Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects instances where AutoIt (AutoIt3.exe) is observed performing process injection or launching suspicious binaries (RegSvcs.exe or mobsync.exe). Attackers frequently use AutoIt for process automation and to execute malicious payloads, and leveraging legitimate binaries like RegSvcs.exe is a known technique for bypassing defenses.
Detects suspicious clipboard activity where the clipboard is either accessed or modified by known utility processes (e.g., AutoIt, RegSvcs) or contains patterns indicative of cryptocurrency address hijacking (e.g., Bitcoin or Ethereum addresses).
Detects processes repeatedly loading GDI/display libraries (gdi32.dll, gdi32full.dll, user32.dll) at a sustained cadence indicative of automated screen capturing. The rule excludes common collaboration and remote access tools known to perform these functions legitimately, flagging high-frequency, long-duration activity consistent with malicious screen scraping techniques.
This rule detects malicious activity related to the exploitation of MpDlpService.exe. It looks for the execution or presence of known malicious file hashes associated with this threat, including a P-stage script, payload files, and a malicious mpclient.dll. Additionally, it identifies instances where the legitimate MpDlpService.exe binary is executed from a non-standard, suspicious directory, which is a common indicator of side-loading or persistence techniques.
Detects a suspicious staging behavior associated with OnyxC2 premium-tier malware. The detection identifies a process respawning itself—a common precursor to hidden VNC or credential access activity—followed by the execution of Microsoft Edge with specific utility flags typically used to masquerade as an indexing component. This pattern is characteristic of techniques used to hijack authenticated browser sessions for C2 purposes.
This rule identifies instances of screen capture events initiated by processes that have previously engaged in network communication with known Remote Management Tool (RMM) domains. By correlating network activity with suspicious endpoint events, it flags potential unauthorized screen scraping performed by tools often abused by attackers for post-compromise reconnaissance.
Detects removable-media/storage interaction events initiated by the PlugX side-loaded process chain (GRrte.exe / Jarte.exe), consistent with the PlugX core's drive-type query and removable-media ejection behavior (GetDriveTypeW / DeviceIoControl)
Detects instances where the legitimate Windows Character Map utility (charmap.exe) is spawned by suspicious processes or PowerShell, and subsequently loads clr.dll. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL sideloading or process injection techniques used by malware to execute arbitrary code within a trusted system process context.
Detects instances where a browser process (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, or IE) programmatically writes content to the system clipboard using JavaScript commands. This pattern is commonly observed in 'ClickFix' style social engineering attacks, where a user is coerced into copying and executing a malicious command script provided by an attacker, often in the context of resolving a fake system error.
Detects endpoint, process, and network activity associated with the 'TaskStomp' threat actor, specifically targeting known malicious file hashes, command-and-control domains, and specific URLs used in their campaigns.
Detects activity associated with a potential RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) agent communicating with known malicious infrastructure and accessing sensitive files like credentials or IDs. This often indicates an adversary leveraging legitimate RMM tooling for post-compromise activity or exfiltration.
This rule detects persistence attempts via Component Object Model (COM) hijacking. It identifies a specific process 'December_blob.exe' creating or modifying registry keys associated with COM CLSIDs (specifically InprocServer32) and simultaneously dropping or utilizing a file named 'hvcsrv.dll' within an 'IdentityNexusIntegration' directory. This combination of registry modification and file system activity suggests the registration of a malicious COM object to achieve execution persistence.
Detects suspicious process injection attempts into browser processes (e.g., chrome.exe, msedge.exe) characterized by direct NT API syscall invocation (e.g., NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx) originating from a non-browser parent process. This behavior, often associated with the Remus infostealer, bypasses standard user-mode API hooking by using direct syscall stubs to chain injection actions.
ChainScript file manager 'files' task: node.exe performing high-volume recursive deletion within masqueraded ChainScript installation paths (drive enumeration, dir listing, file read/write, recursive delete)
This rule detects potential automated network scanning activity originating from hosts that have recently executed cPanel-related processes or binaries. It flags devices that exhibit a high frequency of connection attempts across a diverse range of remote ports and IP addresses within a short timeframe after cPanel interaction, which is characteristic of worm propagation or automated exploitation attempts targeting web server management interfaces.
Detects instances where dllhost.exe (COM Surrogate) running under high-integrity accounts (SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, NETWORK SERVICE) loads an unsigned DLL file located in the C:\ProgramData\ directory. This pattern is commonly associated with DLL side-loading or malicious library injection to maintain persistence or escalate privileges.
Detects instances where dllhost.exe (COM Surrogate) running under high-integrity accounts (SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, NETWORK SERVICE) loads an unsigned DLL file located in the C:\ProgramData\ directory. This pattern is commonly associated with DLL side-loading or malicious library injection to maintain persistence or escalate privileges.
Detects a specific execution pattern associated with the PIVOTPIPE RAT involving two consecutive operator-issued commands. First, a process impersonation action (token theft/impersonation) is detected via PROCESS_OPEN activity, followed by a 'RevertToSelf' call within the same process context. This sequence indicates an attempt to temporarily shift privilege context to impersonate another user before returning to the original security context.
Detects instances where a process attempts to delete its own executable file on disk. This behavior is often associated with malware or adversary tools attempting to remove their footprint post-execution or as part of a cleanup routine.
Detects instances where the Firefox browser process executes from a path containing 'ProgramData' and creates a new file within the 'ProgramData' directory. This behavior is highly suspicious as legitimate Firefox installations reside in 'Program Files' or 'Program Files (x86)', and 'ProgramData' is often abused by malware for persistent storage or staging.
This rule monitors all process creation events on macOS endpoints. By tracking both 'ProcessCreate' and 'ProcessRollup2' event types where the platform is identified as macOS, it provides a foundation for auditing execution activity across the system.
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