Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,483 detections
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This rule detects suspicious PowerShell activity associated with the Lightlife RAT, specifically targeting Google Chrome's login data files to steal credentials and performing checks for the presence of cryptocurrency wallets.
Detects a multi-stage attack chain where an AI-agent's configuration file (e.g., mcp.json) is modified, followed immediately by the execution of a tool process (node/python) spawned by the agent, the subsequent spawning of a shell process, and finally an outbound network connection to a rare, non-standard domain. This sequence is indicative of AI agent tool poisoning, where malicious tool definitions are introduced to execute arbitrary commands and exfiltrate data. Coverts T1195.002, T1565.001, T1059
Detects anomalous behavioral patterns where an AI agent process (e.g., Claude Code, Cursor, Aider) performs multi-category discovery of its own runtime environment, plugins, and host configuration. The rule identifies agents that trigger processes spanning at least three distinct discovery categories (Network, File/Plugin, Software, or System) within a short timeframe, indicating potential reconnaissance of agent-authorized capabilities and tools rather than standard host exploration. Covers T1082, T1518, T1083, T1016
Detects instances where the rnpkeys process (likely used for GPG-related operations) spawns common Windows living-off-the-land binaries such as rundll32, regsvr32, msiexec, cmd, powershell, or wscript. It specifically monitors for patterns indicating potential script execution from temporary folders, the bypass of PowerShell execution policies, or the installation of products via msiexec, which may indicate malicious activity following initial compromise or delivery of a malicious payload.
Detects processes associated with the WinGet/DSC configuration engine (ConfigurationRemotingServer.exe, WindowsPackageManagerServer.exe, or winget.exe) initiating processes with the COR_PROFILER or COR_ENABLE_PROFILING environment variables. This behavior is indicative of leveraging .NET profiler hijacking via the DSC 'Environment' resource for persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on a Windows host aimed at inhibiting system recovery, such as deleting shadow copies, modifying boot recovery configurations, deleting backup catalogs, or stopping security and backup-related services. This rule aggregates distinct categories of these actions by DeviceId and Account to identify potential malicious intent characteristic of ransomware or data destructive attacks.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on a Windows host aimed at inhibiting system recovery, such as deleting shadow copies, modifying boot recovery configurations, deleting backup catalogs, or stopping security and backup-related services. This rule aggregates distinct categories of these actions by DeviceId and Account to identify potential malicious intent characteristic of ransomware or data destructive attacks.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities on a Windows host aimed at inhibiting system recovery, such as deleting shadow copies, modifying boot recovery configurations, deleting backup catalogs, or stopping security and backup-related services. This rule aggregates distinct categories of these actions by DeviceId and Account to identify potential malicious intent characteristic of ransomware or data destructive attacks.
Detects the execution of known Python scripts (CES_Enroll.py, ntlm_ces_relay.py, ces_negotiate_ntlm.py) often associated with NTLM relay attacks or forced authentication techniques. These scripts leverage Python to interact with authentication protocols or relay requests.
Detects the execution of known NTLM Certificate Enrollment Service (CES) relay tools alongside subsequent outbound network connections to Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) CES enrollment endpoints. This behavioral pattern indicates an adversary attempting to relay NTLM authentication to an AD CS server to request a certificate, typically for privilege escalation or persistence.
Detects the execution of MicrosoftIME.exe or the creation of scheduled tasks referencing it from non-standard directories such as User, Temp, or AppData folders. This behavior is indicative of masquerading or persistence mechanisms where a malicious process mimics the legitimate Microsoft Input Method Editor (IME) binary.
Detects multiple, rapid execution sequences of Python or PIP utilities using the 'install' flag with specific common library names often used in reconnaissance or malicious activity. This activity is monitored by looking for repetitive installations of targeted packages within a short timeframe on the same endpoint, which may indicate automated tool deployment or preparation for malicious operations.
Detects a dual persistence mechanism where an adversary establishes persistence both via a registry Run key and a scheduled task, both named 'WindowsUpdate'. The rule correlates these events occurring on the same device within a 15-minute window.
Detects the execution of the Windows Workspaces Broker process (wkspbroker.exe) when it loads a library (DLL) from a path within the RemoteApp Gateway directory under LOCALAPPDATA. This behavior is associated with DLL side-loading techniques used to execute malicious payloads such as the Xray-core implant.
Detects the execution of command interpreters or scripting engines spawned by the ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus GINA client process (typically present at the Windows logon screen). This activity is highly suspicious as it indicates potential command injection or abuse of a pre-authentication component running at SYSTEM privileges.
Detects anomalous executions of ctfmon.exe that deviate from known-good parent process patterns, such as unexpected parent processes (e.g., script hosts, LOLBins) or execution from locations other than C:\Windows\System32\ctfmon.exe. This rule is designed to help identify potential masquerading or process injection associated with exploitation attempts, including CVE-2026-45586.
Detects the SharePoint application pool worker process (w3wp.exe) spawning command-line interpreters or scripting engines. This behavior is indicative of post-exploitation activity where an attacker, having gained remote code execution via techniques like insecure deserialization, executes commands or deploys in-memory webshells within the context of the IIS worker process.
Detects the modification of AI agent configuration files (e.g., mcp.json, config.json) followed shortly by the agent spawning a child process that matches typical Model Context Protocol (MCP) server execution patterns. This behavior may indicate an attacker has modified the configuration to inject malicious server commands or tools that the AI agent will execute upon next initialization, effectively achieving persistent code execution via the agent's legitimate functionality.
Detects instances where PowerShell is initiated via LNK files, specifically targeting PDF LNK attachments or known malicious script naming patterns (update1.vbs, update2.ps1) and common downloader cmdlets (e.g., IEX, Invoke-WebRequest). It also includes specific indicators for remote file downloads.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user or system initiates a PowerShell script (update1.ps1) via Windows Explorer in close temporal proximity (within 5 minutes) to the execution of known update-related tasks or scripts (OneDriveUpdateScheduler or update1.vbs). This correlation aims to identify potential persistence or malicious activity masquerading as update processes.
This rule detects interactive or user-triggered execution of PowerShell carrying indicators of payload downloading, inline evaluation, or Base64 encoding. Because explorer.exe is the parent process, it typically signifies a payload delivered via email/web that a user opened directly such as an .lnk shortcut.
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