Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects unauthorized attempts to terminate, stop, or access Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) or Antivirus agent processes. This is identified by monitoring command-line utilities like taskkill, net, and sc targeting known security service names, as well as detecting suspicious cross-process access (e.g., OpenProcess) by unauthorized processes targeting security agent PIDs.
Detects behavior indicative of the Remcos RAT injecting its code into legitimate Windows processes (such as iexplore.exe, ieinstal.exe, ielowutil.exe, svchost.exe, or explorer.exe). The rule identifies this by monitoring for a process matching the Remcos naming convention that launches a secondary process in a suspended state, followed by cross-process activity that deviates from standard system behavior.
Detects cross-process injection activity targeting Internet Explorer related processes (iexplore.exe, ieinstal.exe, ielowutil.exe). The rule monitors for unauthorized processes that are not signed by trusted publishers (Microsoft, Google, Mozilla) performing injection-like behavior, typically associated with Remcos RAT and its use of techniques such as process hollowing or thread execution hijacking.
Detects instances where a non-browser, non-updater process attempts to perform process injection into common browser executables (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, IE). This behavior is consistent with process hollowing techniques used by Remcos RAT, particularly observed in campaigns such as FortiBleed, to masquerade malicious activity under legitimate browser processes.
Detects execution patterns where security tools such as Microsoft Defender, Sysmon, and Filebeat are intentionally impaired or disabled using service control commands (sc.exe) and PowerShell cmdlets (Set-MpPreference), consistent with adversary activity aimed at bypassing security monitoring.
Detects the creation or modification of the 'Debugger' registry value under the 'Image File Execution Options' (IFEO) key. This technique is often used by adversaries to establish persistence, achieve privilege escalation, or hijack the execution of specific applications, including security tools.
This rule detects potential tampering with security software processes and services, as well as the execution of suspicious batch scripts (i.bat). It identifies when administrative tools like sc.exe, taskkill.exe, or net.exe are used to stop or delete security agents such as Sysmon, Filebeat, SentinelAgent, or antivirus services. It also monitors for the execution of 'i.bat' via command shell, which is commonly associated with malicious automation or persistence.
Detects the creation of Image File Execution Options (IFEO) registry entries that associate a debugger with common security-related or monitoring binaries (e.g., Sysmon, SetACL, Filebeat). Attackers use this technique to hijack the execution flow of these security tools, effectively disabling or impairing their functionality (a form of defense evasion).
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender features, including real-time, behavior, and script scanning monitoring, as well as modifications to the 'DisableAntiSpyware' registry key, disabling system recovery via bcdedit, or execution of common scripts used to disable Windows Defender.
Detects indicators of Akira ransomware activity, including execution of the binary, dropping of ransom notes, renaming of files with .akira extension, and the use of vssadmin to delete volume shadow copies.
Detects coordinated efforts to impair host-based security by disabling Microsoft Defender via Set-MpPreference, terminating security agent processes (e.g., Sysmon, Filebeat, SentinelOne), stopping security services, or executing known security-disabling PowerShell scripts.
Detects the addition of Microsoft Defender exclusions (Path, Extension, or Process) via WMIC or PowerShell, followed by a file creation event within a suspicious directory (e.g., Temp, AppData, ProgramData) within 15 minutes. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass antivirus detection for malicious payloads.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Windows Defender settings by adding the root C:\ directory to the exclusion list. This behavior is indicative of Millenium RAT attempting to evade detection and maintain persistence on a compromised host.
Detects attempts to terminate security product processes, either through cross-process termination or by executing taskkill.exe targeting security product image names. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to disable endpoint protection software to evade detection.
This rule detects unauthorized modifications to the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in memory. It specifically monitors for calls to VirtualProtect or VirtualProtectEx when directed at amsi.dll or attempting to patch AmsiOpenSession, which is a common technique used by malware to disable AMSI scanning capabilities and evade EDR/AV inspection.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands 'Add-MpPreference' or 'Set-MpPreference' to add the entire C drive as an exclusion path for Windows Defender. This is a common technique used by attackers to disable security monitoring for the entire file system.
Detects cross-process injection (Process Injection) from a specifically identified 'Mixed Reality' process into svchost.exe, followed by suspicious module loads (non-system32 DLLs) within that svchost.exe instance. This behavior pattern is consistent with DcRAT and XenoRAT deployment activities using masquerading or hijacked processes.
Detects TLS callback injection using IMAGE_TLS_DIRECTORY structures
Detects attempts by scripts (spawned via wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe) to disable or interfere with security products. This includes disabling Microsoft Defender via registry modifications or PowerShell commands, disabling the Windows Firewall using netsh, and terminating or stopping security software processes and services using taskkill, sc, or net.
This rule detects attempts to inject code into or patch the Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) DLL (amsi.dll). It monitors for Sysmon Event IDs 8 (CreateRemoteThread) and 10 (ProcessAccess) initiated by suspicious processes like PowerShell or scripting hosts where the target is amsi.dll or where amsi.dll is being accessed in a way consistent with memory patching or hooking, aiming to bypass endpoint security scanning capabilities.
Detects evidence of the MYRA Linux RAT, which uses LD_PRELOAD hijacking via a malicious library located at /usr/local/lib/.libcache.so for persistence or execution flow hijacking. The rule also identifies the malware's practice of masquerading as the 'systemd-userdbd' service, often launched from a Node.js-based environment.
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