Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

1,080 detections

Detects anomalous thread execution call stacks indicative of the SparroWocky anti-forensic evasion technique. This method involves spoofing thread start addresses and call stacks by injecting or manually manipulating stack frames to include legitimate-looking system functions (e.g., BaseFlushAppcompatCacheWorker, BaseCheckVDMp) alongside malicious execution patterns involving NtDelayExecution and SleepEx to hide the true origin of code execution.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects remote thread creation attempts (via CreateRemoteThread or NtCreateThreadEx) where the associated module path is empty or null, which is a common indicator of process injection techniques attempting to execute code without a backing file on disk.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects threads created using CreateThread or CreateRemoteThread where the start address resolves to the AnimateWindow function in user32.dll. This technique is often used by malware, such as those leveraging the MinHook library, to disguise the true entry point of injected code by redirecting thread execution through a legitimate Windows API function (hooking).
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects the allocation of executable memory regions (RWX or EXECUTE_READ) that are not backed by a file on disk (i.e., anonymous memory). This behavior is a common indicator of process injection, shellcode execution, or fileless malware techniques where code is injected into a process and executed directly from memory without a corresponding file on disk.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects reflective memory mapping and reflective code loading activities consistent with the SparroWocky payload. The rule identifies suspicious memory configurations, specifically executable and writable (RWX) memory regions that are not backed by a corresponding file on disk, often associated with memory-only execution techniques. It also monitors for execution artifacts related to NtMapViewOfSection or reflective loading keywords.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects reflective memory mapping and reflective code loading activities consistent with the SparroWocky payload. The rule identifies suspicious memory configurations, specifically executable and writable (RWX) memory regions that are not backed by a corresponding file on disk, often associated with memory-only execution techniques. It also monitors for execution artifacts related to NtMapViewOfSection or reflective loading keywords.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
002
Detects the use of PowerShell, pwsh, or cmd to execute the 'Add-MpPreference' command with the '-ExclusionPath' parameter, specifically targeting common directories like Telegram Desktop or specific system directories. This activity suggests an attempt to bypass security scanning by excluding known malicious locations or folders from Microsoft Defender's real-time monitoring.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
003
Detects the use of PowerShell, pwsh, or cmd to execute the 'Add-MpPreference' command with the '-ExclusionPath' parameter, specifically targeting common directories like Telegram Desktop or specific system directories. This activity suggests an attempt to bypass security scanning by excluding known malicious locations or folders from Microsoft Defender's real-time monitoring.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
003
Detects the use of PowerShell, pwsh, or cmd to execute the 'Add-MpPreference' command with the '-ExclusionPath' parameter, specifically targeting common directories like Telegram Desktop or specific system directories. This activity suggests an attempt to bypass security scanning by excluding known malicious locations or folders from Microsoft Defender's real-time monitoring.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
003
This rule detects the process 'ShieldCrash.exe' accessing or interacting with the Windows ELAM (Early Launch Anti-Malware) configuration directory. ELAM drivers are critical components for secure boot and early malware detection; unauthorized access or manipulation by unknown processes may indicate an attempt to tamper with security tools or evade endpoint protection.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
607
Detects the loading of the Alinubx.sys (aka CcProtect.sys) kernel driver, often dropped as nvfsflt64.sys or registered as NvFsFilter, followed by a rapid, simultaneous termination of security product processes. This activity is indicative of a BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attack chain where kernel-mode primitives are used to terminate EDR/AV processes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
001
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands containing indicators of AMSI or ETW unhooking (e.g., references to amsi.dll, AmsiScanBuffer, EtwEventWrite, or VirtualProtect). This activity is commonly associated with attackers attempting to bypass endpoint security telemetry and antimalware scanning mechanisms prior to executing malicious payloads.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
004
Detects instances where the Windows Search Indexer service process (SearchIndexer.exe) performs suspicious process-related API calls such as memory writes, remote thread creation, or opening processes against common web browser executables (chrome.exe, msedge.exe). This behavior is characteristic of malicious process injection where a legitimate, high-privileged system process is abused to inject code into a browser process.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
1 month ago
001
Detects instances where the Windows Search Indexer service process (SearchIndexer.exe) performs suspicious process-related API calls such as memory writes, remote thread creation, or opening processes against common web browser executables (chrome.exe, msedge.exe). This behavior is characteristic of malicious process injection where a legitimate, high-privileged system process is abused to inject code into a browser process.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
1 month ago
001
Detects instances where the Windows Search Indexer service process (SearchIndexer.exe) performs suspicious process-related API calls such as memory writes, remote thread creation, or opening processes against common web browser executables (chrome.exe, msedge.exe). This behavior is characteristic of malicious process injection where a legitimate, high-privileged system process is abused to inject code into a browser process.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
1 month ago
001
Detects instances where the Windows Search Indexer service process (SearchIndexer.exe) performs suspicious process-related API calls such as memory writes, remote thread creation, or opening processes against common web browser executables (chrome.exe, msedge.exe). This behavior is characteristic of malicious process injection where a legitimate, high-privileged system process is abused to inject code into a browser process.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
1 month ago
001
Detects instances where the Windows Search Indexer service process (SearchIndexer.exe) performs suspicious process-related API calls such as memory writes, remote thread creation, or opening processes against common web browser executables (chrome.exe, msedge.exe). This behavior is characteristic of malicious process injection where a legitimate, high-privileged system process is abused to inject code into a browser process.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects thread creation events where the initiating module is ntdll.dll, bypassing the conventional CreateThread path originating from kernel32.dll. This is a common behavioral indicator of process injection techniques used to hide malicious thread execution.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
This rule detects processes manually resolving API function addresses by traversing the Process Environment Block (PEB) Ldr structure or parsing module export tables. This technique is often used by malicious code to resolve Windows API functions dynamically without relying on standard LoadLibrary or GetProcAddress calls, effectively evading common API-hooking based monitoring.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects memory allocation operations in processes where the protection mask is set to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE (0x40). This behavior is often associated with code injection techniques, where an adversary allocates memory with write and execute permissions to load or execute malicious payloads in memory.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
Detects suspicious thread injection activities (CreateRemoteThreadApiCall, NtCreateThreadEx, or RtlCreateThread) or the loading of 'ntdll.dll' by specific potentially unauthorized binaries (e.g., RuntimeSSH.exe, smqdservice.exe, etc.) or within the 'ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry' directory. This often indicates reflective code injection or process tampering, excluding known legitimate Windows system processes.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
1 month ago
001
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