Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the suspicious loading of known vulnerable drivers (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver - BYOVD) via the Windows service control manager (sc.exe) or event log 7045, followed by the immediate termination of major endpoint security software processes within a 300-second window. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to disable or tamper with security tools using kernel-level privileges.
This rule detects potential process injection or process hollowing attempts by correlating Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) events indicating process memory modification permissions (such as PROCESS_VM_WRITE and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD) with subsequent Sysmon Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread) events targeting the same process. This behavior is indicative of an adversary injecting malicious code into a legitimate host process (e.g., svchost.exe, explorer.exe).
Detects attempts to disable, stop, or reconfigure security software (Antivirus, EDR, Endpoint Protection) on Windows endpoints by abusing legitimate administrative utilities such as sc.exe, net.exe, taskkill.exe, wmic.exe, and PowerShell to tamper with service configurations or kill security-related processes.
Detects a suspicious pattern of mass security process termination, where a process masquerading as legitimate consumer or gaming software (e.g., Kaspersky, Valorant, Javelin) repeatedly uses commands like taskkill, sc stop, or NtTerminateProcess to disable EDR agents and antivirus software within a short time window. This behavior is indicative of pre-ransomware staging activities used by threat actors.
This rule detects potentially malicious in-memory module loading, such as Beacon Object File (BOF) execution, on hosts already identified as exhibiting suspicious behavior related to MLTBackdoor or sideloading activity. It monitors for memory allocation or protection changes (AllocateVirtualMemory, VirtualProtect, CreateRemoteThread) that result in executable memory (RWX or execute-only) without a corresponding file on disk, which is a common indicator of fileless code injection.
Detects attempts to disable security services (Windows Defender, EDR agents), modify audit policies via auditpol, or stop/clear the Windows Event Log service. This behavior is a common precursor to post-compromise activity intended to blind defenders and conceal malicious actions.
Detects Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) events where a process opens lsass.exe with a GrantedAccess mask matching known credential-dumping access rights (e.g. PROCESS_VM_READ combinations used by Mimikatz/ProcDump-style tooling), excluding common legitimate EDR/AV/diagnostic source processes.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Windows Defender settings (e.g., disabling real-time monitoring, adding exclusions, or stopping services) using the Set-MpPreference cmdlet or service control commands. This technique is frequently utilized by ransomware actors, such as the ALPHV/BlackCat group, to neutralize security protections prior to executing malicious payloads.
Detects remote thread creation (CreateRemoteThread or QueueUserAPC) into common Windows system processes (rundll32.exe or svchost.exe) originating from suspicious source processes. This activity is indicative of process injection techniques commonly utilized by Cobalt Strike beacons during post-exploitation, lateral movement, or ransomware deployment phases.
Detects evidence of the Antino backdoor performing sleep-masking shellcode evasion. The rule monitors for 'slc.dll' being sideloaded by 'GatherOsState.exe' and the subsequent invocation of memory management APIs (VirtualAlloc, NtAllocateVirtualMemory) paired with memory protection changes (VirtualProtect) or thread context modification, which are characteristic behaviors used by Antino to mask malicious shellcode in memory between execution intervals.
Detects a potential process hollowing technique where 'Finalized.dll' (loaded from unconventional locations like a ComponentsFolder or System32) is used to spawn 'clspack.exe' in a suspended state from a non-standard path (e.g., AppData\Microsoft). This sequence indicates an attempt to mask malicious execution under a legitimate process name.
Detects the use of PowerShell Set-MpPreference commands to disable multiple Microsoft Defender security features, including real-time monitoring, behavioral scanning, and threat detection actions. This activity is consistent with ransomware behavior, such as Nova or The Gentlemen families, attempting to neutralize endpoint protection before proceeding with malicious actions like file encryption.
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes (AV/EDR) using common administrative tools including taskkill.exe, wmic.exe, and PowerShell Stop-Process. This behavior is frequently observed during the pre-encryption phase of ransomware attacks, such as Nova and Gentlemen, to evade detection.
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes (AV/EDR) using common administrative tools including taskkill.exe, wmic.exe, and PowerShell Stop-Process. This behavior is frequently observed during the pre-encryption phase of ransomware attacks, such as Nova and Gentlemen, to evade detection.
Detects known Cobalt Strike default named pipe naming conventions and cross-process reflective DLL injection activities into common Windows host processes such as rundll32.exe, svchost.exe, and others. This rule monitors for suspicious named pipe creation events and process memory manipulation patterns indicative of beacon behavior and post-exploitation injection.
Detects a behavioral pattern characteristic of Everest ransomware, where a sequence of rapid process terminations occurs within a 20-second window. The rule identifies the coordinated termination of security/analysis tools, antivirus/backup/database services, and other high-memory processes on a single device, excluding known legitimate maintenance processes.
Detects a behavioral pattern characteristic of Everest ransomware, where a sequence of rapid process terminations occurs within a 20-second window. The rule identifies the coordinated termination of security/analysis tools, antivirus/backup/database services, and other high-memory processes on a single device, excluding known legitimate maintenance processes.
Detects a behavioral pattern characteristic of Everest ransomware, where a sequence of rapid process terminations occurs within a 20-second window. The rule identifies the coordinated termination of security/analysis tools, antivirus/backup/database services, and other high-memory processes on a single device, excluding known legitimate maintenance processes.
Detects the abuse of WerFaultSecure.exe or similar Windows Error Reporting processes, invoked with debugging or dumping flags against security/EDR process names, or spawned by unexpected parent processes. This technique is often used to freeze security tools (EDR-Freeze) by exploiting process suspension via mini-dump handles.
This rule detects various process injection techniques (such as CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, and remote memory writes) initiated by external processes targeting high-value, commonly abused Windows system processes like svchost.exe, lsass.exe, and explorer.exe. These techniques are often used by ransomware and other malware to hide malicious code execution within trusted system memory space.
Detects the execution of attrib.exe spawned by known Sauron Loader process names (rnpkeys.exe, rnp.exe, or tdwp.exe). The rule flags instances where attrib.exe is executed without its typical command-line arguments (file attribute flags), suggesting it is being used as a surrogate process for injected C2-tasked shellcode.
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