Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
678 detections
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Detects when the legitimate SentinelAgentWorker.exe process loads 'SentinelAgentCore.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory like AppData\Roaming. This behavior is indicative of DLL sideloading (T1574.002), a technique used by threat actors like Storm-0249 to execute malicious code under a trusted process. The rule specifically checks for the SentinelOne agent process running from its expected installation path to increase fidelity.
Detects the RomCom loader 'msedge.dll' being loaded from a location outside of the legitimate Microsoft Edge installation directory. This is a known TTP for the RomCom threat group to load their Mythic Agent, often as a result of COM hijacking.
Detects a process loading a commonly hijacked system DLL from a non-standard file path that is unsigned. This is indicative of DLL Search Order Hijacking, a technique used by malware like Rhadamanthys to achieve persistence and stealthy execution.
Detects the ClickOnce service (dfsvc.exe) DLL sideloading an unsigned DLL from the ClickOnce application cache directory. This behavior is indicative of a malicious ClickOnce deployment, a technique used for initial access and code execution as seen in 'OneClik' and 'SesameOp' campaigns.
Detects the DLL sideloading of sbamres.dll by the legitimate VipreAV component vetysafe.exe. This technique has been associated with China-linked threat actors like Space Pirates, Kelp (Salt Typhoon), and APT41 subgroups.
Detects DLL side-loading patterns associated with the Lazarus Group's Operation DreamJob campaign. This involves legitimate Windows executables loading malicious DLLs from non-standard paths.
Detects the loading of version.dll from a non-standard directory, a technique associated with DLL Sideloading. This specific variant was observed being used by a loader for TorNet and PureHVNC.
Detects Code Integrity (CI) engine blocking Microsoft Defender's processes (MpCmdRun and NisSrv) from loading unsigned DLLs. This activity may indicate an attempt to sideload arbitrary DLLs into legitimate Microsoft Defender processes, potentially for privilege escalation, persistence, or defense evasion.
Detects the DLL side-loading of 'jli.dll' by 'keytool.exe' from common malware staging directories. This is a more generic version of a rule detecting a technique used by ValleyRAT in Operation Silk Lure.
Detects when the Code Integrity (CI) engine blocks a process from loading an unsigned DLL that resides in a suspicious location. This often indicates an attempt to bypass security controls or execute malicious code through DLL hijacking or side-loading.
Detects the sideloading of specific trojanized DLLs by legitimate Windows executables, a technique observed in Lazarus APT campaigns targeting a Spanish aerospace company. The rule identifies suspicious DLL loads by monitoring 'ImageLoaded' events for particular DLLs being loaded by specific executables from unusual paths, indicating potential DLL hijacking or sideloading for persistence, privilege escalation, or defense evasion.
Detects DLLs loading from a spoofed Windows directory path with an extra space (e.g "C:\Windows \System32") which can bypass Windows trusted path verification. This technique tricks Windows into treating the path as trusted, allowing malicious DLLs to load with high integrity privileges bypassing UAC.
This rule detects potential DLL sideloading of 'MpSvc.dll'. It specifically looks for instances where 'MpSvc.dll' is loaded from a location other than the legitimate Windows Defender directories or the WinSxS directory. This technique can be used by adversaries to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, or evade defenses by tricking a legitimate application into loading a malicious DLL.
Detects processes loading a Lua library (DLL), which could indicate the execution of an embedded Lua script for post-exploitation. This technique was demonstrated in the LOLMIL (Living Off the Land Models and Inference Libraries) research where an autonomous malware used an embedded Lua interpreter to run dynamically generated code.
Detects high-fidelity DLL side-loading in user-writable folders (Downloads, AppData, Temp) where an unsigned or untrusted DLL—created shortly before it is loaded—is executed by a trusted, signed process. This query correlates DLL load timing, signature metadata, and parent process trust to surface sophisticated attack chains, such as those used by Subtle Snail and Lazarus APT groups.
This analytic detects suspicious loading of the `vaultcli.dll` module by processes executing from publicly writable Windows directories. `vaultcli.dll` is known to be abused by information stealers, such as Meduza, to extract credentials from the Windows Credential Vault. The rule monitors for `ImageLoaded` events (Sysmon EventID 7) where `vaultcli.dll` is loaded by a process whose path is within common temporary, public, or other writable system directories. This behavior indicates potential credential theft attempts by malicious software.
Detects blocked load events that did not meet the authenticode signing level requirements or violated the code integrity policy.
The analytic detects instances where a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) is loaded from a temporary directory on a Windows system. Loading DLLs from non-standard paths such as %TEMP% is uncommon for legitimate applications and is often associated with adversary tradecraft, including DLL search order hijacking, side-loading, or execution of malicious payloads staged in temporary folders. Adversaries frequently leverage these directories because they are writable by standard users and often overlooked by security controls, making them convenient locations to drop and execute malicious files. This behavior may indicate attempts to evade detection, execute unauthorized code, or maintain persistence through hijacked execution flows. Detection of DLL loads from %TEMP% can help surface early signs of compromise and should be investigated in the context of the originating process, user account, and potential file creation or modification activity within the same directory.
The following analytic identifies processes loading Mozilla NSS-Mozglue libraries such as mozglue.dll and nss3.dll. It leverages Sysmon Event logs, specifically monitoring EventCode 7, which tracks image loaded events. This activity is significant because it can indicate unauthorized access or manipulation of these libraries, which are commonly used by Mozilla applications like Firefox and Thunderbird. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data exfiltration, credential theft, or further compromise of the system.
Detects a process launched by the Windows Task Scheduler from a non-standard directory that immediately loads a DLL from the same directory. This is a strong indicator of DLL Sideloading for persistence, as seen in campaigns by groups like ToddyCat.
This analytic identifies instances where executable files (.exe) are loaded as modules, detected through 'ImageLoaded' events in Sysmon logs. This method leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to track unusual module loading behavior, which is significant as it deviates from the norm of loading .dll files. This activity is crucial for SOC monitoring because it can indicate the presence of malware like NjRAT, which uses this technique to load malicious modules. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain persistence, and further compromise the host system.
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