Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects sophisticated shellcode execution patterns characteristic of MovieReaper, specifically monitoring for the combination of RWX memory protection allocation, manipulation of Vectored Exception Handlers (VEH), and usage of manual syscall stubs (NtProtectVirtualMemory) to bypass EDR user-mode API hooking.
Detects the execution of taskkill.exe to forcibly terminate the iediagcmd.exe diagnostic process, initiated by the process GRrte.exe. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to impair security or diagnostic tools on the endpoint.
This rule detects attempts by AutoIt scripts (running as AutoIt3.exe or from Temp directories) to perform process injection into the Windows Character Map utility (charmap.exe). It monitors for suspicious API calls like OpenProcess, CreateRemoteThread, and VirtualAllocEx, specifically looking for memory access and protection flags commonly used during malicious process injection.
Detects when a single process terminates two or more critical security, database, or backup related processes within a short window. This behavior is often associated with adversary attempts to disable security controls or disrupt database operations, commonly observed during the impact phase of an attack or preparatory to data destruction/encryption.
Detects when three or more critical security, database, or service processes are terminated on a Windows host within a short timeframe. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to disable security monitoring (e.g., Windows Defender/MsMpEng.exe) or perform disruptive activity against critical infrastructure (e.g., SQL Server processes).
Detects a malicious chain of events on Android devices, likely attributed to the RatHat malware, where the 'SystemHelperService' abuses Accessibility Services to programmatically enable Developer Options and Wireless Debugging. It further monitors for the capture of a 6-digit pairing code to facilitate unauthorized local ADB self-pairing.
This rule detects the execution, file presence, or driver loading associated with 'EDRKiller' and 'WarsawKiller', which are malicious tools used to terminate or disable endpoint security products.
Detects in-memory modification of the AmsiScanBuffer function within PowerShell processes, specifically targeting the injection of patch instructions (e.g., MOV EAX, 80070057; RET). This technique is characteristic of .NET loaders like PIVOTPIPE attempting to bypass Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) inspection before executing malicious payloads.
This rule detects suspicious process injection activity directed at explorer.exe. It looks for cases where explorer.exe is initiated by a non-standard parent process and performs remote thread creation, thread context manipulation, or process image mapping, which are common techniques used by malware to hide execution within a legitimate system process.
Detects processes attempting to interact with the Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) via loading amsi.dll, calling functions such as AmsiScanBuffer or AmsiOpenSession, or modifying related registry keys. This behavior is highly indicative of attempts to disable or bypass AMSI protection, a common step in executing malicious scripts or payloads on Windows systems.
This rule detects potential PIVOTPIPE activity by correlating AMSI patching indicators with anomalous memory protection changes. It identifies processes that perform frequent transitions to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE or PAGE_NOACCESS, which is indicative of memory-based obfuscation techniques used to evade memory scanning and detection during sleep cycles.
Detects modifications to the 'InProcServer32' registry key within HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID. This activity, which involves pointing a CLSID to a library file located in non-standard user-writable directories (like AppData), is a common technique for COM object hijacking used to achieve persistence or code execution.
Detects the loading of the Alinubx.sys (aka CcProtect.sys) kernel driver, often dropped as nvfsflt64.sys or registered as NvFsFilter, followed by a rapid, simultaneous termination of security product processes. This activity is indicative of a BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attack chain where kernel-mode primitives are used to terminate EDR/AV processes.
Detects the loading of the Alinubx.sys (aka CcProtect.sys) kernel driver, often dropped as nvfsflt64.sys or registered as NvFsFilter, followed by a rapid, simultaneous termination of security product processes. This activity is indicative of a BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attack chain where kernel-mode primitives are used to terminate EDR/AV processes.
Detects attempts to disable or modify Windows Defender security features, such as Real-time Monitoring, Tamper Protection, or adding unauthorized exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets or direct registry modifications.
Detects attempts to disable or modify Windows Defender security features, such as Real-time Monitoring, Tamper Protection, or adding unauthorized exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets or direct registry modifications.
Detects techniques used by SloppyRAT, including indirect NTDLL syscalls bypassing API hooks (Hell's Gate style), and the use of DJB2 API hashing for NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtCreateThreadEx. It monitors for CallTrace patterns indicating unbacked memory calls into ntdll.dll, detection of hardcoded DJB2 hash constants, or the presence of the B8 (mov eax, imm32) instruction followed by the 0F 05 syscall opcode.
Detects the loading of the kernel driver 'Alinubx.sys', identified as a renamed instance of the 'CcProtect.sys' driver. This driver is known to be abused in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security software processes from kernel mode, specifically observed in the context of Rapuncel infostealer campaigns.
This rule detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender security features by monitoring for unauthorized modifications to specific registry keys (DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, or the WinDefend service start type) in conjunction with related process execution activity (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, reg, or MpCmdRun) that includes keywords associated with defender configuration changes.
This rule detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender security features by monitoring for unauthorized modifications to specific registry keys (DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, or the WinDefend service start type) in conjunction with related process execution activity (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, reg, or MpCmdRun) that includes keywords associated with defender configuration changes.
This rule detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender security features by monitoring for unauthorized modifications to specific registry keys (DisableAntiSpyware, DisableRealtimeMonitoring, or the WinDefend service start type) in conjunction with related process execution activity (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, reg, or MpCmdRun) that includes keywords associated with defender configuration changes.
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