Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects the two-stage execution chain associated with Raspberry Robin (Gamarue) propagation via removable media. The rule correlates the initiation of suspicious processes (msiexec.exe, rundll32.exe, or explorer.exe) from removable drive paths containing disguised DLLs or LNK files with subsequent obfuscated rundll32.exe execution command lines within a 30-minute window.
Detects ClickFix-style activity where a user is tricked into entering or pasting malicious command strings into the Windows File Explorer address bar. This activity results in the spawning of common utilities like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or certutil.exe with arguments associated with UNC paths, Base64 encoding, or download cradles (e.g., IEX, bitsadmin, or URLCache operations).
Detects execution of potentially malicious processes (mshta, powershell, cmd, conhost) which are common vectors for ClickFix-style attacks, where a user is socially engineered into copying and pasting malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog or a command prompt.
Detects ClickFix-style activity where a user is tricked into entering or pasting malicious command strings into the Windows File Explorer address bar. This activity results in the spawning of common utilities like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or certutil.exe with arguments associated with UNC paths, Base64 encoding, or download cradles (e.g., IEX, bitsadmin, or URLCache operations).
Detects ClickFix-style activity where a user is tricked into entering or pasting malicious command strings into the Windows File Explorer address bar. This activity results in the spawning of common utilities like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or certutil.exe with arguments associated with UNC paths, Base64 encoding, or download cradles (e.g., IEX, bitsadmin, or URLCache operations).
Detects potential execution of malicious commands following a fake browser crash dialog, often used in social engineering attacks (CrashFix). The rule identifies PowerShell or Windows Script Host processes spawned by common web browsers shortly after a browser session start, specifically looking for common command-line indicators used to copy-paste or execute malicious snippets, while filtering out legitimate WerFault.exe crash reporting activity.
This rule detects potential command and control or malicious file staging activity by correlating DNS TXT record queries (often used for data exfiltration or staging configuration) performed by common system utilities (nslookup, PowerShell) with the subsequent execution of files from suspicious directories (Downloads, Temp) within a 30-minute window on the same device.
Detects potential execution of malicious commands following a fake browser crash dialog, often used in social engineering attacks (CrashFix). The rule identifies PowerShell or Windows Script Host processes spawned by common web browsers shortly after a browser session start, specifically looking for common command-line indicators used to copy-paste or execute malicious snippets, while filtering out legitimate WerFault.exe crash reporting activity.
Detects host-side indicators of potential container escapes and unauthorized access, including mounting sensitive container runtime sockets, executing containers with privileged flags, host namespace sharing, and the use of nsenter to break out of a container context.
Detects a SYSTEM-level dllhost.exe process, associated with specific COM object instantiation (CLSID {135fd325-45b7-4c30-89f8-4386961669f0}), loading a DLL from the C:\ProgramData\ directory. This behavior is indicative of an attacker-planted DLL being unmarshaled through a crafted OBJREF, effectively bypassing security controls like EOAC_NO_CUSTOM_MARSHAL.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe or native Windows event logs that exhibit suspicious characteristics commonly associated with persistence mechanisms. These characteristics include tasks triggered at logon or system startup, tasks running with elevated SYSTEM privileges, tasks configured to be hidden, or tasks executing binaries from temporary, user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, Public). This pattern is often observed in attack chains leveraging RMM tools or delivery mechanisms like ClickFix.
Detects potential malicious PowerShell activity involving suspicious file paths in 'C:\Users\Public\' and the use of 'UPLOAD' command strings, which may indicate the staging and execution of payloads.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms by monitoring for the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'OneDriveUpdateScheduler' name, as well as the execution of suspicious scripts named 'update1.vbs' or 'update1.ps1' by wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe when spawned from explorer.exe.
Detects a coordinated attack sequence where a browser process is terminated, followed immediately by the execution of an unsigned Python interpreter from a suspicious location (temp/downloads folder), which is then followed by the installation of an unsigned browser extension. This pattern mimics ClickFix and browser-based RAT lure campaigns.
Detects a multi-stage process execution chain beginning with common end-user applications (browsers, Office apps, explorer.exe) spawning known LOLBins (Living-off-the-Land Binaries), which in turn execute secondary LOLBins with suspicious command-line indicators. This pattern often signifies post-exploitation activity such as secondary payload delivery, fileless malware execution, or proxy execution of malicious scripts/commands, consistent with ClickFix or BYOVD-related ingress techniques.
This rule detects potential 'ClickFix' phishing activity where a user is tricked into executing malicious commands in a Windows shell. The rule looks for browser or file explorer processes acting as the parent process to command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, etc.) executing suspicious command-line arguments often used to fetch or run malicious scripts from the internet.
Detects anomalous child process execution from SharePoint's w3wp.exe worker process following the loading of suspicious .NET assemblies (PresentationFramework.dll, System.Xaml.dll, System.Data.Services.dll). This behavior is indicative of a post-exploitation stage for SharePoint SafeControls bypass vulnerabilities, where a gadget chain is utilized to execute unmanaged or child processes.
Detects the 'ClickFix' social engineering attack where a user is instructed to use the Windows Run dialog (Win+R) to execute a malicious one-liner. This activity is characterized by explorer.exe spawning common command/script interpreters (powershell, cmd, mshta, etc.) containing typical download-and-execute strings (cradles), which bypasses browser-based download security controls.
Detects mshta.exe or rundll32.exe spawned as a direct child of explorer.exe with a remote HTTP/HTTPS URL or javascript: URI as an argument. This pattern is indicative of ClickFix-style phishing campaigns where users are socially engineered into running malicious commands via the Windows Run dialog or clipboard, leading to execution of remote malicious payloads proxied through trusted system binaries.
Detects the execution of Python interpreters from user-writable directories (Temp, Downloads, AppData) when launched by common LOLBins or shell-like parents, which is indicative of the CastleLoader 'ClickFix' phishing chain where attackers deploy a portable Python runtime to execute malicious payloads.
Detects the execution of NetSupport Remote Access Tool (RAT) components (client32.exe, Nskbfltr.sys, or TCCTL32.dll) from locations outside of the standard program installation directories. This behavior is often indicative of unauthorized persistence or masquerading by malware utilizing remote support software for C2.
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