Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of a scheduled task intended to masquerade as 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask' using either schtasks.exe or PowerShell. The rule specifically monitors for tasks being registered in AppData/Roaming directories, which is a common indicator of persistence by malicious actors attempting to mimic legitimate Microsoft Edge update processes.
Detects the use of PowerShell to add an exclusion to Microsoft Defender. The detection looks for common obfuscation flags (Hidden, NonI, NoP, Bypass) in the command line and targets the MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore executable or DLL for exclusion, which is a common persistence or evasion technique. It excludes parent processes known for administrative activity to reduce noise.
Detects the use of PowerShell to add an exclusion to Microsoft Defender. The detection looks for common obfuscation flags (Hidden, NonI, NoP, Bypass) in the command line and targets the MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore executable or DLL for exclusion, which is a common persistence or evasion technique. It excludes parent processes known for administrative activity to reduce noise.
Detects the use of PowerShell to add an exclusion to Microsoft Defender. The detection looks for common obfuscation flags (Hidden, NonI, NoP, Bypass) in the command line and targets the MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore executable or DLL for exclusion, which is a common persistence or evasion technique. It excludes parent processes known for administrative activity to reduce noise.
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
Detects the execution of 'tailcat.exe' from non-standard locations such as user directories (AppData, Users), which is indicative of potential unauthorized use of Tailscale portable binaries to establish network proxies or unauthorized tunnels.
Detects a suspicious sequence of command execution patterns characteristic of the Kothamine agent performing post-compromise system discovery. The rule triggers when multiple discovery commands (tasklist, ipconfig, taskkill) are executed by the same process instance within a 5-minute window, consistent with typical C2 behavior for reconnaissance.
Detects a suspicious sequence of command execution patterns characteristic of the Kothamine agent performing post-compromise system discovery. The rule triggers when multiple discovery commands (tasklist, ipconfig, taskkill) are executed by the same process instance within a 5-minute window, consistent with typical C2 behavior for reconnaissance.
Detects a suspicious sequence of command execution patterns characteristic of the Kothamine agent performing post-compromise system discovery. The rule triggers when multiple discovery commands (tasklist, ipconfig, taskkill) are executed by the same process instance within a 5-minute window, consistent with typical C2 behavior for reconnaissance.
Detects a suspicious sequence of command execution patterns characteristic of the Kothamine agent performing post-compromise system discovery. The rule triggers when multiple discovery commands (tasklist, ipconfig, taskkill) are executed by the same process instance within a 5-minute window, consistent with typical C2 behavior for reconnaissance.
Detects the Kothamine post-installation technique where npm/node spawns PowerShell to reflectively load a .NET assembly stager into memory. This behavior is followed by the PowerShell process spawning anomalous instances of RuntimeBroker.exe or svchost.exe. These spawned processes exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as executing from non-standard file paths, having missing command-line arguments (like the required '-k' for svchost), or having an illegitimate parent process (powershell.exe) instead of standard system parents like services.exe or wininit.exe.
Detects the Kothamine post-installation technique where npm/node spawns PowerShell to reflectively load a .NET assembly stager into memory. This behavior is followed by the PowerShell process spawning anomalous instances of RuntimeBroker.exe or svchost.exe. These spawned processes exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as executing from non-standard file paths, having missing command-line arguments (like the required '-k' for svchost), or having an illegitimate parent process (powershell.exe) instead of standard system parents like services.exe or wininit.exe.
Detects the Kothamine post-installation technique where npm/node spawns PowerShell to reflectively load a .NET assembly stager into memory. This behavior is followed by the PowerShell process spawning anomalous instances of RuntimeBroker.exe or svchost.exe. These spawned processes exhibit suspicious characteristics, such as executing from non-standard file paths, having missing command-line arguments (like the required '-k' for svchost), or having an illegitimate parent process (powershell.exe) instead of standard system parents like services.exe or wininit.exe.
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects behavior consistent with the Kothamine agent, where a recently dropped DLL in a temporary directory is loaded by a short-lived explorer.exe process. This rule monitors for file creation, subsequent module loading by the explorer process, and ensures the process was spawned in close proximity to the file activity, indicating likely process injection.
Detects the execution of the Kothamine injector by correlating three distinct stages: the use of PowerShell to create an AV exclusion for 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore', the dropping of the 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore' binary into the user's AppData directory, and subsequent process injection (OpenProcess/VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory/CreateRemoteThread) into explorer.exe.
Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
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