Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects unauthorized processes modifying the registry value 'PONT_STRING' within the Outlook Options General key. This registry value controls the display of content download warnings in Microsoft Outlook. Modifying this key from a non-Outlook process is a technique used by threat actors, such as APT28, to bypass security warnings and facilitate the execution of malicious payloads or content within Outlook.
Detects the use of taskkill.exe or tskill.exe to forcibly terminate known security agent processes. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to disable endpoint protection software to evade detection during post-exploitation activities.
Detects the use of taskkill.exe or tskill.exe to forcibly terminate known security agent processes. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to disable endpoint protection software to evade detection during post-exploitation activities.
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes using taskkill, tskill, or PowerShell's Stop-Process cmdlet. This is a common technique used by adversaries to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) or antivirus (AV) agents on a compromised system to evade detection.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by monitoring for specific keywords associated with memory patching or tampering within the command lines of PowerShell, .NET-based binaries (dotnet.exe, csc.exe, msbuild.exe), and related processes. The rule specifically looks for strings like 'AmsiUtils', 'amsiInitFailed', and base64-encoded equivalents often used by offensive security tools to neutralize AMSI scanning capabilities.
Detects attempts to terminate security-related processes using taskkill, tskill, or PowerShell's Stop-Process cmdlet. This is a common technique used by adversaries to disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) or antivirus (AV) agents on a compromised system to evade detection.
Detects the execution of an injector process associated with MYRA RAT, specifically monitoring for ptrace-based process injection techniques. The rule identifies processes attempting to attach to other processes using system calls like PTRACE_ATTACH, PTRACE_PEEKDATA, PTRACE_POKEDATA, or process_vm_writev. It also flags the specific behavior of spawning a 'sleep 600' decoy process as an injection target.
Detects the use of vssadmin.exe or wmic.exe to delete Volume Shadow Copies. This is a common technique used by ransomware and other malware to prevent system recovery and impede incident response efforts.
Detection of the ark.x64.dll performing reflective code loading of the Cobalt Strike beacon into memory.
Identifies PowerShell utilizing ProcessHollowing.Execute to hijack MsBuild.exe.
Detects modifications to the Windows Defender exclusion list via registry keys. Adding exclusions can be used by attackers to hide malicious files, processes, or directories from antivirus scanning.
Detects attempts to bypass or disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell sessions by monitoring for common indicators such as manual manipulation of AmsiUtils, AmsiScanBuffer, or reflection-based patching techniques. This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to execute malicious code without security interference.
Detects attempts to bypass or disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell sessions by monitoring for common indicators such as manual manipulation of AmsiUtils, AmsiScanBuffer, or reflection-based patching techniques. This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to execute malicious code without security interference.
This rule detects attempts to unhook or tamper with Native APIs by monitoring 'WriteProcessMemory' calls targeting 'ntdll.dll'. This technique is often used by adversaries to evade EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) solutions by disabling their API monitoring capabilities.
This rule correlates multiple suspicious activities indicative of ransomware or destructive attacks. It detects a combination of volume shadow copy deletion, bulk file modifications, creation of suspicious scheduled tasks, and network connections occurring during periods of high file write activity. The rule triggers when multiple signals are observed or when specific high-fidelity destructive indicators are present.
Detects potential PPID spoofing and process injection activity associated with SharkLoader and Cobalt Strike. The rule monitors for cross-process injection into critical system processes or shell spawning from suspicious directories (AppData/Roaming or ProgramData/KasperskyLab), typically used by SharkLoader to stage payloads or perform parent process spoofing.
Detects instances where suspicious, non-Windows-standard processes (residing outside of System32 or SysWOW64) spawn or interact with critical system processes like svchost.exe or explorer.exe. This activity is indicative of process injection techniques used by malware loaders, such as SharkLoader, to execute malicious code within the context of trusted system processes to maintain persistence or elevate privileges.
Detects the Windows Update Service (wusvc.exe) loading advapi32.dll or performing suspicious API calls like GetProcAddress to resolve GetUserNameA. This behavior is atypical for the legitimate Windows Update service and may indicate process injection, credential harvesting, or tampering attempts.
Detects the loading of amsi.dll into a process, excluding common trusted security processes. This behavior is often indicative of an attempt to interact with or bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by non-security software, which can be a precursor to executing obfuscated scripts or malicious code.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving the loading of amsi.dll in conjunction with memory protection changes (VirtualProtectApiCall) that often signify an attempt to patch or disable the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in memory. It specifically monitors for remote thread creation, memory protection modifications involving 'AmsiScanBuffer', and executable memory page allocation within 30 seconds of loading amsi.dll, excluding known trusted Microsoft processes.
This rule detects unauthorized modifications to the ImagePath registry value for the Windows Update service (wusvc). By changing this path to a non-standard executable or DLL, an attacker can achieve persistence and elevate privileges by having their code execute when the service starts.
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