Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects evidence of the Alinubx.sys kernel driver being loaded or interacted with via its device interface using a specific IOCTL (0x222024). This driver is known to be abused in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security software processes from kernel mode, effectively bypassing Windows Protected Process Light (PPL) protections.
Detects the creation of a PowerShell process that identifies itself as being spawned by explorer.exe, while the process ID (PID) and parent process ID (PPID) relationship indicates inconsistency, often characteristic of the PSSpoof technique used by malware like SloppyRAT to evade detection by spoofing the process tree.
Detects attempts by malicious software, specifically SloppyRAT, to query or modify Microsoft Defender settings by interacting with WMI classes like MSFT_MpPreference or MSFT_MpComputerStatus. This activity is indicative of efforts to disable security controls such as real-time monitoring to facilitate further malicious actions.
Detects evidence of SloppyRAT employing the Hell's Gate technique, specifically the resolution and indirect invocation of low-level NT system calls (e.g., NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx) designed to bypass EDR user-mode API hooking during process injection activities.
Detects the mass termination of multiple security-related processes on a host within a short timeframe, correlated with the presence of specific driver modules potentially associated with security software interference or evasive behavior.
Detects the deletion of Google Chrome browser extension settings from the Windows Registry. Adversaries often target the 'extensions.settings' registry value under 'PreferenceMACs' to disable security extensions, force the installation of malicious extensions, or tamper with browser-based security controls.
This rule detects indicators of the Rapuncel browser injection by monitoring for the creation of a known malicious DLL hash on disk, identifying non-standard parent processes invoking elevation_service.exe, and detecting the loading of unrecognized DLLs into Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge browser processes.
Detects in-memory tampering of the EtwEventWrite function within ntdll.dll, a technique commonly used by malware and loaders to disable Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) telemetry to avoid detection by security products.
This rule detects system calls originating from unbacked, private, or unknown memory regions, which is a common indicator of reflective code loading or process injection techniques. It also flags suspicious call stacks where standard processes like PowerShell, rundll32, or .NET execute system calls on ntdll.dll from non-standard module memory.
This rule detects potential security software tampering by identifying the loading of a specific driver (Alinubx.sys) followed by the termination or interference of common security agent processes within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to disable endpoint protection using a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) or malicious driver approach.
Detects when a high volume of distinct security-related processes or services are terminated on a single host within a 2-minute window. This behavior is strongly indicative of an adversary attempting to disable endpoint protection software as part of a post-compromise defensive evasion effort.
Detects instances where the process 'GRrte.exe' forcefully terminates 'iediagcmd.exe' using taskkill.exe. This activity is indicative of an attempt to disable or impair specific security diagnostic tools or EDR-related components on the host.
Detects multiple defense evasion techniques typically associated with the Monkey ransomware family, including clearing Windows Event Logs, clearing PowerShell command history, tampering with AMSI and ETW, modifying Microsoft Defender exclusions, and disabling Task Manager or CMD via registry keys.
This rule detects potentially malicious system configuration changes, specifically the suspension or disabling of BitLocker drive encryption via 'manage-bde.exe' and the weakening of SChannel security protocols or ciphers by modifying registry keys. These activities are indicative of an attacker attempting to bypass disk encryption or lower the security posture of network communication.
Detects forged thread call stacks by identifying processes that spoof legitimate thread entry points such as RtlUserThreadStart and BaseThreadInitThunk in kernel32.dll, a technique commonly associated with advanced thread execution hijacking methods like SilentMoonwalk or StackMoonwalk.
Detects instances of process call stack spoofing, specifically techniques like SparroWocky (hooking CreateThread to report fake start addresses such as AnimateWindow) or SilentMoonwalk (forged call stacks masking API call origins as RtlUserThreadStart or BaseThreadInitThunk) used to evade EDR behavioral monitoring.
Detects the loading of the Alinubx.sys (aka CcProtect.sys) kernel driver, often dropped as nvfsflt64.sys or registered as NvFsFilter, followed by a rapid, simultaneous termination of security product processes. This activity is indicative of a BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attack chain where kernel-mode primitives are used to terminate EDR/AV processes.
Detects WriteProcessMemory or CreateRemoteThread operations targeting csc.exe or chrome.exe. This activity is often associated with process injection techniques used to execute code within the context of a legitimate or compiler-related process.
Detects WriteProcessMemory or CreateRemoteThread operations targeting csc.exe or chrome.exe. This activity is often associated with process injection techniques used to execute code within the context of a legitimate or compiler-related process.
Detects unauthorized write operations targeting the memory space of amsi.dll, specifically attempting to patch exported functions such as AmsiScanBuffer or AmsiScanString. This technique is commonly employed by malicious actors to neutralize the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) and prevent security telemetry from inspecting scripts and payloads during execution.
Detects unauthorized attempts to disable Windows Defender Tamper Protection by setting the TamperProtection registry value to 0. This action allows an adversary to weaken system security, potentially enabling them to modify Defender exclusions or stop security services without interference.
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