Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
20,484 detections
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IDS Classtypes
1
Detects execution of auto.exe (associated with AvisLoader) combined with a specific registry-based UAC bypass technique using the ICMLuaUtil COM elevation moniker (CLSID 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7). This pattern is characteristic of UACME method 41 to achieve privilege escalation.
Detects execution of auto.exe (associated with AvisLoader) combined with a specific registry-based UAC bypass technique using the ICMLuaUtil COM elevation moniker (CLSID 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7). This pattern is characteristic of UACME method 41 to achieve privilege escalation.
Detects execution of shell commands (cmd, powershell) by processes associated with AvisLoader (e.g., 78324.exe, VLCAssistant.exe, auto.exe), followed by the creation or modification of files in suspicious user-writable directories (e.g., appdata, temp) within a 10-minute window, suggesting potential C2 activity and secondary payload staging.
Detects the execution of 'Silent XMR Miner Builder.exe' followed by the spawning of common compilers (e.g., csc.exe, gcc.exe, donut.exe), which is indicative of a developer tool being used to compile and build a cryptocurrency mining payload.
Detects the execution of 'Silent XMR Miner Builder.exe' followed by the spawning of common compilers (e.g., csc.exe, gcc.exe, donut.exe), which is indicative of a developer tool being used to compile and build a cryptocurrency mining payload.
Detects the execution of 'Silent XMR Miner Builder.exe' followed by the spawning of common compilers (e.g., csc.exe, gcc.exe, donut.exe), which is indicative of a developer tool being used to compile and build a cryptocurrency mining payload.
Detects the execution of 'Silent XMR Miner Builder.exe' followed by the spawning of common compilers (e.g., csc.exe, gcc.exe, donut.exe), which is indicative of a developer tool being used to compile and build a cryptocurrency mining payload.
Detects a UAC bypass sequence associated with the ChainScript/Rapuncel loader, where a process invokes an 'elevation:Administrator!new' COM moniker (such as CMSTPLUA or ICMLuaUtil) followed by the execution or hollowed-out spawning of 'ServiceModelReg.exe' to achieve elevated privileges.
Detects anomalous file staging activity combined with keyword-matched file access or suspicious Steam application launches, characteristic of the Rapuncel (BoryptGrab) malware's credential and crypto-wallet harvesting routine.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with 'ComponentTask33Agent' which involves either creating a scheduled task or modifying Windows Registry Run keys, alongside potential VBScript-based agent execution via wscript.exe.
Detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference or Set-MpPreference) to modify Microsoft Defender exclusions (paths, processes, or extensions). This behavior is often associated with adversaries attempting to evade security detection by excluding malicious files or processes from being scanned by Microsoft Defender.
Detects Node.js or Python processes exhibiting suspicious behavior consistent with information-stealing malware (such as BeaverTail or InvisibleFerret). The rule monitors for these processes accessing sensitive files, including browser credentials, cookies, browser extension wallet settings, cryptocurrency wallet files, and various identification document image types, followed by the execution of archiving utilities (e.g., zip, rar, 7z) to stage the collected data for exfiltration.
Detects the execution of known remote-access or screen-sharing software (e.g., TeamViewer, AnyDesk, RDP) within 30 minutes of launching common video conferencing applications (e.g., Zoom, Teams, Google Meet). This pattern is consistent with an adversary remotely assisting an unauthorized user during a live coding interview or similar assessment process.
Detects the creation of multiple suspicious scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe initiated by scripting engines (wscript.exe, cscript.exe). The rule filters for specific task names associated with known malicious patterns and XML definition files located in a specific directory path, identifying potential automated persistence or malware installation behavior.
Detects a chained sequence of suspicious activity initiated by agentic AI development tools (e.g., Claude Code, Aider, AutoGen). The rule identifies the execution of these tools followed by local reconnaissance commands, lateral movement attempts, and outbound network connections originating from the same host, indicating potential automated exploitation or credential abuse.
Detects anomalous, chained execution patterns initiated by AI agents integrated with Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. The rule identifies a multi-stage sequence involving the invocation of browser automation tools followed by shell execution and subsequent outbound network activity, potentially indicating an AI-driven attack chaining filesystem, shell, or cloud-API access in an unauthorized manner.
This rule identifies potential infections associated with the MacSync malware family by matching process, file, and network indicators (hashes, malicious domains, and specific payload URLs) against endpoint telemetry. It monitors for execution of known malicious binaries, file creation events, and communication with identified command-and-control infrastructure.
This rule identifies potential infections associated with the MacSync malware family by matching process, file, and network indicators (hashes, malicious domains, and specific payload URLs) against endpoint telemetry. It monitors for execution of known malicious binaries, file creation events, and communication with identified command-and-control infrastructure.
Detects anomalous child process spawning from common web browsers or productivity applications (e.g., Office, Acrobat) on hosts that have recently communicated with known LLM or code-generation APIs. This behavioral correlation is intended to identify the potential execution of AI-generated exploit code.
This rule detects activities associated with the MacSync backdoor, specifically focusing on persistence mechanisms such as LaunchAgent manipulation, .repair-run scripts, and suspicious GIT hook usage. It also correlates these events with the termination of macOS notification agents (BTMNotificationAgent, NotificationCenter, BackgroundTaskManagementAgent), which is a tactic used to suppress security alerts during malicious operations.
Detects the use of legitimate data transfer utilities (s5cmd, rclone) configured to exfiltrate sensitive document types (.doc, .pdf, .sql, etc.) to S3-compatible cloud storage. The rule correlates this activity with recent access to files containing sensitive credentials or configuration data, a pattern observed in double-extortion campaigns.
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