Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

1,080 detections

Detects potential process injection attempts involving the Windows Update service (wusvc.exe). The rule monitors for remote thread creation or APC injection activities combined with memory operations (VirtualAlloc or VirtualProtect) that set memory regions to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, which is a common pattern for running shellcode in a hijacked process context.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
004
Detects evidence of VILE ransomware behavior involving token and privilege manipulation, including the use of Windows API functions such as AdjustTokenPrivileges, OpenProcessToken, and DuplicateTokenEx, as well as potential EDR bypass indicators via NT syscalls like NtCreateWaitCompletionPacket.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
004
Detects in-process memory manipulation of amsi.dll (AmsiScanBuffer/AmsiScanString) within PowerShell script block logs (Event ID 4104). This activity often involves using VirtualProtect or Marshal.Copy to apply an in-memory patch (e.g., return-early 0xC3) to neutralize AMSI scanning capabilities, which is a common technique for bypassing defensive security controls.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
003
This rule monitors PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) for command patterns indicative of Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) or Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) bypass techniques. These include reflective manipulation of AMSI internals (e.g., AmsiUtils, amsiInitFailed), DynamicMethod IL code generation for malicious hooks, and attempts to suppress ETW logging via the PSEtwLog provider.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
003
This rule monitors PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) for command patterns indicative of Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) or Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) bypass techniques. These include reflective manipulation of AMSI internals (e.g., AmsiUtils, amsiInitFailed), DynamicMethod IL code generation for malicious hooks, and attempts to suppress ETW logging via the PSEtwLog provider.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
103
Detects attempts to disable or impair Microsoft Defender Antivirus using legitimate system administration tools such as PowerShell (Set-MpPreference, Add-MpPreference), WMIC, sc.exe, or net.exe. Adversaries may use these tools to bypass security controls by disabling real-time monitoring or adding unauthorized exclusion paths.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
003
Detects unauthorized writes to the /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches interface by non-root users or processes that are not standard system maintenance tools. This activity is a known post-exploitation technique used by exploits like the 'pedit' COW exploit to clear cached setuid binary pages in memory for evasion or cleanup.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
005
Stealthy backdoor MLTBackdoor linked to KongTuke ClickFix and ModeloRAT campaigns
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
002
Campaign converting compromised FortiGate firewalls into credential stealers
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
102
Detects suspicious cross-process activity, such as process hollowing, where an unsigned or unusually located process (e.g., in AppData, Temp, or Downloads) attempts to inject code into legitimate Windows system processes like svchost.exe or explorer.exe.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
102
This rule monitors Windows Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) for suspicious activity where the CallTrace indicates the use of direct syscalls (bypassing standard Win32 DLL chain) or anomalous execution paths while targeting high-value processes such as security agents, system services, and critical infrastructure (e.g., lsass.exe, svchost.exe).
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
002
Detects multiple methods commonly used for defense evasion and credential theft on Windows systems, including: enabling WDigest credential caching via Registry modification, execution of forensic tools (FTK Imager) sometimes repurposed for security tool tampering, disabling Microsoft Defender real-time monitoring or removing exclusions via PowerShell/CMD, and loading known vulnerable kernel drivers associated with BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
002
Detects cross-process memory operations and remote thread creation associated with the SPECTRALVIPER sideloading chain. It specifically flags injections originating from IntelAudioService.exe into OneDrive or svchost processes, the loading of the DtlCrashCatch.dll module, and general suspicious remote thread or memory write operations against these targets, excluding known system processes and security software.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
002
This rule detects suspicious remote thread creation events (Sysmon Event ID 8) where a process initiates a thread in high-value system processes like lsass.exe, svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or winlogon.exe. It specifically filters out activity originating from common Windows system directories, highlighting potential process injection attempts by unauthorized binaries.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
002
This rule detects suspicious remote thread creation events (Sysmon Event ID 8) where a process initiates a thread in high-value system processes like lsass.exe, svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or winlogon.exe. It specifically filters out activity originating from common Windows system directories, highlighting potential process injection attempts by unauthorized binaries.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
002
This rule monitors for suspicious activities related to Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) and authentication daemons. It detects unauthorized modifications to PAM configuration and shared object files, unexpected child processes spawned by sshd, the use of LD_PRELOAD in authentication contexts, and the tracing of authentication binaries (e.g., sshd, login, sudo) via strace.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
002
Detects potential indicators of an SSH/PAM backdoor. This includes three behaviors: 1) SSH-related system processes writing to suspicious file paths (e.g., /tmp, /dev/shm, or hidden files in user directories), 2) PAM sessions immediately followed by suspicious file writes, and 3) successful SSH authentications for usernames previously reported as 'Invalid' by the system, suggesting a tampered PAM module allowing arbitrary authentication.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
002
Detects unauthorized write, modification, or rename operations within Linux Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) directories (/lib/security, /lib64/security, /usr/lib/security, /etc/pam.d). The rule identifies activity performed by processes that are not recognized package managers (e.g., apt, yum, dpkg), which is a common technique used by threat actors to inject malicious authentication modules or backdoors (e.g., pam_unix.so replacement) to hijack authentication processes.
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Ibrahim Saud@tektrix
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Detections.ai Community
4 months ago
202
Detects unauthorized cross-process memory operations targeting high-value Windows processes (e.g., lsass.exe, svchost.exe) by unsigned or untrusted processes. It also detects indicators of reflective DLL injection within process command lines.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
302
This rule detects suspicious HTTP request bodies containing the 'LD_PRELOAD' environment variable assignment, targeting common temporary or writable directories. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to perform dynamic linker hijacking on a Linux system to inject malicious shared libraries into target processes.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
Bharat Cyber Guardians
4 months ago
002
Detects Remcos RAT using process hollowing to inject into the default browser executable. The loader chain originates from a TuglaInsaatci-masquerading executable and passes through in-memory DLL stages (Optimax.dll / System Optimizer Ultimate.dll) before hollowing the browser. The Remcos_Mutex_Inj mutex confirms successful injection into the browser process.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
4 months ago
2011
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