Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
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Detects network communication to known malicious infrastructure associated with the GRAYRABBIT malware campaign. The rule correlates TCP connections on port 443 to the domain 'mail.uaiubifas.top' with process events attempting to discover system and user information (GetAdaptersAddresses, gethostname, GetUserNameA), which is characteristic of the malware's initial beaconing behavior.
This rule monitors for the presence of files matching a known list of malicious SHA256 hashes on devices. It correlates these file events with process creation events occurring on the same device within a 10-minute window, identifying potential execution of malicious binaries or artifacts.
Detects the execution of known GoCaracal malware samples, identified by specific file hashes or staging file paths, occurring in conjunction with low-level keyboard hook installations using SetWindowsHookEx. This behavior is indicative of active keylogging activity.
This rule detects the creation of specific system mutexes commonly used by malware for persistence or to avoid multiple infections (Mutual Exclusion). It monitors for both a specific hardcoded mutex and a pattern-based approach (15-20 alphanumeric characters) initiated by executables from common temporary or user-writable directories, which is a frequent indicator of malicious secondary payloads or droppers.
This rule detects the creation of specific system mutexes commonly used by malware for persistence or to avoid multiple infections (Mutual Exclusion). It monitors for both a specific hardcoded mutex and a pattern-based approach (15-20 alphanumeric characters) initiated by executables from common temporary or user-writable directories, which is a frequent indicator of malicious secondary payloads or droppers.
This rule detects the creation of specific system mutexes commonly used by malware for persistence or to avoid multiple infections (Mutual Exclusion). It monitors for both a specific hardcoded mutex and a pattern-based approach (15-20 alphanumeric characters) initiated by executables from common temporary or user-writable directories, which is a frequent indicator of malicious secondary payloads or droppers.
BigBear 2.0 IOC HUNT (Cortex XDR)
Cortex XDR
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
This rule detects unauthorized processes modifying the 'Secure Preferences' configuration file in Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge browser data directories. This activity often indicates an attempt by malicious software to hijack browser settings, such as forcing extensions or modifying security policies, which is a common precursor to credential theft or persistent malicious access.
This rule detects unauthorized processes modifying the 'Secure Preferences' configuration file in Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge browser data directories. This activity often indicates an attempt by malicious software to hijack browser settings, such as forcing extensions or modifying security policies, which is a common precursor to credential theft or persistent malicious access.
This rule detects unauthorized processes modifying the 'Secure Preferences' configuration file in Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge browser data directories. This activity often indicates an attempt by malicious software to hijack browser settings, such as forcing extensions or modifying security policies, which is a common precursor to credential theft or persistent malicious access.
Detects the presence of known file hashes associated with Vectra Remote Access Trojan (RAT). The rule monitors both file creation/existence events and process execution events where the SHA256 hash matches the identified indicators of compromise.
Detects command-line activity indicating an attempt to interact with or abuse the Docker socket (/var/run/docker.sock) for container escape. Such activity is often observed in post-compromise scenarios, such as ransomware attacks where an adversary attempts to break out of a containerized application to gain control of the underlying host.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
Detects thread creation where the start address resolves to the 'AnimateWindow' function within 'user32.dll'. This behavior is a known indicator of thread-hijacking techniques, such as those implemented by the SparroWocky framework using the MinHook library, where the thread entry point is spoofed to evade detection.
Detects instances where the Chrome browser process accesses camera or microphone hardware, or invokes media device APIs, potentially indicating unauthorized audio or video recording.
This rule detects rapid, repetitive state change operations (such as think, act, or mode changes) occurring within the Microsoft Edge browser context when interacting with Microsoft domains. This behavior is indicative of automated browser interactions, such as those performed by botnets, automated testing frameworks, or potentially malicious browser automation scripts.
Detects the presence of known synchronization objects (mutexes, events, or shared memory) associated with SparroWocky malware, identified via Microsoft Defender DeviceEvents and DeviceProcessEvents telemetry. The rule monitors for these specific markers in process creation, remote thread creation, and named pipe events.
This rule detects a process loading English (.en-US) MUI resource files from the C:\Windows\System32\en-US\ directory when the initiating process is located outside of standard system directories (System32, SysWOW64, Program Files). This behavior is indicative of a masquerading or camouflage technique where a malicious executable attempts to mimic a legitimate system process by loading its localized resources.
This rule monitors for indicators of code execution anomalies commonly associated with process injection, ROP (Return-Oriented Programming) chains, or memory manipulation. It specifically looks for spoofed call stacks, return address validation failures, suspicious API usage in common thread initialization routines, and ROP gadgets within critical modules like kernel32.dll.
This rule detects high-frequency, sub-second screen capture activity typically associated with malwares utilizing screen scraping to exfiltrate changed screen regions. It specifically monitors API calls related to graphical interface manipulation (BitBlt, GDI) and screen capture events, triggering when the frequency of these calls reaches a consistent, rapid interval.
Detects network communication to known malicious infrastructure associated with the GRAYRABBIT malware campaign. The rule correlates TCP connections on port 443 to the domain 'mail.uaiubifas.top' with process events attempting to discover system and user information (GetAdaptersAddresses, gethostname, GetUserNameA), which is characteristic of the malware's initial beaconing behavior.
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