Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the modification of Excel macro security settings (specifically VBAWarnings or AccessVBOM) or the creation of autorun.inf files on removable drives. It identifies these behaviors when they coincide with the execution of Synaptics.exe within a 30-minute window, suggesting a potential correlation between local administrative tasks and malicious document-based payloads or portable drive staging.
Detects outbound network connections to 'registry.npmjs.org' originating from 'node' or 'bun' processes. This behavior may indicate an attempt to exfiltrate data, interact with malicious packages, or perform credential harvesting via npm tokens during execution.
This rule detects the process 'ShieldCrash.exe' accessing or interacting with the Windows ELAM (Early Launch Anti-Malware) configuration directory. ELAM drivers are critical components for secure boot and early malware detection; unauthorized access or manipulation by unknown processes may indicate an attempt to tamper with security tools or evade endpoint protection.
This rule detects a correlation between the creation of a specific suspicious file named 'A08744D2.tmp' and the subsequent activity of the Windows Media Player Network Sharing Service ('wmpnetwk.exe') within a short time window. This pattern often indicates potentially malicious activity where a temporary file may be used to stage or interact with the service process.
This rule monitors for potential persistence and malicious activity by aggregating three distinct detection signals: COM hijacking attempts via the InprocServer32 registry key, the creation of scheduled tasks using specific suspicious naming conventions, and the identification of named mutexes indicative of specific malware presence.
Detects the legitimate wmpnetwk.exe process, commonly used as a target for ShadowPad process injection, initiating outbound network connections while simultaneously accessing Firefox browser profile data. This behavior is indicative of credential theft and command-and-control communication typical of post-compromise activity.
This rule monitors for the connection of specific KVM-over-IP hardware devices (e.g., PiKVM, Guermok) which can be used by an adversary to gain remote access to a system's physical keyboard, video, and mouse interface, effectively bypassing software-based security controls.
Detects the GoCaracal lightweight implant performing process injection by identifying combinations of remote process memory allocation (VirtualAllocRemoteApiCall), memory writing (WriteProcessMemoryRemoteApiCall), and remote thread creation (CreateRemoteThreadApiCall) associated with specific suspicious filenames. It also monitors command-line activity for injection-related flags.
This rule detects attempts by users to disable or clear command line history logs for shell environments, including PowerShell (e.g., modifying PSReadLine history) and Unix-like shells (e.g., unset HISTFILE, setting HISTSIZE to 0, or disabling history collection). Such actions are frequently performed by adversaries to hinder incident response and forensic analysis by obscuring their post-exploitation activity.
This rule detects the creation of a specific mutex named 'GlobolID-4465173'. Mutexes are often used by malware to ensure that only a single instance of the malicious process runs on an infected host, serving as a reliable indicator of compromise (IOC) for specific malware families or campaigns.
Detects ERAAgent.exe (ESET Remote Administrator Agent) interacting with suspicious named pipes (e.g., mojo, spoolss) and attempts to extract credentials from command line parameters, indicating potential credential dumping or lateral movement techniques using the agent process.
Detects attempts to access or create copies of the Active Directory 'ntds.dit' database or the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) registry hive using unauthorized processes. Attackers often target these files to extract credential hashes from Domain Controllers or local systems.
Detects rapid, repeated execution of process control utilities (kill, strace, inotifywait, timeout) directed at monitored processes, often used by malware (such as 'redtail') to disable security monitoring, debugging, or auditing tools on Linux systems.
Detects rapid, repeated execution of process control utilities (kill, strace, inotifywait, timeout) directed at monitored processes, often used by malware (such as 'redtail') to disable security monitoring, debugging, or auditing tools on Linux systems.
Detects specific suspicious processes (identified by hash or path) initiating a listening network connection on non-standard ports typically associated with honeypot captures, specifically referencing Cowrie-related paths or known malicious samples.
This rule detects potential web skimmer activity where a user's browser performs a network connection to known payload delivery hosts (e.g., paste.sh or Google Sheets API) followed by a clipboard modification event on the same device within a one-hour window. This behavior is consistent with malicious scripts attempting to replace copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses with an attacker-controlled address.
Detects the loading or usage of the malicious driver 'DCRCVDrv.sys' associated with the ClearFake crypto stealer campaign, which uses a Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver (BYOVD) technique to interact with the device path '\Device\DCRCVDRV_U' to terminate or impair EDR and security tools.
Detects network communication to known malicious infrastructure associated with the GRAYRABBIT malware campaign. The rule correlates TCP connections on port 443 to the domain 'mail.uaiubifas.top' with process events attempting to discover system and user information (GetAdaptersAddresses, gethostname, GetUserNameA), which is characteristic of the malware's initial beaconing behavior.
Detects network communication to known malicious infrastructure associated with the GRAYRABBIT malware campaign. The rule correlates TCP connections on port 443 to the domain 'mail.uaiubifas.top' with process events attempting to discover system and user information (GetAdaptersAddresses, gethostname, GetUserNameA), which is characteristic of the malware's initial beaconing behavior.
Detects file creation, modification, or renaming in System32 by TieringEngineService.exe or MsMpEng.exe within a short time frame.
Detects rapid, repeated invocation of Microsoft Defender remediation processes (mpcmdrun.exe, MsMpEng.exe) occurring in conjunction with suspicious file write or rename operations in System32. This pattern is characteristic of a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition, where an attacker attempts to exploit the timing gap between Defender's detection and remediation actions to replace a file with a malicious version.
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