Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects inbound network connections initiated by common Windows Nearby Sharing processes ('NearShare.exe', 'NearbySharing.exe', 'quickshare.exe', 'NearbyConnectionsService.exe') that occur on non-standard ports, potentially indicating unauthorized or malicious use of these utilities.
Detects the loading of graphics-related DLLs (gdiplus.dll, gdi32.dll, gdi32full.dll) by processes executing from typically writable directories such as Temp, AppData, or ProgramData. This behavior is consistent with the screen capture functionality of the JFMBackdoor (Red Lamassu), which utilizes these libraries to capture, encode, and stage screen images.
Detects anomalous registry activity associated with the JFMBackdoor, specifically when the legitimate Windows utility fltMC.exe is used for registry modification or enumeration. This rule looks for high-frequency registry operations performed by fltMC.exe, particularly targeting common persistence locations or other registry paths, indicating potential malicious use following DLL side-loading.
Detects inbound network connections initiated by common Windows Nearby Sharing processes ('NearShare.exe', 'NearbySharing.exe', 'quickshare.exe', 'NearbyConnectionsService.exe') that occur on non-standard ports, potentially indicating unauthorized or malicious use of these utilities.
Detects the node.exe process deleting its own executing script file 'setup.cjs' located within an 'easy-day-js' node_modules directory. This behavior is indicative of the anti-forensics self-deletion mechanism used by the easy-day-js supply chain dropper to remove its footprint after executing a subsequent malicious payload.
Detects suspicious handle requests (Sysmon Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread, Event ID 10: ProcessAccess) targeting critical Windows processes lsass.exe, svchost.exe, and explorer.exe from unauthorized source processes. The rule specifically looks for suspicious access rights and filters out known legitimate system processes.
Detects the loading or access of specific DLLs (Optimax.dll or System Optimizer Ultimate.dll) by processes originating from user-writable directories (AppData or Temp), which is characteristic of the TuglaInsaatci campaign utilizing steganographic techniques to deploy Remcos RAT.
Detects suspicious handle requests (Sysmon Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread, Event ID 10: ProcessAccess) targeting critical Windows processes lsass.exe, svchost.exe, and explorer.exe from unauthorized source processes. The rule specifically looks for suspicious access rights and filters out known legitimate system processes.
Detects the hallmark Nightspire pre-encryption routine: executing vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe to quietly delete Volume Shadow Copies, preventing host restoration.
Detects attempts by GreenBlood ransomware or similar threats to delete Volume Shadow Copies and Windows Backup catalogs using 'wmic.exe', 'vssadmin.exe', and 'wbadmin.exe' with specific command-line arguments. This activity is typically performed to prevent system recovery and data restoration.
Detects behaviors associated with ransomware attempting to evade sandbox or virtual machine environments. This rule specifically looks for checks against the 'OOBEInProgress' and 'SystemSetupInProgress' registry values under '\Registry\Machine\System\Setup', and the presence of '_CLUSTER_NETWORK_NAME_' in process command lines. These checks are often performed by malware, such as Reynolds ransomware, to determine if it is running in an analysis environment before proceeding with malicious activities like encryption.
Detects modern phishing tradecraft where malicious JavaScript is embedded inside SVG image files. The browser evaluates the SVG, decodes a Base64 payload, and drops a secondary archive or executable directly to disk via Blob/Data URIs. This rule specifically looks for file creation events in the Downloads folder for common executable or archive file types, correlated with browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox) accessing local SVG files.
Detects attempts by the Remcos RAT to access audio and video capture devices (camera, microphone) by monitoring process command lines for keywords related to these devices. It also looks for processes initiated by PowerShell or cmd.exe, which are common methods for malware execution.
Detects process activity indicative of keylogging by the Remcos RAT loader. The rule specifically looks for processes with 'Remcos' or 'GST*.com' in their file name that also contain command-line arguments related to capturing window text or foreground window information, which are common keylogger behaviors.
Detects potential process injection into Google Chrome processes using Asynchronous Procedure Calls (APC) or remote thread creation. This rule specifically looks for Chrome processes launched with specific command-line arguments (indicating a potentially controlled or sandboxed environment) that then have remote API calls like QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall, CreateRemoteThreadApiCall, or NtQueueApcThreadApiCall targeting them, originating from a different process. The AdditionalFields check for 'CryptUnprotectMemory', 'NtTestAlert', or 'NtQueueApcThreadEx2' further refines the detection of suspicious APC-related activities.
Detects the use of 'curl.exe' with specific command-line arguments indicating a SOCKS5 proxy connection to 'localhost:9050' and a request to '/recvf.php'. This pattern is often associated with malware or adversary activity attempting to exfiltrate data or establish C2 communications through a local SOCKS proxy, potentially part of a multi-hop proxy chain.
This rule detects suspicious activities indicative of Phantom Stealer malware injecting into 'explorer.exe'. It looks for screen capture API calls originating from 'explorer.exe', the loading of GDI DLLs into 'explorer.exe', and 'explorer.exe' being spawned from unexpected parent processes, all of which are behaviors associated with Phantom Stealer.
Detects the use of the 'ditto' command with specific arguments indicating data staging or collection activities, particularly when archiving to a temporary location like '/tmp/osalogging.zip'. This could be indicative of an adversary collecting data from the local system before exfiltration.
This rule detects various activities associated with the RustDesk remote access tool, including process execution, file staging (RustCustom.zip or rustdesk.exe by hash), firewall rule creation for RustDesk, and service installation related to RustDesk. Detection is based on process names, file names, SHA256 hashes, firewall rule names, and service names.
Detects rapid, consecutive execution of commands or scripts to enumerate both the username and computername on a system within a 30-second window. This behavior is consistent with initial host fingerprinting often performed by adversaries, including techniques used by SHEETCREEP malware.
This rule monitors for processes with suspicious file names (specifically identified as potential obfuscated binaries) that perform API calls to 'GetTickCount64' associated with sandbox evasion techniques such as environment detection, debugger checking, and memory inspection.
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