Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the 'ted' backdoor or similar malicious activity attempting to manipulate HAProxy's internal connection counters by accessing or writing to the HAProxy process memory (/proc/[pid]/mem or /proc/self/mem). This behavior is characteristic of an attempt to evade backend logging and statistics tracking by directly modifying process memory structures.
Detects when a Node.js process initiates a low-level keyboard hook (WH_KEYBOARD_LL or WH_KEYBOARD) while running from common user-writable directories, which may indicate malicious keylogging activity by a suspicious process.
Detects when a Node.js process initiates a low-level keyboard hook (WH_KEYBOARD_LL or WH_KEYBOARD) while running from common user-writable directories, which may indicate malicious keylogging activity by a suspicious process.
This rule detects attempts to perform process injection techniques (such as creating remote threads or opening processes) targeting the 'ctfmon.exe' process, where the initiating process is not 'ctfmon.exe' itself. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity such as reflective code loading or the execution of malware like SparkRAT, which may use this legitimate Windows process to mask its activity.
This rule detects potentially malicious process injection activities (CreateRemoteThreadApiCall, ProcessInjection, OpenProcessApiCall) targeting the Volume Shadow Copy Service process (vssvc.exe). It monitors for interactions originating from processes other than legitimate system processes (svchost.exe, services.exe) or vssadmin.exe, which is commonly associated with Volume Shadow Copy manipulation. Such activity often indicates attempts by malware or attackers to inject code into a critical system process to gain persistence, escalate privileges, or evade detection.
This rule detects the termination of critical security software processes (e.g., antivirus agents) by a process that has recently acquired SeDebugPrivilege. This behavior is indicative of a malicious actor attempting to disable endpoint security controls to evade detection.
This rule detects cross-process injection techniques, such as OpenProcess, CreateRemoteThread, and memory modifications, specifically targeting 'svchost.exe' instances that do not appear to be hosting critical Windows services. By filtering out known critical services (e.g., RpcSs, DcomLaunch), the rule flags suspicious attempts to inject code into legitimate service host processes to mask malicious activity.
This rule detects the termination of critical security software processes (e.g., antivirus agents) by a process that has recently acquired SeDebugPrivilege. This behavior is indicative of a malicious actor attempting to disable endpoint security controls to evade detection.
This rule detects potential tampering with the Huorong security product by monitoring for specific process names (HipsTray.exe, HipsMain.exe, HipsDaemon.exe, wsctrlsvc.exe, TrafficProt.exe) interacting with suspicious API calls or command lines indicative of token privilege manipulation, service blinding, or security product disabling/downgrade.
Detects attempts to modify, disable, or exclude paths and processes from Microsoft Defender Antivirus using legitimate administrative utilities such as PowerShell, cmd, sc, and netsh. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to evade security monitoring.
Detects the use of common Linux command-line utilities (sed, grep, awk, bash, sh) to perform operations on sensitive system logs or shell history files. The rule targets command strings indicative of log modification, filtering, or removal of audit trails, often associated with an attacker attempting to conceal malicious activity.
This rule detects attempts to manipulate process access tokens using the Windows 'SetTokenInformation' API. Specifically, it monitors for adjustments to token privileges or integrity levels, or the presence of 'Untrusted' markers. These behaviors are often indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass Windows access controls, perform token manipulation, or conduct privilege escalation.
Detects the GoCaracal lightweight implant performing process injection by identifying combinations of remote process memory allocation (VirtualAllocRemoteApiCall), memory writing (WriteProcessMemoryRemoteApiCall), and remote thread creation (CreateRemoteThreadApiCall) associated with specific suspicious filenames. It also monitors command-line activity for injection-related flags.
Detects anomalous network connections to the local Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) debugging interface (127.0.0.1) associated with suspicious commands or function calls. This pattern is indicative of msaRAT malware attempting to perform process injection, bypass Content Security Policy (CSP), or execute code within a target browser process.
Detects the loading of potential Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) drivers, specifically those known to be utilized for bypassing endpoint security controls. This rule triggers on specific driver filenames or drivers loaded from non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., %TEMP%, Public), which are common tactics for dropping and executing malicious kernel-mode code.
Detects periodic execution cycles of ERAAgent.exe that involve memory protection changes, characteristic of the SLEEPWALKER malware's XOR-decrypt-execute-reencrypt loop scheduled by a cron-like mechanism.
This rule detects attempts to perform process injection techniques (such as creating remote threads or opening processes) targeting the 'ctfmon.exe' process, where the initiating process is not 'ctfmon.exe' itself. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious activity such as reflective code loading or the execution of malware like SparkRAT, which may use this legitimate Windows process to mask its activity.
This rule detects the termination of specific security-related processes (e.g., antivirus services) shortly after a specific driver, 'ardrv.sys', is loaded on a Windows system. This sequence is characteristic of a 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) attack, where an adversary loads a signed but vulnerable kernel driver to gain elevated privileges, which they then use to disable or terminate security monitoring processes.
Detects periodic execution cycles of ERAAgent.exe that involve memory protection changes, characteristic of the SLEEPWALKER malware's XOR-decrypt-execute-reencrypt loop scheduled by a cron-like mechanism.
Detects behavioral indicators associated with the ChocoShell malware, a fileless PowerShell-based infostealer. The rule monitors for malicious command-line activity including AMSI bypass, credential theft from Token Broker and WLAN profiles, disabling of Microsoft Defender signatures, and communication with local API endpoints typical of the CornFlake controller.
The following analytic detects Windows Filtering Platform filters that are added and configured to block outbound traffic for known EDR and security agent processes.
Tools such as EDRSilencer abuse WFP to disrupt outbound telemetry from EDR processes, which can bypass detections that only look for the tool process name.
This detection looks for WFP add events with a block action and EDR process names embedded in the hexdump-like Conditions field.
Tools such as EDRSilencer abuse WFP to disrupt outbound telemetry from EDR processes, which can bypass detections that only look for the tool process name.
This detection looks for WFP add events with a block action and EDR process names embedded in the hexdump-like Conditions field.
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