Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects suspicious activity related to the OpenSSH server suite, including unauthorized modifications to core SSH binaries by non-package-manager processes, sshd processes writing files to temporary directories (a common indicator of credential harvesting), and sshd execution from non-standard file paths which may indicate a trojanized binary or persistence mechanism.
Detects modifications to the 'Userinit' or 'Shell' values within the 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon' registry key, when initiated by processes running from 'AppData' or 'Temp' directories. These registry keys are commonly abused by malware to achieve persistence upon user logon.
Detects suspicious handle requests (Sysmon Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread, Event ID 10: ProcessAccess) targeting critical Windows processes lsass.exe, svchost.exe, and explorer.exe from unauthorized source processes. The rule specifically looks for suspicious access rights and filters out known legitimate system processes.
Detects cross-process memory injection patterns by correlating Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) logs for VirtualAllocEx (with executable protection) and WriteProcessMemory, combined with Sysmon image load events to verify the target process has loaded user32.dll, a common indicator for GUI-related processes often targeted for injection.
Detects indicators of persistence activity associated with the MYRA RAT. This includes unauthorized modifications to shared library preload mechanisms (/etc/ld.so.preload), creation of malicious shared objects in systemd user paths by common interpreter/shell processes, suspicious modification of cron job files by those same processes, and the execution of the 'systemd-userdbd' process from non-standard, unauthorized filesystem locations.
Detects suspicious handle requests (Sysmon Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread, Event ID 10: ProcessAccess) targeting critical Windows processes lsass.exe, svchost.exe, and explorer.exe from unauthorized source processes. The rule specifically looks for suspicious access rights and filters out known legitimate system processes.
Detects cross-process memory injection patterns by correlating Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) logs for VirtualAllocEx (with executable protection) and WriteProcessMemory, combined with Sysmon image load events to verify the target process has loaded user32.dll, a common indicator for GUI-related processes often targeted for injection.
This rule detects suspicious HTTP request bodies containing the 'LD_PRELOAD' environment variable assignment, targeting common temporary or writable directories. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to perform dynamic linker hijacking on a Linux system to inject malicious shared libraries into target processes.
This rule detects suspicious process injection activity characterized by a sequence of API calls (VirtualAlloc, CreateRemoteThread, WriteProcessMemory) in conjunction with the loading of 'mpr.dll'. This combination of events can indicate an attempt to inject malicious code into a process, potentially for evasion or privilege escalation. The rule filters out common legitimate processes to reduce false positives.
Detects the in-memory loading of 'Optimax.dll' and 'System Optimizer Ultimate.dll', which are identified as first and second-stage loaders respectively, associated with a steganographic Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) delivery chain. This chain is known to drop Remcos RAT and other malware families. The rule also identifies related dropper processes based on internal file names 'TuglaInsaatci' and 'oacY.exe', and suspicious API calls indicative of process injection techniques like CreateRemoteThread and ProcessHollowing.
This rule detects suspicious attempts by non-browser processes to access Google Chrome's process memory or create threads within it. This behavior is often indicative of process injection techniques used by malware to hook into or extract data from the browser, potentially for credential theft or session hijacking. The rule specifically looks for API calls like OpenProcess, NtCreateProcessEx, CreateRemoteThread, NtReadVirtualMemory, and ReadProcessMemory targeting 'chrome.exe' by processes other than Chrome itself or its legitimate update/driver executables.
Detects VirtualProtect API calls that change the memory protection of ntdll.dll to PAGE_READWRITE. This behavior is commonly associated with EDR unhooking techniques where malware removes hooks placed by security products to monitor system API calls.
This rule detects attempts to modify Windows Defender exclusions using PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference) or direct Registry manipulation. Adversaries often modify these exclusions to hide malicious files or directories from antivirus scanning, a technique used to impair defensive security tools.
This rule detects processes that load 'amsi.dll' while concurrently performing suspicious memory or API activities often associated with AMSI bypass techniques, such as calling 'VirtualProtect' to change memory permissions or using API resolution functions like 'AmsiOpenSession', 'GetProcAddress', or 'GetModuleHandleA'. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to disable or subvert the Antimalware Scan Interface.
Detects potential process injection attempts targeting svchost.exe by monitoring for specific memory manipulation and object handling APIs (ZwWriteVirtualMemory, NtDuplicateObject, ZwQueryAttributesFile). Also monitors for a synthetic process event containing a specific hardcoded command line string associated with potential malicious setup activity.
Detects unauthorized modification of the amsi.dll memory space using process access operations such as VirtualProtect. This behavior is a common technique used by malware and scripts to disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in-memory, allowing for the execution of malicious payloads without triggering security product alerts. The rule specifically monitors for sensitive process access granted to amsi.dll originating from high-risk parent processes such as PowerShell, script interpreters, and Microsoft Office applications.
Detects DcRAT loader attempts to disable AMSI scanning by patching the AmsiOpenSession function in amsi.dll memory using VirtualProtect, a technique associated with malware such as DcRAT and historical campaigns like Operation DragonReturn.
Detects cross-process injection techniques associated with Remcos RAT, such as VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, and remote thread creation. The rule identifies suspicious interaction with critical Windows system processes (e.g., explorer.exe, svchost.exe) by non-system processes, often indicative of malware injecting code to maintain persistence or evade detection.
Detects outbound network connections from the aspnet_compiler.exe process. This process is often abused by malware like LokiBot as a host for malicious payloads through process injection to establish C2 communication, as it has no legitimate need for external network connectivity.
Detects various methods employed by LCRYX ransomware to disable security software and firewall configurations. The rule identifies suspicious process executions, including PowerShell commands to modify Windows Defender settings, netsh commands to disable firewalls, sc.exe commands to stop security services, and the termination of various antivirus processes (e.g., MsMpEng.exe, avp.exe, bdagent.exe) via taskkill. It specifically monitors these actions when spawned from script hosts like wscript, cscript, or shells like powershell and cmd.
Detects attempts to stop, disable, delete, or configure the Sysmon service using standard administrative utilities (sc.exe, taskkill.exe, or PowerShell). Attackers often perform these actions to blind defensive visibility before executing further malicious activity.
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