Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the modification of Image File Execution Options (IFEO) registry keys for Windows accessibility binaries (e.g., sethc.exe, utilman.exe). Adversaries frequently use this technique to hijack these binaries to launch a command shell with SYSTEM privileges when triggered from the login screen.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry keys related to Component Object Model (COM) objects (CLSID or InprocServer32) where the registry value points to suspicious file paths, specifically those within temporary directories like Temp or AppData. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation by hijacking COM object execution flow.
This rule detects potential VILE ransomware activity by identifying a specific combination of Windows token manipulation APIs (e.g., AdjustTokenPrivileges, DuplicateTokenEx) paired with the usage of VILE-specific direct NT syscalls (NtCreateWaitCompletionPacket, ProcessPrng) within the same process context. This behavioral pairing serves as a high-fidelity indicator of VILE ransomware execution.
Detects the execution behavior associated with the VILE ransomware, specifically focusing on the combination of privilege manipulation API usage (e.g., AdjustTokenPrivileges, DuplicateTokenEx) and the creation of known ransomware-related artifacts like configuration files or decoy files.
Detects the spawning of suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, PowerShell, node.exe, calc.exe) by the Lunar Client application. This behavior is indicative of an exploit targeting the Electron framework's preload IPC bridge, allowing a renderer process to execute commands or gain elevated privileges on the host system.
Detects evidence of AnyDesk exploiting an COM impersonation vulnerability via the adprinterpipe named pipe. The rule monitors for AnyDesk spawning SYSTEM-level child processes, interaction with the adprinterpipe, or modification of critical print-related registry keys.
Detects attempts to modify or bypass AppArmor security profiles using utilities such as aa-complain, aa-disable, or apparmor_parser, correlated with process execution involving user namespace unsharing (e.g., via unshare or CLONE_NEWUSER/CLONE_NEWNET). This combination suggests an attacker attempting to weaken host security controls or perform a container breakout or privilege escalation by manipulating kernel-level namespaces and security policies.
Detects execution of exploit binaries associated with CVE-2026-46331 (pedit COW) or the abuse of legitimate 'tc' (traffic control) and 'unshare' utilities to perform page cache corruption and privilege escalation in user namespace contexts.
This rule detects activities related to the DirtyClone exploit (CVE-2026-43503), including the execution of the exploit binary, the compilation of the exploit from source code using gcc, the use of unshare to prepare network and user namespaces, and suspicious execution of su by non-standard parent processes indicating potential post-exploit root shell acquisition.
This rule detects potentially malicious command-line arguments used with common Linux utilities. It monitors for: the use of 'unshare' for namespace manipulation often used for privilege escalation or container escapes, the 'ip xfrm' command for configuring IPsec policies, and the loading of kernel modules ('modprobe'/'insmod') with suspicious parameters ('esp4', 'esp6', 'rxrpc') which could indicate the installation of malicious rootkits or kernel-level backdoors.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry keys related to Component Object Model (COM) objects (CLSID or InprocServer32) where the registry value points to suspicious file paths, specifically those within temporary directories like Temp or AppData. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation by hijacking COM object execution flow.
Detects MYRA RAT install-guard.js preinstall hook forcing re-execution with sudo npm install -g apintergrationpost to gain root privileges
Detects potential process impersonation by monitoring for suspicious named pipe creation followed by system-level process spawning.
This rule monitors Cisco Unified Communications Manager (UCM) environments for multiple stages of an attack chain, including potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts against administrative interfaces, suspicious file modifications by service accounts, indicators of privilege escalation, and anomalous outbound network connections from core Cisco processes.
Detects an unprivileged process executing from a user-specific temporary directory with the 'RP_' prefix, while simultaneously interacting with specific file patterns in 'C:\Windows\Temp'. This behavior is consistent with the 'RoguePlanet' Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) exploit, which uses junction-swap techniques to manipulate Defender quarantine workflow files to achieve privilege escalation.
This rule detects potential User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts by monitoring for modifications to specific registry keys (ms-settings\Shell\Open\command) followed by the execution of known auto-elevating Windows binaries like 'fodhelper.exe' or 'computerdefaults.exe'. The rule correlates the registry modification with a subsequent process creation from an suspicious location, indicating a likely attempt to gain elevated privileges.
Detects instances where known Windows binaries frequently abused for User Account Control (UAC) bypass (fodhelper.exe, eventvwr.exe) spawn unexpected child processes. These binaries are trusted system utilities that, when used as an actor for launching other processes, often indicate malicious activity aimed at privilege escalation.
Detects a User Account Control (UAC) bypass technique where an adversary modifies the registry keys (HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command) to intercept execution when eventvwr.exe is launched. The rule identifies the suspicious registry write followed by the subsequent execution of a child process (like BQT.exe or start.exe) originating from eventvwr.exe.
Detects instances where the Windows Event Viewer utility (eventvwr.exe) spawns a child process other than the Microsoft Management Console (mmc.exe). This behavior is a well-documented technique for bypassing User Account Control (UAC) because eventvwr.exe is an auto-elevating binary, which can be manipulated to execute arbitrary payloads with high-integrity privileges.
Detects anomalous frequency of UAC elevation prompts (consent.exe) initiated by PowerShell. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation attempts, specifically matching the pattern of repeated Start-Process -Verb RunAs usage to solicit user interaction for UAC elevation.
Detects the ClickOnce payload attempting to spawn the UAC consent.exe dialogue to elevate its privileges post-install.
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