) which indicate attempted credential dumping from system memory.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe or PowerShell where the task binary path resides in suspicious directories frequently used by adversaries for staging, such as AppData, Temp, Downloads, or Public folders.
Experimental behavioral hunt for a root-owned shell or interpreter started by a non-root initiating account on explicitly inventoried ISE devices. This identifies an account-context transition in process telemetry; it does not establish preceding exploitation, setuid abuse, or a specific Cisco CVE. Requires verified appliance process telemetry.
Detects the creation of multiple suspicious scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe initiated by scripting engines (wscript.exe, cscript.exe). The rule filters for specific task names associated with known malicious patterns and XML definition files located in a specific directory path, identifying potential automated persistence or malware installation behavior.
Detects the execution of command-line interpreters (cmd, powershell, mshta, etc.) directly spawned by explorer.exe. This activity is indicative of the 'ClickFix' or 'ConsentFix' attack chain, where a victim is coerced into pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog (Win+R) after interacting with a fraudulent CAPTCHA or verification page in their browser. The rule filters out standard installer-related activity to reduce false positives.
Detects execution of rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe when spawned by powershell.exe or mshta.exe, specifically targeting DLLs located in common user-writable or temporary directories (AppData, ProgramData, Downloads). This pattern is consistent with the delivery of CastleLoader shellcode loaders following ClickFix-style social engineering lures.
Detects the use of legitimate Windows system binaries (LOLBins) such as curl.exe, certutil.exe, or bitsadmin.exe to download files. These binaries are monitored when spawned directly from common entry-point processes like explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or powershell.exe, which is characteristic of second-stage payload retrieval in ClickFix social engineering campaigns.
Detects the execution of Windows Installer (.msi) files or screensaver (.scr) files that were recently downloaded and executed via a web browser. Attackers often use these file types as lures for fake updates or software installers to execute malicious code on the victim's system.
Detects instances where a suspected malicious loader initiates process hollowing or APC injection by launching trusted Windows binaries (e.g., LockAppHost.exe, makecab.exe, Magnify.exe) in a suspended state. The rule identifies suspicious post-injection behavior such as unexpected network connections or child process creation originating from these typically benign binaries, which is characteristic of the DeepLoad/ClickFix attack chain.
Detects ClickFix-style fileless execution patterns where PowerShell pipelines (Invoke-RestMethod/Invoke-WebRequest) directly into execution cmdlets (Invoke-Expression/IEX) to download and execute remote scripts entirely in memory. The rule monitors for common bypass flags, hidden windows, and connections to suspicious IP address patterns or non-standard ports typically associated with malicious C2 staging.
Detects creation of the 'keyroll' scheduled task used to relaunch the Sauron Loader DLL side-loading chain. Requires the schtasks.exe command line to both reference the 'keyroll' task name AND explicitly reference the ProgramData\keyroll path or rnpkeys.exe (ruling out unrelated tasks that happen to be named 'keyroll', e.g. legitimate key-rotation automation), and requires an INNER join corroborating an actual rnpkeys.exe relaunch from that path within 24h — a lone task-creation event with no follow-on relaunch no longer alerts.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender antivirus preferences by adding exclusion paths or processes. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to bypass security software detection by excluding their malicious tools or staging areas from scanning.
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