Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
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Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) hunt for artifacts related to the Lazarus Group's Graphalgo/GHAPPIER campaign. It monitors DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over the past 90 days to identify matches against known malicious file hashes (SHA256/SHA1), command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and malicious domains associated with this campaign.
This rule detects potential DLL sideloading activity where legitimate, signed binaries (such as COTFileReadApp.exe or DeElevate64.exe) are executed from non-standard directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, Downloads) while loading specifically identified malicious or sideloaded DLLs. The detection identifies patterns where these binaries operate outside their expected vendor installation paths, indicating a likely attempt to hijack execution flow.
Detects a malicious sequence of actions originating from an Android Accessibility Service, specifically the 'SystemHelperService'. The activity involves the programmatic enablement of Developer Options and Wireless Debugging, followed by the unauthorized extraction of an ADB pairing PIN from the screen, bypassing user interaction requirements.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) hunt for artifacts related to the Lazarus Group's Graphalgo/GHAPPIER campaign. It monitors DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over the past 90 days to identify matches against known malicious file hashes (SHA256/SHA1), command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and malicious domains associated with this campaign.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) hunt for artifacts related to the Lazarus Group's Graphalgo/GHAPPIER campaign. It monitors DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over the past 90 days to identify matches against known malicious file hashes (SHA256/SHA1), command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and malicious domains associated with this campaign.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) hunt for artifacts related to the Lazarus Group's Graphalgo/GHAPPIER campaign. It monitors DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over the past 90 days to identify matches against known malicious file hashes (SHA256/SHA1), command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and malicious domains associated with this campaign.
This rule performs an indicator of compromise (IOC) hunt for artifacts related to the Lazarus Group's Graphalgo/GHAPPIER campaign. It monitors DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, and DeviceNetworkEvents over the past 90 days to identify matches against known malicious file hashes (SHA256/SHA1), command-and-control (C2) IP addresses, and malicious domains associated with this campaign.
Detects unauthorized file deletion activity performed directly by a Node.js process acting as a ChainScript RAT. The RAT uses a bundled node.exe process, operating within specific masquerading directories in the user profile, to execute file system operations such as recursive deletion without spawning child processes.
Detects endpoint, process, and network activity associated with the 'TaskStomp' threat actor, specifically targeting known malicious file hashes, command-and-control domains, and specific URLs used in their campaigns.
Detects instances where an alert marked as process injection (T1055) involves an action process that is unsigned and differs from the actor process image, suggesting potential execution of an unauthorized or malicious payload masked by process injection techniques.
Detects unauthorized processes attempting to open handles to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process with access rights consistent with credential dumping (e.g., PROCESS_VM_READ, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS). This rule also specifically flags the use of well-known tools and techniques such as Mimikatz, ProcDump, and the abuse of rundll32.exe with comsvcs.dll for memory extraction, which is indicative of OS Credential Dumping (T1003.001).
This rule detects potential process injection or process hollowing attempts by correlating Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) events indicating process memory modification permissions (such as PROCESS_VM_WRITE and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD) with subsequent Sysmon Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread) events targeting the same process. This behavior is indicative of an adversary injecting malicious code into a legitimate host process (e.g., svchost.exe, explorer.exe).
This rule detects cross-process operations where common user applications or scripting hosts initiate activity towards sensitive system processes (e.g., lsass.exe, services.exe). This pattern is a frequent indicator of process injection techniques used to achieve code execution in the context of high-privilege or critical system services, often for the purpose of credential theft or persistence.
Detects modifications to the 'PlugPlay' Windows service using 'sc.exe', specifically involving changes to the binary path (binpath) and subsequent service status changes (start/stop) within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This behavior is often associated with the persistence or hijacking of services to execute malicious files, specifically targeting Microsoft Office or Copilot-related process names.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
Detects evidence of the Antino backdoor performing sleep-masking shellcode evasion. The rule monitors for 'slc.dll' being sideloaded by 'GatherOsState.exe' and the subsequent invocation of memory management APIs (VirtualAlloc, NtAllocateVirtualMemory) paired with memory protection changes (VirtualProtect) or thread context modification, which are characteristic behaviors used by Antino to mask malicious shellcode in memory between execution intervals.
Detects a process querying multiple distinct registry keys associated with virtual environments (VMware, VirtualBox, Wine) in a short time window. This behavior is indicative of environmental profiling performed by malware (such as 2CLoader) to detect sandbox or analysis environments prior to malicious payload execution.
Detects a process querying multiple distinct registry keys associated with virtual environments (VMware, VirtualBox, Wine) in a short time window. This behavior is indicative of environmental profiling performed by malware (such as 2CLoader) to detect sandbox or analysis environments prior to malicious payload execution.
Detects a process querying multiple distinct registry keys associated with virtual environments (VMware, VirtualBox, Wine) in a short time window. This behavior is indicative of environmental profiling performed by malware (such as 2CLoader) to detect sandbox or analysis environments prior to malicious payload execution.
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