Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,080 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
542
104
98
88
78
Contributors
471
224
194
49
30
Categories
20,440
11,814
5,871
5,145
4,864
1,080
Platforms
997
84
17
4
3
Products / Services
374
306
162
124
115
MITRE Techniques
744
384
300
286
244
CVEs
15
5
4
2
2
IDS Classtypes
2
1
1
IDS Protocols
3
1
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Windows Defender exclusions by adding the 'C:\' drive root as an exclusion path. This technique, which can be executed via 'Add-MpPreference', 'Set-MpPreference', or 'Invoke-CimMethod', effectively disables real-time scanning across the entire system drive and is often employed by adversaries to hide malicious activity from antivirus detection.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender (MpPreference) settings by adding specific directories or files to the exclusion list. This behavior is frequently associated with adversaries attempting to evade security detection by ensuring malicious tools, staged payloads, or persistent files remain unscanned by the antivirus engine.
Detects artifacts associated with the CRUDEEXCLUDE Delphi-based loader, which is used to deploy the HEAVYGRAM backdoor. The rule identifies a combination of Delphi indicators, anti-analysis sandbox connectivity checks, decoy message boxes, and attempts to modify Windows Defender exclusions for specific paths associated with the malware's activity.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands using 'Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath' initiated by the CRUDEEXCLUDE Delphi utility. This behavior is associated with threat actors staging directories for the deployment of HEAVYGRAM/SHADEGENES payloads.
Detects attempts by PowerShell processes to modify the memory space of amsi.dll, a common technique used to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by patching its functions in-memory.
Detects suspicious processes attempting to open security-critical DLLs like amsi.dll or ntdll.dll with potential write or execute access. This behavior is often associated with runtime patching techniques used to disable or evade AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) and ETW (Event Tracing for Windows) monitoring, which are common defensive evasion tactics.
Detects the invocation of the undocumented ntdll function 'EtwpCreateEtwThread', which is used as an alternative to standard thread-creation APIs like CreateThread or CreateRemoteThread. This technique is often associated with advanced shellcode execution, such as MovieReaper, designed to evade common thread-creation monitoring sensors.
Detects the invocation of the undocumented ntdll function 'EtwpCreateEtwThread', which is used as an alternative to standard thread-creation APIs like CreateThread or CreateRemoteThread. This technique is often associated with advanced shellcode execution, such as MovieReaper, designed to evade common thread-creation monitoring sensors.
Detects the invocation of the undocumented ntdll function 'EtwpCreateEtwThread', which is used as an alternative to standard thread-creation APIs like CreateThread or CreateRemoteThread. This technique is often associated with advanced shellcode execution, such as MovieReaper, designed to evade common thread-creation monitoring sensors.
Detects evidence of the MovieReaper loader technique. This behavior involves registering or rewriting Vectored Exception Handlers, allocating memory with EXECUTE_READWRITE protection, and triggering debug-break exceptions to redirect execution into raw NtProtectVirtualMemory syscalls, effectively bypassing user-mode API hooks often used for monitoring.
Detects the creation of specific Object Manager namespace directories and objects used by the ShieldCrash proof-of-concept (CVE-2026-69414) to hijack the Microsoft Defender scan process.
Detects in-memory modification of the ntdll.dll module to patch EtwEventWrite or EtwEventWriteFull functions, a technique used by adversaries to evade Windows event tracing and suppress telemetry. The rule specifically targets activities originating from w3wp.exe, consistent with behavior observed in IIS-hosted deployments like GhostContainer.
Detects in-memory modification of the ntdll.dll module to patch EtwEventWrite or EtwEventWriteFull functions, a technique used by adversaries to evade Windows event tracing and suppress telemetry. The rule specifically targets activities originating from w3wp.exe, consistent with behavior observed in IIS-hosted deployments like GhostContainer.
Detects the loading and service creation of the CcProtect/Alinubx kernel driver, a known technique for Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks. The rule identifies suspicious characteristics such as file name mismatches, unauthorized product/company signatures, and the creation of services associated with this malicious driver family (e.g., NvFsFilter) to facilitate EDR/AV termination or privilege escalation.
Detects the loading or presence of the Alinubx.sys kernel driver, a malicious component used for Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks. This driver facilitates the mass termination of security product processes (AV/EDR) by exposing a specific IOCTL (0x222024) to interface with kernel-mode process termination primitives (e.g., ZwTerminateProcess), often serving as a precursor to the deployment of stealers like Rapuncel.
Detects in-memory tampering of the EtwEventWrite function within ntdll.dll, a technique commonly used by malware and loaders to disable Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) telemetry to avoid detection by security products.
This rule detects attempts to tamper with the Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) or suspicious modifications to the memory of common scripting and proxy processes (powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, rundll32.exe, mshta.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe). Such activities are often indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass security detection mechanisms to execute malicious code or hide their presence.
This rule monitors for suspicious process execution patterns that suggest system tampering, security tool evasion, or data concealment. It detects activities such as clearing event logs, modifying Windows Defender preferences (exclusions/real-time monitoring), creating suspicious scheduled tasks, deleting volume shadow copies, and using PowerShell for credential or system state manipulation.
This rule monitors for a collection of adversarial behaviors on Windows systems, including persistence mechanisms via scheduled tasks and registry run keys, tampering with security services (VSS, Windows Defender), credential harvesting attempts (LSASS memory), log and history clearing, and external network communication to known IP geolocation services.
Detects the loading of amsi.dll or clr.dll into the charmap.exe process. Adversaries often inject malicious code into legitimate, system-native processes like charmap.exe to bypass detection and perform in-memory patching of security controls, such as disabling AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface).
Detects a suspicious sequence of activity involving persistence via Registry Run keys (specifically targeting SMQDService or winappx entries) followed by modifications to Microsoft Defender configuration (adding exclusions via PowerShell) within a two-hour window on the same device.
Page 15 of 52