Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,748 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,333
86
83
79
79
Contributors
515
305
271
90
67
Categories
20,440
11,814
5,871
5,145
4,864
1,748
Platforms
1,485
337
160
7
7
Products / Services
937
169
119
81
56
MITRE Techniques
759
440
326
250
242
CVEs
5
5
5
5
5
IDS Classtypes
1
This rule performs an IOC sweep over the past 30 days using DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to detect indicators associated with PoeLLM / Canto Incognito malware campaigns, specifically scanning for known C2 IP addresses, Kryptex cryptomining pool endpoints/domains, and specific file hashes (SHA256).
This rule performs an IOC sweep over the past 30 days using DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to detect indicators associated with PoeLLM / Canto Incognito malware campaigns, specifically scanning for known C2 IP addresses, Kryptex cryptomining pool endpoints/domains, and specific file hashes (SHA256).
This rule performs an IOC sweep over the past 30 days using DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to detect indicators associated with PoeLLM / Canto Incognito malware campaigns, specifically scanning for known C2 IP addresses, Kryptex cryptomining pool endpoints/domains, and specific file hashes (SHA256).
The following analytic detects suspicious system network configuration discovery activities, which may indicate an adversary's attempt to gather information about the network environment. Such actions typically involve commands or tools used to identify network interfaces, routing tables, and active connections. Detecting these activities is crucial, as they often precede more targeted attacks like lateral movement or data exfiltration. By identifying unusual or unauthorized network discovery efforts, this analytic helps security teams to swiftly detect and respond to potential reconnaissance operations, mitigating the risk of further compromise.
The following analytic identifies the usage of microsoft.workflow.compiler.exe, a rarely utilized executable typically found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution telemetry. The significance of this activity lies in its uncommon usage, which may indicate malicious intent such as code execution or persistence mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could leverage this process to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further compromise of the system.
Correlates ARTEX tool artifacts on a device with that device contacting the ARTEX host, xcai.pro, or the DeepSeek API within 24 hours.
Detects WmiPrvSE.exe spawning a child process executable from a user-writable AppData\Local folder, which often results from a .NET process invoking ManagementClass(Win32_Process).Create.
Detects WmiPrvSE.exe spawning a child process executable from a user-writable AppData\Local folder, which often results from a .NET process invoking ManagementClass(Win32_Process).Create.
The following analytic detects the creation or connection to known suspicious C2 named pipes.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by C2 tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
It leverages Sysmon EventCodes 17 and 18 to identify known default pipe names used by C2 tools.
If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to abuse these to potentially gain persistence, command and control, or further system compromise.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
Detects a process querying multiple distinct registry keys associated with virtual environments (VMware, VirtualBox, Wine) in a short time window. This behavior is indicative of environmental profiling performed by malware (such as 2CLoader) to detect sandbox or analysis environments prior to malicious payload execution.
Correlates ARTEX tool artifacts on a device with that device contacting the ARTEX host, xcai.pro, or the DeepSeek API within 24 hours.
Correlates ARTEX tool artifacts on a device with that device contacting the ARTEX host, xcai.pro, or the DeepSeek API within 24 hours.
Detects WmiPrvSE.exe spawning a child process executable from a user-writable AppData\Local folder, which often results from a .NET process invoking ManagementClass(Win32_Process).Create.
Detects WmiPrvSE.exe spawning a child process executable from a user-writable AppData\Local folder, which often results from a .NET process invoking ManagementClass(Win32_Process).Create.
Detects suspicious process-injection related API calls (such as CreateRemoteThread, VirtualAllocEx, and WriteProcessMemory) where the source or target process is a common AI agent runtime environment (e.g., python.exe, node.exe, java.exe, dotnet.exe). This detects potential malicious code execution or reflective loading initiated by or targeting these runtime processes.
Detects instances where a process contacts multiple distinct AI-provider domains within a short time frame while simultaneously performing suspicious operations, such as accessing the LSASS memory, executing process injection, or establishing WMI persistence. This pattern is indicative of a potential 'ClosedQuorum' adversary behavior involving data exfiltration or AI-assisted malicious activity.
This rule detects various forms of process injection (Remote Thread, APC, Map View of Section) targeting common, high-value Windows processes such as explorer.exe, lsass.exe, and web browsers. This behavior is a common technique used by attackers to gain persistence, elevate privileges, or execute code within the context of legitimate system or user-level processes to evade detection.
This rule detects file and process activity originating from or involving specific directories and filenames associated with 'Agta' software, including temporary files such as PowerShell scripts and XML tasks. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized use of backup or testing utilities for malicious purposes, such as script execution or task manipulation.
Detects endpoint, process, and network activity associated with the 'TaskStomp' threat actor, specifically targeting known malicious file hashes, command-and-control domains, and specific URLs used in their campaigns.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
Page 6 of 84