Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a process querying multiple distinct registry keys associated with virtual environments (VMware, VirtualBox, Wine) in a short time window. This behavior is indicative of environmental profiling performed by malware (such as 2CLoader) to detect sandbox or analysis environments prior to malicious payload execution.
Detects the execution of 'rnpkeys.exe' originating from the 'C:\ProgramData\keyroll' directory, which is a non-standard location for executable files and may indicate malicious activity.
This rule detects various process injection techniques (such as CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, and remote memory writes) initiated by external processes targeting high-value, commonly abused Windows system processes like svchost.exe, lsass.exe, and explorer.exe. These techniques are often used by ransomware and other malware to hide malicious code execution within trusted system memory space.
This rule detects file and process activity originating from or involving specific directories and filenames associated with 'Agta' software, including temporary files such as PowerShell scripts and XML tasks. This behavior is indicative of potential unauthorized use of backup or testing utilities for malicious purposes, such as script execution or task manipulation.
This rule monitors for processes masquerading as Dell-related software (e.g., 'Dell Window Guard.exe', 'Dell.Virus.Guard.exe') or processes containing the command-line argument 'AgtaBackstage'. It flags devices where multiple variations of these suspicious file names appear or where the specific 'AgtaBackstage' string is present, which is indicative of potential malicious activity or persistence mechanisms using software-related naming conventions.
This rule detects cross-process operations where common user applications or scripting hosts initiate activity towards sensitive system processes (e.g., lsass.exe, services.exe). This pattern is a frequent indicator of process injection techniques used to achieve code execution in the context of high-privilege or critical system services, often for the purpose of credential theft or persistence.
Detects potential process injection attempts where a process is created in a suspended state (often used for hollowed or injected code) and subsequently performs sensitive remote memory or thread operations (e.g., NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemote, WriteProcessMemoryRemote) on that process.
Detects the ChainScript RAT agent (executing as node.exe from specific masquerading directory paths) scanning for and enumerating cryptocurrency wallet files, browser-stored wallet extensions, and related sensitive configuration data.
Experimental behavioral hunt for a root-owned shell or interpreter started by a non-root initiating account on explicitly inventoried ISE devices. This identifies an account-context transition in process telemetry; it does not establish preceding exploitation, setuid abuse, or a specific Cisco CVE. Requires verified appliance process telemetry.
Detects potential process injection attempts (e.g., Early Bird APC injection or process hollowing) where a process is spawned in a suspended state, followed shortly by a remote-thread or QueueUserAPC injection primitive targeting that same process. The rule correlates process creation events with subsequent API calls while excluding known legitimate patterns like .NET runtime operations, system updaters, and EDR/AV security components.
Detects attempts to create a memory dump of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process using well-known utilities such as procdump, rundll32 with comsvcs.dll, and taskmgr, which are frequently used by adversaries to perform credential dumping.
Detects endpoint, process, and network activity associated with the 'TaskStomp' threat actor, specifically targeting known malicious file hashes, command-and-control domains, and specific URLs used in their campaigns.
Detects removable-media/storage interaction events initiated by the PlugX side-loaded process chain (GRrte.exe / Jarte.exe), consistent with the PlugX core's drive-type query and removable-media ejection behavior (GetDriveTypeW / DeviceIoControl)
Detects instances where a process attempts to delete its own executable file image shortly after being launched. This behavior is often associated with malware attempting to minimize its forensic footprint, such as self-deleting installers or RAT (Remote Access Trojan) components that move to a different location or execute from memory.
Detects common runtime processes (Node.js, npx, Python) often used for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers accessing sensitive local credential files such as AWS credentials, SSH private keys, or environment files. This behavior is indicative of potential credential harvesting by unauthorized MCP servers in developer environments.
Detects suspicious activity associated with the DarkMe RAT, specifically targeting cryptocurrency wallet data files. The rule correlates file access to known wallet data paths by a hollowed process 'clspack.exe', followed by suspicious outbound network activity originating from that same process, and potentially preceded by WMI-based antivirus enumeration.
Detects suspicious cross-process memory operations where a source process requests process creation/write permissions on a target process (e.g., browsers, explorer.exe, or svchost.exe), followed immediately by the execution of a remote thread injection technique such as CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, or NtCreateThreadEx within the same process pair.
Detects potential process injection attempts (e.g., Early Bird APC injection or process hollowing) where a process is spawned in a suspended state, followed shortly by a remote-thread or QueueUserAPC injection primitive targeting that same process. The rule correlates process creation events with subsequent API calls while excluding known legitimate patterns like .NET runtime operations, system updaters, and EDR/AV security components.
Detects potential process injection attempts (e.g., Early Bird APC injection or process hollowing) where a process is spawned in a suspended state, followed shortly by a remote-thread or QueueUserAPC injection primitive targeting that same process. The rule correlates process creation events with subsequent API calls while excluding known legitimate patterns like .NET runtime operations, system updaters, and EDR/AV security components.
This rule detects potential process injection activity where a process is created in a suspended state and subsequently performs memory unmapping followed by a remote memory write operation. This behavior targets critical system processes such as svchost, explorer, lsass, services, and spoolsv, which is highly indicative of process hollowing or similar injection techniques used by malicious actors.
Detects non-SYSTEM processes enabling SeDebugPrivilege or SeImpersonatePrivilege shortly before launching a process as the SYSTEM user. This behavior is highly indicative of token manipulation and impersonation techniques (e.g., Potato-family exploits) used to elevate privileges from a standard or administrative account to SYSTEM.
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